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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT IBADAN

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE Y. M. HASSAN

DATE: 23RD JULY, 2026                                               

SUIT NO: NICN/IB/70/2024

BETWEEN

DR. ADETUNJI TEMITOPE ADENIYI  --------------------------------- CLAIMANT

AND

BOWEN UNIVERSITY, IWO -------------------------------------------- DEFENDANT

(Of the Registered Trustees of Nigerian Baptist Convention)

REPRESENTATION

  • Oluwadamilare Awokoya with O.S. Mohammed for the Claimant.
  • Festus Adesiyan for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.         The Claimant instituted this suit against the Defendant via a General Form of Complaint and other Originating Processes dated and filed on 28th day of November, 2024 claiming the following reliefs:

  1. A DECLARATION that the Defendant's published words quoted in paragraph 26 of the Statement of Facts and contained in the Defendant's Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 written to Admiralty University of Nigeria is libelous of the Claimant. 
  2. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to write and cause to be delivered, a letter of apology to the Claimant and retracting the libelous statements and such other correspondence of any manner whatsoever on this subject matter, and the same letter of apology to be published in at least two widely read national dailies or newspapers, within seven days of the delivery of the Judgment of this Honourable Court. 
  3. AN ORDER mandating the payment of a sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One Billion Naira) as general damages in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant for act of defamation committed by the Defendant against the Claimant. 
  4. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, its servants, agents or privies from further writing, printing, publishing or causing to be written, printed or published the aforesaid words used therein or similar words defamatory of the Claimant. 
  5. An Award of the sum of Five Million Naira (N5,000,000.00) as cost of prosecuting this suit. 
  6. Post Judgment Interest at the rate of 10% from the date of judgment till liquidation of judgment.

2.         In response to the originating processes served on the Defendant, the Defendant filed statement of defence and other processes dated and filed on 18th March, 2025. Therein, the Defendant raised preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to hear and determine this suit on the grounds that:

  1. The suit discloses no reasonable cause of action, in that the words emphasized by the Claimant contain no defamatory or libelous words.
  2. The Claimant has been compensated for the termination of his employment in suit number NICN/ASB/06/2022, and is by this suit seeking for double compensation. 
  3. The facts and claims of the Claimant has been caught by the doctrine of Res Judicata, as the issues forming the fulcrum of this action had been previously litigated upon between the parties in NICN/ASB/06/2022, and the Claimant granted all his claims therein. Where: 
    1. The Claimant and Defendant were parties in suit no. NICN/ASB/06/2022. 
    2. The subject matter in NICN/ASB/06/2022 and this present suit is premised on the same issues, particularly the letter of 20th July, 2020.
    3. The Asaba Judicial Division of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Delivered a Judgment in the said suit. 

3.         The Claimant filed a reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence and Claimant’s additional written statement on oath dated and filed on 27th day of March, 2025.

4.         Upon settlement of pleadings, trial in this suit commenced on 23rd October, 2025 and was concluded on 19th January, 2026. Both the Claimant and the Defendant called one witnesses each.

CLAIMANT’S CASE

5.         The Claimant opened his case on 23rd October, 2025 testified as CW1 by adopting his statements on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered in evidence 19 documents out of which 4 were objected to by the Defendant’s Counsel and ruling on same was reserved. The documents were admitted and marked as Exhibits A to R2 respectively.

6.         Under cross examination, CW1 testified inter alia that he graduated from Bowen University and was employed there. That 2018/2019 session starts early October and lasts for 15 to 17 weeks. That the first semester of 2018/2019 session ends mid-February, 2019 when the senate consider the result. That his claim in Exhibits R1 and R2 were accepted by the Admiralty University. That he completed Exhibit N and all necessary signatures are contained administratively. That Exhibit N is an abridge copy of other attached documents. The original letter still remains the resignation letter with attachment as included in the resignation letter.

            Testifying further, CW1 stated that he submitted his resignation letter on 28th January, 2019. That there was no monetary dispute between him and Prof. P.O. Omaji of Admiralty University and also no misunderstanding between him and Prof. Patrick Osiegbu, Head of Department in Admiralty University. That the Admiralty University did not refused to assess his promotion as a reader. That Exhibit D is as a result of his private negotiation with his counsel.

7.         Under re-examination, CW1 stated that the commencement of 2018/2019 session is early October, 2018.


 

 

DEFENDANT’S CASE

8.         The Defendant opened its defence on 19th January, 2026 and called one Mr. Amos Abiodun Odunlade, the former Head in the Human Resource Department of the Defendant, who testified as DW1, adopted his statement on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered 12 documents in evidence out of which two (2) were objected to and ruling reserved. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits S1 to Z2 respectively.

9.         During cross examination of DW1, he stated amongst other things that the Defendant is on session now which started in October, 2025. That the new students will resume on 29th September, 2025, a week before the returning students. That this session will end in February, 2026. That he became a member of Human Resource Department in April, 2014 and he became the Head of that Department in 2019. That Exhibit U1 was written in response to the resignation of the Claimant. That they returned the Manager’s cheque of N20,000.00 to the Claimant and Exhibit L did not mention whether the other Manager’s cheque of N427,880.21 was returned to the Claimant. That the Claimant left without the acceptance of his notice of resignation.

Testifying further under cross examination, DW1 stated that the Claimant wrote a letter of resignation on 28th January, 2019 and the Defendant got the letter on 31st January, 2019 and since then, the Defendant did not see the Claimant again. That the Claimant filled exist form in the University as at 21st February, 2019. That the Claimant has two options to terminate his appointment which are three months’ notice or three months payments of salary in lieu of notice. That the Claimant was appointed as Lecturer (1) and rose through the ranks to Senior Lecturer in the University. That they stopped paying Claimant salary at the end of January, 2019 and he was taken out of staff email system at the end of January, 2019. That he is aware that the Claimant’s appointment with the Admiralty University was terminated and which led to court action at NICN Asaba in which the Defendant was a party. That when the Claimant stopped coming to the University, he was not issued query because he was not seen again. That the bursary deals with payment of salary and H.R. deals particularly with mailing system and Registrar office.

FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESSES

10.       At the close of trial and pursuant to the directive of the court, parties filed their respective final written addresses. The Defendant’s final written address is dated the 26th day of February, 2026 and filed same date. In it, Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Festus Adesiyan Esq., formulated four issues on preliminary objection for determination which are namely:

  1. Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter hinged on the tortious claim of Defamation which occurred outside the place of work?
  2. Whether this suit and the reliefs sought does not amount to double compensation in view of the Consent Judgment and Terms of Settlement and payout in NICN/ASB/06/2022? 
  3. Whether the suit of the Claimant is not caught by the doctrine of res judicata?
  4. Whether the Claimant has by his pleading presented a reasonable cause of action against the Defendant? 

Also, Defendant’s Counsel equally distilled three issues for determination on the substantive suit, to wit:

  1. Whether the letter of 22nd July, 2020 written by the Defendant contains any defamatory words or connotation to sustain an action in defamation? 
  2. If issue one is determined in the affirmative: 

- Whether the Defence of Justification will avail the Defendant with respect to the contents of the letter of 22nd July, 2020? 

