IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HON. JUSTICE JOYCE A.O.DAMACHI

 

 DATE 14 AUGUST 2026              SUIT NO: NICN/LA/317/2023

 

BETWEEN

OGECHI MAUREEN FEMI-GEORGE            ---CLAIMANT               

AND

GPC MEDIA LTD                      ----- DEFENDANT

(Trading Under the Name and Style of Superscreen Television)                     

 

JUDGEMENT

 

1.The suit was commenced by a General Form of Complaint and Statement of Facts dated 17 November 2023 and filed on 28 May 2024, which was subsequently amended pursuant to an order of this Court dated 17 October 2024. Whereof the Claimant Claims as follows from the Defendant:

1.       An Order of this Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N450,000 Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) being arrears of salary for the period of March 2017-November 2017;

 

2.     AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N50,000 Fifty Thousand Naira) being one month salary in lieu of notice of termination;

 

3.      AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to release forthwith the Claimant’s microwave oven and table top fridge which the Defendant detains in its office. In the alternative to relief 3:AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the sums of N75,000 and N82,000 being the costs of a fairly used microwave oven and a table top fridge detained by the Defendant;

4.     General Damages in the sum of N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira) for the pain and financial hardship underwent by the Claimant for the unpaid salary arrears;

5.     Cost of this action assessed at N2,000,000 (Two Million Naira only)

 

2. HARMONISED FACTS

3. The Claimant, Ogechi Maureen Femi-George, commenced this action against the Defendant, GPC Media Ltd, seeking financial entitlements and the recovery of personal property arising from the termination of her employment. The Claimant asserts that she was employed on 8 November 2009 as a News Secretary and rose to the position of Marketing Manager before being orally disengaged on 6 January 2021.

She contends that the Defendant is the actual owner and operator of Superscreen Television, which she argues is an unregistered trading name lacking separate juristic personality, thereby making the Defendant her true employer.

 

4. Conversely, the Defendant denies any employer-employee relationship with the Claimant, maintaining that it is an independent contractor engaged solely to train staff at Superscreen Television, which it asserts is a separate entity.

 

5.     The Defendant resists all these claims, relying on the doctrine of privity of contract to assert that the Claimant's contract of employment was strictly with Superscreen Television, and further denying any knowledge, possession, or detention of her personal effects.

 

6.     The Defendant filed its Statement of Defence on 30 September 2024, and the Claimant subsequently filed her Reply and a Second Witness Statement on Oath in February 2025.

 

7.     During the trial, the Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered Exhibits C1 to C10, while the Defendant called Prince Bright Eweka as DW1, who tendered one exhibit. Following the conclusion of evidence, the parties filed and adopted their final written addresses

 

8.     DEFENDANT FWA & ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

9.     Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Adebisi A. Sogunle, Emmanuel Ogbitse, and Alex Nwaolulu of A.A. Sogunle & Associates, submitted that the Claimant is not an employee of the Defendant and that no contract of employment exists between them.

 

10.  On Issue 1: Whether the claimant upon the preponderance of probability has proved her case  

 

11.    LDC submitted that the contract of employment in this suit is between Superscreen Television and the Claimant, and that the parties are strictly bound by the terms of their agreement.

12.  Counsel relied on Union Bank of Nig. Ltd. v. Edit (1993) 4 NWLR (pt. 287) 288 CA for the proposition that the terms of employment are fully spelt out in the agreement between the parties and that they are bound by such terms. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant is an employee of Superscreen Television and not that of the Defendant, pointing out that the contract was sealed between Superscreen and the Claimant. Counsel relied on Apena v. National Union of Printing, Publishing and Paper product (NUPPPP) (2003) 8 NWLR (pt. 822) 426 CP for the proposition that under the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, an employee is an individual who works under a contract of employment.

13.   Learned Counsel contended that a party who enters into an agreement is clearly bound by its terms and cannot seek better terms when the agreement becomes a subject of litigation. Counsel relied on Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC (2003) 2 NWLR (pt. 805) 589 SC and William v. William (2014) 15 NWLR (pt. 1430) p. 213 for the proposition that the court is bound by the original terms of the agreement and will interpret them in the interest of justice. Counsel also relied on UBN plc v. Soares (2012) 11 NWLR p. 550 for the proposition that parties are bound by the clear and unambiguous terms of their contract of employment. Counsel submitted that the Labour Act, Cap L1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, recognizes contracts of employment, and that the Claimant's letter of employment dated 8th of November 2009, marked as Exhibit C1, was clearly between Superscreen Television and the Claimant. Counsel raised the question of whether the contract was ever varied to include the Defendant, answering in the negative.

14.  LDC argued that the documents marked as C2, C3, and C4, which were demand letters, were directed at the Defendant but the Defendant refused acceptance because there was no contract of employment between them. Counsel submitted that the Defendant is merely an independent contractor whose service to Superscreen is specified (to train staff) and cannot act beyond its brief.

15.  Counsel relied on Chukwumah v. SPDN Ltd. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 512 for the proposition that an extraneous agreement not entered into by the parties cannot be made the basis of an action by an employee. Counsel further submitted that the relationship of employer and employee on contract is of strict liability to the effect that the master is liable for its wrongful or tortious acts and cannot be passed to another except by agreement, and that no inference can be drawn from the conduct of a party not contracted by Superscreen. Counsel pointed out that the testimony of DW1, Prince Bright Eweka, confirmed that the Defendant is an independent contractor engaged to train Superscreen staff, and that the Defendant is a separate entity that was incorporated long after Superscreen was already in operation.

16.  In response to the Claimant's arguments, Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted in his Reply on Point of Law that the Claimant's assertion that Superscreen Television is merely an unincorporated trading name lacking juristic personality was not proved. Counsel pointed out that under cross-examination, CW1 admitted she did