  1. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought? 

ARGUMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

11.       On issue one of the preliminary objection, Defendant’s Counsel stated that jurisdiction of this Honourable Court was enumerated in Section 254(A-F) of the Alteration Act of 2010, where the jurisdiction of the court was spelt out. Consequently, Counsel contended that the tort of defamation does not fall within the jurisdiction of the issues which may be brought before the court for adjudication.

12.       Learned Counsel argued that jurisdiction is the life wire of suits placed before the Court, and the jurisdiction which was not statutorily given to a Court cannot be donated even by consent of parties. He relied on the case of OGUNMAKIN v. MILAD, OSUN STATE (1999) 3 NWLR (pt. 594) 261 at 265.

13.       Counsel further argued that the tortious claim of defamation is not part of the claims which the National Industrial Court can here or determine and referred the Court to the cases of:

  1. ECOBANK (NIG.) LTD. & ORS. v. IDRIS (2021) LPELR-52806 (CA);
  2. OLUSHOLA & ANOR v. SALIU (2021) LPELR-56027 (CA);
  3. KOSEMANI v. ADEKUGBE (unreported) NICN/IB/25/2025, ruling delivered on the 2nd December, 2025. 
  4. ALOYSIUS v. DIAMOND BANK PLC (2015) 58 NLLR (pt. 199) 92;
  5. OKEKE & ORS. v. UNION BANK (2011) 22 NLLR (pt. 61) 161 at 183;
  6. DR. AYO AKINYEMI v. CRAWFORD UNIVERSITY (2011) 22 NLLR (pt. 61) 90 at 110.

14.       In another submission, Counsel stated that the phrase, ‘and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith’ as used in Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) is now wide enough to entertain the tort of defamation, as decided in the cases enumerated above. He added that an interpretation that opens its arms to the tort of defamation as claimed in this suit, would invariable go at variance to the intent of the Court to be one of exclusive and enumerated jurisdiction, and bring the jurisdiction of the Court into direct conflict with the jurisdiction of the State High Court as provided for in Section 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 

15.       To this end, Counsel stated that in the interpretation of statutes the intention of the legislature must be borne in mind at all times, and the mischief which the legislation seeks to cure must be paramount in any interpretation. He referred the Court to the case of ADESANOYE v. ADEWOLE (2006) All FWLR pt. 340 pg. 1000 at 1023 para. B.

In addition, Counsel stated that indeed from the letters and spirit of Sections 254 A-F and the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, it is clear that it is not the intention of the legislature to open the flood gate of this Honourable Court to any suit wearing the toga of ‘employment related’. 

16.       In his final submission on issue one, Counsel submitted that it must be emphasized that he letter of 22nd July, 2020 was not written in the cause of the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant, but at a time when the Claimant had recused himself from the services of the Defendant, albeit not properly for a period exceeding a year. Invariably, it did not occur during the cause of the Claimant’s employment, and falls outside the issues upon which this Court can adjudicate on. 

17.       Counsel argued issue two and four together and contended that the existence of NICN/ASB/06/2022 Between: DR. ADETUNJI TEMITOPE ADENIYI v. (1) ADMIRALTY UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA (ADUN) (2) PROFESSOR PAUL O. OMAJI (3) BOWEN UNIVERSITY, was brought to the attention of this Honourable Court. The pleadings in the were duly admitted in evidence as Exhibits Y, X and Z1, and the consent judgment and terms of settlement admitted as Exhibits R1, R2 and Z2, was placed before the Honourable Court. 

He stated that in a plethora of cases the Court of Appeal and the Apex Court have denounced acts of parties seeking for double portion, and even though a party may seek for it, the Courts in Nigeria have always leaned against granting such reliefs. That assuming but not conceding that the Defendant indeed defamed the Claimant, the law and indeed justice would still lean against and frown upon acts of seeking for double portion. In this respect, he referred this Honourable Court to the cases of OTTO v. MABAMIJE (2004) 17 NWLR (pt. 903) 489 at p. 507 paras. G-H; U.B.N. v. EMOLE (2001) 18 NWLR (pt. 745) 501; LCC v. UNACHUKWU (1978) 3.SC 199; EKPU v. FAGBAMI (1978) 3 SC 709; ARMEL'S TRANSPORT v. TRANSCO (NIG.) LTD. (1974) 11 SC 237.

18.       Arguing further, Learned Counsel stated that the Claimant in this respect, had and agreed to a settlement out of Court as seen in Exhibits R1, R2 and Z2, where he accepted to be paid monetary benefits, and which was made the judgment of this Court therein, and which matter partly also borders on defamation as seen in reliefs C, I, J and K of Exhibit X.

19.       Learned Defendant’s Counsel contended moreso that the Claimant who has been compensated monetarily in NICN/ASB/06/2022 for defamatory reliefs, against parties which included the Defendant in this suit, cannot be allowed to claim for double compensation as claimed in this suit. Reliance was placed on the case of YISI (NIG.) LTD. v. TRADE BANK PLC (2013) 8 NWLR (pt. 1357) 522 at pp. 548-549, paras. D-B.

20.       In conclusion on issues one and four, Counsel contended that the same bundle of facts which resulted in the cause of action and the eventual settlement in the suit in NICN/ASB/06/2022 is what has been rebranded in this present suit. That it is trite law that a party who has set up a mischief or pursued and irregularity cannot benefit from it and that the words complained of by the Claimant in paragraph 26 of his statement of facts are not defamatory and did not disparage the Claimant in any way, thus rubbing the Claimant of any cause of action in this suit. Learned Counsel commended the cases of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION v. ABUBAKAR (2006) 6 MJSC, 1 at 27, paras A-C; PROGRESSIVE ACTION CONGRESS v. INEC & 3 ORS (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 478) 260 at 325, para. E.

21.       On issue three of the notice of preliminary objection, Counsel argued that the cause of action in this suit was already decided upon by this Honourable Court sitting in the Asaba Judicial Division, thereby falling squarely in the boundaries of the doctrine of res judicata. He relied on the case of EDEM v. ISHIE (2023) 2 NWLR (pt. 1869) 507.

22.       In another contention, Counsel stated that the Claimant in this case, also as the Claimant in NICN/ASB/06/2022 claimed for reliefs in tort and particularly defamation, against Defendants which included the Defendant in this case (as the 3rd Defendant in NICN/ASB/ 06/2022), and particularly as seen in reliefs C, I, J and K of Exhibit X which is the Claimant’s Amended Statement of Facts. Consequently, Counsel submitted that it is trite law, that immediately parties has had a shot on a subject matter before a Court, the same parties cannot re-litigate the same subject matter before another Court. Reliance was placed on the case of ARUBO v. AIYELERU (1993) 3 NWLR (pt. 280) 126. 

23.       Learned Counsel argued further that the issues presented before this Honourable Court having been made an issue in an earlier suit, cannot now be re-litigated upon. He relied on the case of ADEYEFA v. BAMGBOYE (2014) 11 NWLR, (pt. 1419) 520 at 538, paras. D-E; NWOSU v. UDEAJA (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 125) 188.

24.       It is also the submission of the Defendant’s Counsel that it is settled that the effect of a successful plea of the res jidicata robs the Honourable Court of the jurisdiction to hear or determine the present suit which is in violation, as in this case. In this respect, reference was made to the cases of OGBOLOSINGHA v. B.S.I.E.C. (2015) 6 NWLR (pt. 1455) 311 at 334, para. G; MAYA v. OSHUNTOKUN (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 723) 62 at 80, paras. C-D.

            To this end, Counsel urged this Honourable Court to so hold and dismiss this action on the grounds that:

  1. This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to preside upon tortious defamation.
  2. This suit offends the rule against double compensation.
  3. The Claimant has not presented a reasonable cause of action against the Defendant.
  4. This suit offends the doctrine of res judicata.

ARGUMENTS OF ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE SUIT

25.       In arguing issue two, Counsel submitted that in an action for defamation, it behooves on the court to test the defamatory words to see whether they are indeed defamatory of the Claimant from the onset of the judgment. He relied on the case of KATTO v. C.B.N (1999) 6 NWLR (pt. 607) 390.

Consequently, Counsel referred the court to Exhibit L and argued that statement that the Claimant Absconded and Failed to Properly Disengage from the services of the Defendant does not in any way disparage the Claimant, and bring him to disrepute in the face of the reasonable man on the street.

            Reference was made to the case of STANDARD CHATERED BANK (NIG) LTD v. AMEH (2022) 15 NWLR (pt. 1854) 559 at 599-600.

26.       In his further argument, Learned Defendant’s Counsel stated that from the documents tendered before this Honourable Court as Exhibits X and Y, it is clear that the Claimant had running issues with Admiralty University before their receipt of the letter of 20th July, 2020, wherein there were monetary allegations flying around between the Claimant and Admiralty University, on one hand. On the other hand were there the issues relating to the character of the Claimant in the employment of Admiralty University of Nigeria as seen in paragraph 7 of Exhibit Y, which made reference to “Claimant’s cantankerous character”, also “overly ambitious, confrontational, stubborn and disrespectful of his superiors”, which “negative character earned him several invitations from the disciplinary committee of the 1st Defendant”. 

27.       It is the contention of the Defendant that the contents of Exhibit L, in the context in which it was made was no in way defamatory of the Claimant, as no reasonable man on the street would think less of the Claimant on the wordings complained about. He referred the court to the cases of C.S.S. & D.F. LTD. v. SCHLUMBERGER (NIG.) LTD. (2018) 15 NWLR | (pt. 1642) 238 at p. 254, para. A; OKOLO v. MID-WEST NEWSPAPER CORP. (1977) 1 SC 33; DUMBO v. IDUGBOE (1983) 1 SCNLR 29; AGBANELO v. UBN LTD. (2000) 7 NWLR (pt. 666) 534; ESIKA v. MEDOLU (1997) 2 NWLR (pt. 485) 54 (p. 68, paras. C-D; DIN v. AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS OF (NIG.) LTD. (1990) 3 NWLR (pt. 139) 392.

28.       In his final submission on issue one, Counsel urged this Honourable Court to find that the words complained about is not defamatory of the character of the Claimant in the context in which it was made, and dismiss the suit forthwith. Reliance was placed on the case of ANATE v. SANUSI (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 725) 542 at 556, para. H.

29.       On issue two, Counsel submitted that it is trite law that justification is a complete defence for a claim of defamation, in that a Claimant cannot be allowed to benefit from a complaints with respect to a character which is actually his. Reliance was placed on the case of A.S.U.U. v. OGUNSANWO (2014) 17 NWLR (pt. 1437) 475 (p. 493, paras. D-F. He added that in this respect, assuming without conceding that the words complained about by the Claimant is libelous, establishing the truth of the statement is a complete defence to the suit.

30.       Learned Counsel argued and referred the court to Exhibits L, G, S, T, M, V and the testimonies of the Claimant under cross examination and stated that the failure of the Claimant to fulfill th terms of his employment in Exhibits G and T before leaving for Admiralty University of Nigeria as demonstrated above, will coast home the defence of justification on behalf of the Defendant. He cited in this respect the case of DIN v. AFRICAN NEWSPAPER LTD (1990) 3 NWLR (pt.139) 392 and at 409, paras. D-E & H.

31.       Arguing finally on issue two, Counsel urged the court to find and hold that the failure of the Claimant to abide by the terms of his employment in Exhibits G and T before making himself scarce from the employment of the Defendant, justified the words complained of in Exhibit L before this Honourable Court.

32.       On issue three, Counsel contended that the Claimant is not a witness of truth and his evidence should be discountenanced with in its totality as being unreliable and tainted. Learned Counsel referred the court to testimonies of the Claimant under cross examination and Exhibit N and contended that the witness lied under oath in that neither the Bursary Department nor the Human Resource Department signed Exhibit N, contrary to the testimonies of the Claimant.

33.       Arguing issue three further, Counsel stated that having given false testimony, the Honourable Court is humbly urged to disregard the entire evidence of the Claimant as being preposterous and an attempt to derail the cause of justice. This is more because a bearer of false evidence cannot be ascribed credibility, which would leave this claims of the Claimant bare, and un-grantable. He relied on the case of DAGGASH v. BULAMA (2004) 14 NWLR (pt. 892) 144 at p. 250, paras. D-E; ONIBUDU v. AKIBO (1982) 7 SC 60; ODIVE v. OBOR (1974) 1 SC 23; NNAIIOFOR v, UKONU (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 36) 505. 

34.       Again, Counsel contended that the statement complained about by the Claimant is not only not defamatory, there is justification for the making of the statement, and by virtue of the Consent Judgment of the Court in Exhibit R1 and R2 the Claimant’s suit will amount to double compensation. 

35.       In another submission, Counsel stated that it is trite that a party will not be allowed to benefit from his own irregularity, that in this respect, the Claimant who failed to properly disengage from the service of the Defendant, cannot in law or equity be allowed to benefit from that same failure to fulfill the terms of the contractual agreement between the parties, and thereafter be granted the reliefs sought in this suit. He referred the Court to the cases of ADEOGUN v. FASHOGBON (2008) 17 NWLR (pt. 1115) 149 (p. 174, para E);  OILFIELD SUPPLY CENTRE LTD. v. JOHNSON (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 58) 625; SODIPO v. LEMMINKAINEN Oy (No. 1) (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 547; AFRICAN PETROLEUM LTD. v. OWODUNNI (1991) 8 NWLR (pt. 210) 391; NICON HOTELS LTD. v. N.D.C. LTD. (2007) 13 NWLR (pt. 1051) 237 (pp. 271-272, paras. H-A).

            Consequently, Counsel stated that the Claimant has claimed for the sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One Billion Naira) as damages for defamation is ludicrous, when in actual fact he had been compensated for the same head of claim in NICN/ASB/06/2022 as seen in Exhibit R1 and R2.

36.       On relief (e) claimed by the Claimant, Counsel contended that Claimant should bear the cost of his Counsel, and cannot push the same to the Defendant, and where he wants to push the same to the Defendant, it does not have any support in law, is incompetent and is not grantable, and urged the Court to tow the path of the law. He referred to the case of IHEKWOABA v. ACB LIMITED (1998) 10 NWLR (pt. 571) 590 at 610-611, paras. H-A; GUINESS NIGERIA PLC v. NWOKE (2000) NWLR (pt. 689) pg. 135 at 150.

            To this extend, Counsel urged the court to so hold in also dismissing this head of claim and the entire case of the Claimant.

37.       In his final submission, Learned Defendant’s Counsel urged the court to dismiss the claims of the Claimant on the following ground that:

  1. This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear or determine tortious claims of Defamation. 
  2. This suit amounts to an attempt to seek for double compensation in the light of the consent judgment in Exhibit R1 and R2. 
  3. The subject matter of this suit has been previously litigated upon, and a judgment given before this Honourable Court sitting in Asaba in NICN/ASB/06/2022 as seen in Exhibits X, Y and Z1. 
  4. The Claimant does not have a reasonable cause of action against the Defendant. 
  5. The words complained about by the Claimant are not defamatory, and does not in any way ridicule the Claimant. 
  6. The words compiained about by the Claimant are true, and the defence of justification will avail the Defendant. 
  7. The Claimant is not a witness of truth and his evidence upon being discountenanced, will leave the claim of the Claimant bare and ungrantable.
  8. The reliefs of the Claimant are an affront to either of reason, justice or established laws.

38.       The Claimant’s final written address is dated 10th day of April, 2026 and filed on 13th day April, 2026. In it, Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Oluwadamilare Awokoya Esq., distilled two issues for determination which are as follows:

  1. Whether or not the Claimant has succeeded in proving his case by preponderance of evidence as to be entitled to the grant of the reliefs prayed for in the Statement of Facts. 
  2.  Whether or not this Honourable Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 

39.       In arguing the issues, Counsel submitted on issue one that the Claimant has succeeded in proving his case by preponderance of evidence as to be entitled to the grant of the reliefs prayed for in the statement of facts. Reference was made to section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

40.       Counsel urged that the matter before this Honourable Court is hinged on the contents of the Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 and invite the Court to meticulously examine the contents of the said Letter with fine-tooth comb together with the circumstances of the exit of the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant and then decide if the content of the Letter constitute a publication of injurious falsehood, hence defamatory. 

41.       On the nature and principle of injurious falsehood, Counsel argued that the grievance of the Claimant in this suit is Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 written by the Defendant to Admiralty University of Nigeria which contained injurious falsehood calculated by the Defendant to discredit the Claimant in his office and profession. Conversely, the said Letter exposed the Claimant to ridicule, leading to the termination of his appointment and also injured him in his professional dealings, which is his lecturing profession.

            Reliance was placed on the cases of STANBIC IBTC BANK v. LONGTERM GLOBAL CAPITAL LTD & ORS (2021) LPELR-55610(CA) pp. 89-90, paras. E-G; OKPANACHI v. PUNCH (NIG) LTD. & ORS (2021) LPELR-54887(CA) p. 21-22, paras. A-B.

42.       On the words complained of are untrue, Counsel referred the court to Exhibits L, G and also T and submitted that Exhibit L written by the Defendant to Admiralty University of Nigeria is riddled with falsehood and same is injurious to the Claimant. In this respect, Counsel cited the case of PROMASIDOR (NIG) LTD. & ANOR v. ASIKHIA (2019) LPELR-46443(CA).

Also, Counsel contended that the grouse of the Defendant against the Claimant stemmed from the fact that the Claimant did not give her 3 months written notice, but only paid for 3 months in lieu of notice. On this score, the Defendant then concluded that the Claimant did not disengage properly. That the position of the Defendant, leading to the allegation of improper disengagement, is not true. 

In this respect, Counsel submitted that the Claimant disengaged his employment with the Defendant properly. He referred the court to the evidence-in-chief of the Claimant at paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 17, and 19 of the Statement on Oath filed on the 28th day of November, 2024.

Similarly, Counsel referred the court to paragraph 17 of the statement of defence and contended that it is not in dispute that the Claimant's department, Claimant's faculty, University Library, University Works and Services Section, University Audit Section, University Hospital, University ICT and University CICS, all of the Defendant cleared the Claimant in pursuance of his resignation. The Bursary and the Human Resource Department did not sign the exit form but the Bursary Department stopped the salary of the Claimant upon receipt of the Letter of Resignation in January, 2019 and the Human Resource Department took the Claimant off the staff email upon the receipt of the Letter of Resignation of the Claimant in January, 2019 and submitted that the Human Resource Department and the Bursary Department had, by their conduct, impliedly accepted the resignation of the Claimant. In this respect, Counsel cited the cases of FGN & ORS v. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD. (2002) LPELR-3172 (SC) pp. 18-18, paras. A-B; ABDUL v. SHEKWOLO & ORS (2022) LPELR-56682 (CA) pp. 21-21, paras A-B; SUNDAY v. OLUGBENGA & ORS (2008) LPELR-4995 (CA) pp. 13-13, paras. B-D.

43.       On the second issue is the falsity of abscondment from the service of the Defendant. Counsel submitted that it is trite that abscondment generally means sudden abandonment of employment without notice, showing an intention not to return. There is plethora of evidence by the Defendant that it received notice of resignation of the Claimant which negated her position that the Claimant absconded from duty. The position of the Claimant is that he gave a notice of resignation and also filled the relevant disengagement form. 

Submitting further, Counsel stated that the receipt of the resignation letter of the Claimant by the Defendant, endorsement of his exit form, stoppage of his salary and removal from staff email are sufficient evidence of notice of the resignation of the Claimant. He pointed out that the statement of the Defendant in the Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 admitted as Exhibit L is not only false but malicious and urged the Court to so hold.

            He referred the court to paragraph 7 of the Defendant’s witness statement on oath and testimonies of DW1 under cross-examination as well as Exhibit V.

To this end, Counsel submitted that the words written against the Claimant in the Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 are not true because the Claimant properly disengaged himself from the services of the Defendant, he did not abscond and never displayed any unethical conduct. 

44.       That they were published maliciously, Counsel contended that there is no dispute as to the publication of the letter dated 22nd July, 2020 and submitted that the malice exhibited by the Defendant against the Claimant was the vindictiveness shown in reckless disregard to the legal rights of the Claimant. The Defendant used the publication to show her spite, ill-will and corrupt motive against the Defendant. The Defendant authored Exhibit L in complete departure from his duty to the Claimant and expressed an unjustifiable intention to inflict injury on the Claimant. 

45.       The Learned Claimant’s Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 29-54 of the Claimant’s evidence-in-chief and contended that the Claimant suffered severe damage as a result of the unwarranted publication of Exhibit L to Admiralty University of Nigeria. Reference was made to Exhibit I. Moreso, Counsel referred the court to paragraph 37 and 46(b) of the statement of defence and stated that it is an admission that the Claimant suffered injury. He cited the case of PROMASIDOR (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. ASIGHIA (2019) LPELR-46443(CA) page 9-21, paras. E-B; CROSS RIVER STATE NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION v. ONI & ORS (1995) LPELR-898(SC) pp. 33-33, paras. D-G.

            Consequently, Counsel submitted that Defendant defamed the Claimant with her letter dated 22nd day of July, 2020 admitted as Exhibit L and should be made to pay for her recklessness.

46.       On claim for writing of letter of apology and retracting the libelous statement, Counsel submitted that it is appropriate in this case to grant the relief for the Defendant to write an apology retracting the defamatory words in at least two widely read national dailies or newspapers. Reliance was placed on the case of PUNCH (NIG) LTD. & ORS v. EWANG (2025) LPELR-82497(CA) 41 at 43, paras. F-B.

47.       On general damages, Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to general damages in the circumstances of this case and that damages are pecuniary compensation obtainable by a successful party in an action for a wrong which is either tort. In this regard, reliance was placed on the case of ASESA v. EKWENEM (2009) 3 NWLR (pt. 1158) 410, 434; MAMMAN v. SALAUDEEN (2005) LPELR-1833(SC) OR (2006) 135 LRCN, 859, 899-900; GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS LTD. v. AJEI (2011) LPELR-1343(SC).

48.       On claim of solicitor fee as cost of prosecuting this suit, Counsel referred the court to paragraph 55 of the Claimant’s statement on oath and Exhibit D and submitted that the Claimant has discharged the onus placed on him by the law having specifically pleaded necessary facts sodified and his claim with the tendering of receipt of payment which was admitted as Exhibit D. In this regard, Counsel cited the cases of BASHIR MOH’D (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. GIDALLE & ORS (2023) LPELR-61561(CA) 52-54, paras. D-E; FCMB v. ABDULGAFARU & CO. LTD & ORS (2025) LPELR-82795(SC).

49.       On post judgment interest, Counsel submitted that this case is a suitable one for the grant of post judgment interest as the Claimant has claimed. He cited in the respect the case of CAPPA & D. ALBERTO (NIG) PLC v. N.D.I.C. (2021) LPELR-53379(SC) and Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court Rules.

50.       On the whole, Counsel urged the court to grant all the claims of the Claimant as contained in the Statement of Facts.

51.       On the other hand, the Defendant filed Reply on Points of Law to the Claimant’s final written address. The said Reply on Points of Law is dated the 27th day of April, 2026 and filed on 28th day of April, 2026.

COURT’S DECISION

52.       I have taken my time and studied carefully the originating processes filed by the parties in this suit and I evaluated the entire evidence adduced both oral and documentary. I also gone through the final written addresses and reply on points of law and considered Counsel arguments while adopting their respective final written addresses. Having done all these, it is therefore my humble view that the various issues formulated by Counsel in their written addresses can be summed up into one which is whether or not the Claimant has proved his case as required by law to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

53.       Before I dwell into the issue for determination, it is important to state in the beginning that from the state of pleadings and evidence led by the parties, it is not in dispute that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant as shown in Exhibit E, F, and H, which are Offer of Temporary Appointment, Renewal of Temporary Appointment, Offer of Appointment and Appointment as Vice-Dean respectively. It is equally in evidence that the Claimant tendered his resignation as shown in Exhibit M which is Resignation Letter, Exhibit N which is Disengagement Clearance Certificate, Exhibit O which is Exit Form, Exhibits P1 and P2 which are Flat Handover Reports and Exhibit Q which is Bowen University I.D Card of the Claimant.

            However, the grouse of the Claimant against the Defendant is that having resigned his appointment with the Defendant, he got another appointment with the Admiralty University of Nigeria which was terminated as shown in Exhibit I and the said termination was as a result of a letter written by the Defendant to the Admiralty University of Nigeria i.e. Exhibit L, wherein the Defendant alleged inter alia that the Claimant did not disengaged properly from their University before taken up job with the Admiralty University of Nigeria. Therefore, the Claimant is alleging that the said Exhibit L is defamatory and is seeking for the reliefs as endorsed in the General Form of Complaint. In other words, the Claimant’s case against the Defendant is principally centred on defamatory.

54.       It should be pointed out that the Defendant in defence of this suit, raised preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The Defendant’s preliminary objection on jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to hear and determine this suit is on the ground amongst others that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine case of defamation and that this case of the Claimant is caught up by the doctrine of res judicata. I consider these to be the main grounds of the preliminary objection, which I shall resolve before proceeding to determine the merit of this suit.

55.       Starting with the first ground which is whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine case on defamation. It is the argument of the Defendant’s Counsel that the tort of defamation does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. He referred the court to Section 254(C) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and submitted that it is not wide enough to entertain the tort of defamation.

56.       Learned Defendant’s Counsel further argued that an interpretation that opens it arms to the tort of defamation as claimed in this suit, would invariably go at variance to the intent of the court to be one of exclusive and enumerated jurisdiction, and bring the jurisdiction of the court into direct conflict with the jurisdiction of the State High Court as provided for in Section 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 

Consequently, Counsel submitted that the tortious claim of defamation is not part of the claims which the National Industrial Court can hear or determine. Reliance was placed on the cases of ECOBANK (NIG.) LTD. & ORS. v. IDRIS (2021) LPELR-52806 (CA); OLUSHOLA & ANOR v. SALIU (2021) LPELR-56027 (CA); ALOYSIUS v. DIAMOND BANK PLC (2015) 58 NLLR (pt. 199) 92; OKEKE & ORS. v. UNION BANK (2011) 22 NLLR (pt. 61) 161 at 183; DR. AYO AKINYEMI v. CRAWFORD UNIVERSITY (2011) 22 NLLR (pt. 61) 90 at 110; KOSEMANI v. ADEKUGBE (unreported) NICN/IB/25/2025, ruling delivered on the 2nd December, 2025.

57.       On the other hand, in response, the Claimant’s Counsel argued that it is trite law that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the Claimant’s case and submitted that this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain a tortious claim of defamation. He contended that this suit is embedded with the factual situation on which the claim is anchored on employment dispute. He referred the court to Section 254(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and the cases of DANTANI v. BALA (2025) LPELR-83081(SC); ELEGBE & ANOR v. HP INT’L SCHOOLS LTD & ORS (2020) LPELR-83245(SC) pp. 49-52, paras. F-A. 

To this end, Counsel urged this Honourable Court to hold that it has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

58.       In reply on points of law, Defendant’s Counsel submitted that defamation being a tortious claim must be an ancillary claim, which is inextricably connected to the principal relief for this Honourable Court to have jurisdiction to entertain it. In that respect, Counsel further submitted that the case of the Claimant is not one within the jurisdiction of this court to determine. He also cited the case of ELEGBE & ANOR v. HP INT’L SCHOOLS LTD & ORS relied upon by the Claimant’s Counsel also.

59.       I have considered the arguments for and against the issue of whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit. It is a notorious fact in law that jurisdiction is the pillar of adjudication. In the recent case of ARIBISALA v. AMCON (2025) LPELR-80536(SC) at (pp. 14-15 para. C), the Supreme Court aptly captured the essence of Jurisdiction thus:

“There is no gainsaying that Jurisdiction plays a foremost role in the adjudicatory process. The undeniable importance and fundamental nature of Jurisdiction is why it can be raised at any stage of proceedings, even on appeal to this Court, and it can also be raised by a Court suo motu. Nevertheless, once it comes to the attention of any of the parties or the Court itself that Jurisdiction may elude the Court, the party who notices same or the Court ought to raise the issue straightaway so that the anomaly can be brought to an end immediately. This is to avoid a situation where parties, Counsel and the Court would have expended fruitless time and effort over a matter, only to realise subsequently that the Court is bereft of Jurisdiction, Where a Court conducts a case in the absence of Jurisdiction, the entire proceedings conducted, including the judgment or ruling, if any, would amount to nothingness, a nullity and an exercise in futility, no matter how brilliantly conducted. See IFEANYI v. OGBA & ORS (2022) LPELR-58787(SC); KAYILI v. YILBUK & ORS (2015) LPELR-24323(SC); AJAYI v. ADEBIYI & ORS (2012) LPELR-7811(SC).”

60.       Furthermore, it is settled law that in determining jurisdiction of court, the only document court will examine is the originating process, in the instant case, the statement of facts. This position of law was re-echoed by the Apex Court in the case of A.G. OF ABIA STATE & ORS v. A.G. OF THE FEDERATION (2025) LPELR-81496 per CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, JSC at pages 35-36, paras. E-A, where it was held thus:

“It is worth reaffirming the settled principle of law that in determining whether or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim/case, the appropriate documents to consider are the originating processes, which in this case, are the Originating Summons, Affidavit in support of same and the accompanying Written Address. See ADETAYO & ORS v. ADEMOLA & ORS (2010) LPELR-155(SC), JAMES v. INEC & ORS (2015) LPELR-24494(SC), ADEYEMI VS. OPEYORI (1976) 9- 10 SC. 31, TUKUR VS. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt.117) 592, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KWARA STATE VS. OLAWALE (1993) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.272) 645 and ONUORAH VS. KADUNA REFINING & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD. (2005) 6 N.W.L.R. (Pt.921) 393 at 404.”

            Similarly, Court of Appeal following the Supreme Court path where it equally held in the case of KIBIYA v. TUNGA (2024) LPELR-61734 per MOHAMMED DANJUMA, JCA at pages 9-10, paras. F-A that:

“The law is settled that to determine the jurisdiction of the Court or the grouse of the Plaintiff, the document the Court would consider is the Statement of Claim.”

61.       It is without doubt that the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court is enumerated in Section 254(C)(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). I need not reproduce same here.

62.       Now, a carefully examination of the Claimant’s statement of facts will show clearly that the Claimant’s case is centred on defamation. For clarity and ease of reference, let me refer to paragraphs 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 36, 41, 46, and 49, of the Statement of Facts which I will reproduce hereunder.

            Paragraph 20 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that he resigned his appointment with the Defendant in line with his Letter of Appointment dated 16th November, 2017.”

            Paragraph 22 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that he secured employment with Admiralty University of Nigeria and worked meritoriously in its service.”

            Paragraph 23 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that on the 10th of March, 2021, after he had worked for Admiralty University of Nigeria for about two years, he received a query vide a Letter dated March 10, 2021 and tagged Re: Case of Gross Misconduct: Dr ADETUNJI, Temitope Adeniyi written under the hand of Mr. Kingsley O. Aduga, the Acting Registrar of Admiralty University of Nigeria stating that Admiralty University of Nigeria received a complaint from the Defendant vide a Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 that the Claimant absconded from the service of the Defendant and he did not disengage properly from the employment of the Defendant before taking up appointment with Admiralty University of Nigeria and Admiralty University of Nigeria requested an explanation from the Claimant. Admiralty University of Nigeria subsequently gave the Claimant a photocopy of the Defendant's Letter dated 22nd July, 2020. Copies of Admiralty University of Nigeria’s Letter dated March 10, 2021 and the Defendant’s Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 are hereby pleaded and will be relied on during the trial of this suit.”

            Paragraph 24 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that the Defendant had no basis in writing the Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 to Admiralty University of Nigeria.”

            Paragraph 25 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that the Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 authored by the Defendant and sent to Admiralty University of Nigeria is a malicious falsehood. The letter is injurious and defamatory of the character of the Claimant.”

Paragraph 33 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that the allegation of the Defendant against him which borders on improper disengagement from employment and abscondment from duty, contained in its Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 and whose extract was produced in paragraph 26 above, is malicious falsehood, hence, libelous.”

            Paragraph 36 reads thus:

“The Claimant further states that the accusation of the Defendant of improper disengagement from its employment and abscondment is false and malicious and the accusation was caused to be printed and published by the Defendant to Admiralty University of Nigeria in order to lower him in the estimation of the management of Admiralty University of Nigeria and to ruin the Claimant's goodwill, reputation and profession.”

            Paragraph 41 reads thus:

“The Claimant states that the defamatory statements contained in the Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 have, in no small measure, disparaged, belittled, traduced and stupendously cast aspersion to the hard-earned image of the Claimant who is a Reader, a top rank staff of Admiralty University of Nigeria, as it came almost about the time the Claimant was waiting to be assessed as a full professor.”

            Paragraph 46 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers that the Letter of the Defendant dated 22nd July, 2020 adversely affected his reputation as his professional integrity suffered considerable distress and embarrassment.”

            Paragraph 49 reads thus:

“The Claimant avers further that unless the Defendant makes public apology to him, which apology is to be communicated to Admiralty University of Nigeria and all other Universities that the Defendant has informed that the Claimant absconded from his duties and did not disengage well and a publication is published in reputable newspapers outfit with National spread, the Claimant's reputation will remain soiled in the academic community and in the entire country and his professional career will continue to suffer.”

63.       From the foregoing and as pointed out earlier, no doubt the Claimant’s case is centred on defamation in view of the content of Exhibit L i.e. Letter dated 22nd July, 2020 written by the Defendant to the Admiralty University of Nigeria. In other words, the Claimant alleged that the content of Exhibit L is defamatory of his character.

64.       At this juncture, the question that comes to mind is whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine cases on tort of defamation.

65.       The Supreme Court has answered this question clearly in a recent case relied upon by both Counsel in this suit, which is a case of ELEGBE & ANOR v. HP INT’L SCHOOLS LTD & ORS (2026) LPELR-83245, per STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, JSC at 25-31, paras. E-C, where it was held thus:

“Defamation, it should be noted remains a distinct tortious cause of action, historically and jurisprudentially rooted in the general law of tort. The mere fact that an allegedly defamatory statement is made in the context of employment ordinarily, does not without more transmute such a claim into a labour or employment dispute within the contemplation of Section 254C of the Constitution. The only bend is if defamation comes as an ancillary claim to labour or employment matters and the Court from the facts assesses it to be inextricably tied or bound up with the main claims before the Court, the Court can accommodate it under Section 254C1(a) as a cause or claim connected with labour matters. I am guided on this issue by the decision of this Court in Egbuonu v. Bornu Radio Television Corporation (1997) LPELR - 1040 (SC), where Iguh, JSC, held thus: "The law is now settled that where ancillary or incidental claim or claims are so inextricably tied to or bound up with the main claims before the Court in a suit, a Court of law cannot adjudicate over them where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims if such incidental or ancillary claims cannot be determined without a determination at the same time of the main claims or where the determination of such incidental or ancillary claims must necessarily involve a consideration or determination of the main claims. See Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 at 548; Alhaji Umaru Tukur v. The Government of Taraba State and Others (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) at 549" A further guide can be scooped from this Court's decision in Adenuga & Ors. v. Odumeru & Ors. (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 184, where Karibi-Whyte, JSC, held thus: "Hence in an ancillary relief which the application subject-matter of this preliminary objection, is, the relief must fall within the purview of the claim. This is because the remedy is for the protection of the claim, that is an injury which may be occasioned by the violation of applicant's right in respect of which he will not be adequately compensated in damages. See Daniel Ogbonnaya & Ors. v. Adapalm Nigeria Ltd. (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 292) 147. The remedy is certain not available to parties in respect of issues not raised in the action or matters not directly related to the issues raised. See Akibu & Ors. v. Munirat Oduntan (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 171) at 10. The application by the plaintiffs/appellants seeking for injunctive orders is clearly not within the claim and not directly related to the claim. The application therefore cannot be for the protection of a right before the Court, which may be violated, unless the application was granted. Furthermore, since the reliefs sought are not in respect of or directly related to a claim before the Court, the Court is without competence and jurisdiction to hear it, since is not in respect of a claim before it. See Madukolu & Ors. v. Nkemdilim & Ors. (1962) 2 SCNLR, 341 (1962) 1 All NLR 587. It is therefore, in such a circumstance unnecessary to inquire into the existence of a legal right enabling the grant of the relief". It is therefore understandably certain that it is within our adjudicatory norm and procedural culture to entertain only ancillary claims that are inextricably connected to the main claim. The combined effect of Section 254C(1) is that once a dispute is labour-centred or employment-related in substance, jurisdiction is exclusively reserved for the National Industrial Court, irrespective of how the claim is framed. No other Court may validly assume jurisdiction over such matters, and any proceedings commenced elsewhere are constitutionally incompetent. The jurisdiction conferred is both substantive and expansive, covering not only disputes strictly arising from labour or employment, but also all matters relating to, connected with, incidental to, or arising from employment relationship and workplace. The law does not allow any interpretation that would introduce ambiguity and distort the careful constitutional allocation of judicial powers, with the attendant risk of undermining the clearly demarcated jurisdictions of the superior Courts of record. Such an approach would also engender doctrinal uncertainty, as litigants may deliberately camouflage ordinary civil claims with the veneer of employment relations in order to improperly invoke the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. We are therefore persuaded that to subsume general tortious claims, particularly defamation, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court would occasion an unwarranted influx of civil causes into a specialized labour forum, thereby diluting its character and converting it into a Court of general civil jurisdiction, contrary to the constitutional design. Accordingly, it is resolved that tortious claims, including defamation, do not fall within the scope of labour and employment matters contemplated by Section 254C of the Constitution and are properly justiciable before the regular Courts, upon a substantive examination of the alleged defamatory publications. The matters intended by the legislature to be vested exclusively in the National Industrial Court are labour and employment disputes strictly so called, and not tortious causes of action merely arising in an employment setting. It is settled law that jurisdiction is determined solely by the claimant's claim, as disclosed on the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim, and not by the defence. In the instant case, a careful examination of the originating processes reveals that the respondent's cause of action is founded squarely on defamation, a tort injurious to reputation. The claim is neither predicated on any contract of employment nor on the enforcement of any condition of service. The mere fact that the alleged defamatory publication made reference to the respondent's resignation from employment does not, without more, transmute the claim into a labour or employment dispute. What is decisive in the determination of jurisdiction is the substance of the claim and the nature of the reliefs sought, and not any attempt by a party to colour a purely tortious claim with employment-related considerations. The defamation complained of arose after the cessation of the employer-employee relationship, and there is no evidence of any subsisting employment relationship between the parties at the material time. The appellants consequently failed to establish any credible basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in respect of a claim wholly unconnected with labour or employment relations. Accordingly, the respondent's cause of action, being one in defamation, falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the State High Court and not that of the National Industrial Court.”

            The court further held in the case of ELEGBE & ANOR v. HP INT’L SCHOOLS LTD & ORS (Supra) per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JSC in concurring with the lead judgment at pages 126-134, paras. C-A thus:

 “Section 254(C) of the Constitution (Third Alteration) provides inter alia thus- "254(C). Jurisdiction (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters- (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from the workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; (b) relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees' Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws; ... (f) relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relation matters; ... (g) relating to or connected with any dispute arising from discrimination or sexual harassment at workplace; (h) relating to, connected with or pertaining to the application or interpretation of international labour standards." The constitutional reference of this matter to this Court as a case-stated, seeks the proper interpretation of the above provision of the Constitution, to wit: Section 254(C) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). This is against the backdrop of the pleadings of the Respondents (as Claimants before the trial High Court) where the Court is called upon to determine whether claims founded on defamation, which arose in an employment setting, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. The law is settled that jurisdiction is determined solely by the claimant's claim, as disclosed in the writ of summons and statement of claim, and not by any defence raised in the statement of defence. From a close scrutiny of the respondents' claim, it is self-evident that their cause of action at the High Court of Lagos State is directly founded on the tort of defamation, and not based on labour, employment, collective agreement or conditions of service, and the like, notwithstanding the fact that the alleged defamatory publication contained references to the 1st appellant's resignation from the 1st respondent's employment. As afore-stated, of the five reliefs sought by the respondents in their statement of caim, the first two reliefs sought declarations from the trial Court that the respondents published defamatory material against the appellant, while the third, fourth and fifth reliefs sought a published retraction of the alleged defamatory material, a perpetual injunction against publishing the alleged defamation and the costs of the action. It is thus apparent that the principal claims of the respondents/claimants rested on the publication, of defamatory material against them by the appellants. The law is long settled that it is the Court that is vested with jurisdiction to entertain the principal claim(s), as against the ancillary claim(s) that will rightly determine the matter. Thus, a Court of law cannot adjudicate over a claim where the ancillary claims are inextricably bound to the principal claims if it lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the principal claims. See Egbuonu V Bornu Radio Television Corp. (1997) LPELR-1041 (SC) per Iguh, JSC; Adenuga & Ors. V Odumeru & Ors (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 184, per Karibi-Whyte, JSC. I am of the view that it is neither the intendment of the draftsman of the Third Alteration Act of the Constitution (supra) nor is it within his contemplation that the elevation of the National Industrial Court (NIC) to a superior Court of record enlarges its jurisdiction such as to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court of a State over tortious claims. Rather, it is plain that the intendment of the draftsman is that where the principal or primary claim falls squarely within the subject matter jurisdiction of the NICN as circumscribed in Section 254C(1) of the Constitution, then the NICN would assume jurisdiction over both the principal/primary claim which falls directly within the jurisdiction of the NICN, as well as any other ancillary claims therein, such as defamation, a claim of a tortious nature, in circumstances related or connected with labour and employment. Where the primary claim does not fall fully within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the NICN, the mere fact that it arises from or is connected with a workplace or labour matrix, does not suffice to confer jurisdiction on the NICN. An objective assessment that can be carried out by Courts faced with such a dilemma as to which Court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain a matter by virtue of Section 254(C) of the Constitution (supra) is to examine the facts on a case- by-case basis, and apply the following tests: a) What is the dominant or substantive cause of action? b) Do the averments in the Statement of Claim and the Reliefs sought by the Claimant substantially relate to defamation, contract or any other cause of action, independent of any employment right or obligation? c) If so, then it goes without saying that the claim falls within the general jurisdiction of the regular High Court. It is only where the alleged defamation or other cause of action is inseparably intertwined with the interpretation, enforcement, or violation of the claimant's employment rights, such that the tort cannot be adjudicated upon without first determining core employment issues, as enumerated in Section 254C of the Constitution, that the NICN may assume jurisdiction. Thus, for the application or otherwise of Section 254C of the Constitution (supra) to the case under consideration, a dispassionate fact-finding test must be carried out by the Court to discover whether or not the allegation of the tort of defamation or other such complaint, is connected with, incidental to, related to, or has arisen from employment or the workplace. This is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis. This underscores and accentuates the principle espoused by this Court that questions of jurisdiction must be determined by juxtaposing the relevant provisions of the Constitution with the averments contained in the statement of claim - FBN Plc V Abraham (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt 1118) 172, 189 (SC); Adeyemi V Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 18, 31. That is to say, if, upon a proper evaluation of the statement of claim, it is shown that the dispute is labour-centred and/or employment-related in substance, jurisdiction is solely reserved for the National Industrial Court to the exclusion of other Courts. However, where the dispute does not have as its crux, heart or core, issues relating to or connected with labour or employment matters, as circumscribed or bounded by Section 254C of the Constitution (supra), then the relevant High Court, other than the NIC, will be seised with jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The basis or rationale behind this is simple. If the argument is to be extended to include any and all matters (such as contract or tort), which merely make an allusion to labour or employment matters ancillary to the primary or principal complaint, as matters which fall under the jurisdiction of the NIC, it will inevitably lead to the over-burdening of the NICN, a specialised Court, and thus, will defeat the very purpose for which the Court was created by the Constitution. If the liberal interpretation is accepted, as advocated by the appellants, as opposed to the restrictive interpretation, the NIC will undoubtedly be inundated, swamped and even overwhelmed by an unwarranted and needless flood of all manner of civil causes that should rightly be handled by State High Courts by virtue of the jurisdiction vested in them by Section 272 of the Constitution (supra), thereby diluting the character of the NIC and converting it into a Court of general civil jurisdiction, contrary to the intendment and purpose for its establishment. In consequence of this calm reasoning and introspection, I take the view that in view of the fact that the principal claim and reliefs sought in the respondents'/claimants' statement of claim is defamation, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State is neither negatively impacted nor excluded by the provision of Section 254C of the Constitution. The State High Court still retains its jurisdiction to handle matters such as those disclosed in this case, whose principal claim is the tort of defamation, as opposed to a claim principally involving labour and employment, etc., as enumerated under Section 254C of the Constitution.”

66.       At this juncture, what can I say, the Apex Court having answered the question, I can neither add nor subtract therefrom but be bound by it in line with the principle of stare decisis. 

Consequently and relying on the authority cited above vis-à-vis the facts and circumstances of this instant case, it can be seen that the principal claim of the Claimant is defamation and the cause of action arising from Exhibit L is founded on defamation which is outside the enumerated jurisdiction of this Honourable Court as spelt out in Section 254(C)(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). To that extend, I hold very strongly that this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit for the reasons stated above.

67.       In the light of the foregoing, it is my considered opinion that this ground of Preliminary Objection is meritorious and is hereby sustained. On that note, I need not proceed to consider the other ground as well as the substantive suit on its merit i.e. the issue for determination, having held supra that this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.

68.       In the final analysis, I refer to Supreme Court case of ADEREMI v. ADEREMI & ORS (2025) LPELR-82796 per CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, JSC, at page 19-19, paras. C-D held that:

“Once a Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, the only consistent order to make is an order striking out the suit. This is the decision in B.L.L.S. Co Ltd v. M.V. Western Star (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt.1678) 489 and A-G., Lagos State v. A-G., Fed. (2014) 9NWLR (Pt.1412) 217.”

            Similarly, it was held in the case of A.G. ABIA STATE & ORS v. A.G. FEDERATION (2024) LPELR-80019 per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC, at page 45-47, paras. F-A thus:

“Having found that the Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate over the Claims/Reliefs sought in this suit on the merit, the law prescribes and stipulates that the proper and appropriate consequential order to be made and entered by the Court is, of striking out the suit on ground of lack or want of jurisdiction. This is to allow the Plaintiffs the discretion or option (if they desire) to pursue the Claims/Reliefs before Federal High Court, which is vested and seized of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate over them on the merit. Aderemi, JSC, in Obi v. INEC (2007) 7 SC, 268, speaking for this Court in the Lead Judgment, had stated that:- "Let me quickly say here that once a Court declines jurisdiction to entertain a suit, the only other step it can take in the matter is to make an order striking out the suit. Any other order or pronouncement made by the Court after declaring that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, is null and void and of no effect." See also Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) SCNLR, 390, Adesokan v. Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (pt. 346) 540, Gombe v. PW Nig. Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 402) 402, Oso v. Unity Bank, Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (pt. 1358) 1 (SC), Braithwaite v. Skye Bank (2013) 5 NWLR (pt. 1346) 1 (SC), Ihedioha v. Okorocha (2016) 1 NWLR (pt. 1492) 147 (SC), Adegbola v. Osiyi (2018) 4 NWLR (pt. 1608) 1 (SC), Nweke v. FRN (2019) 10 NWLR (pt. 1679) 51 (SC).”

69.       On the whole and without further ado, I hereby strike out this suit with suit no.: NICN/IB/70/2024 for want of jurisdiction.

70.       No order as to cost.

71.       Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 

 

____________________________

Hon. Justice Y. M. Hassan

Presiding Judge.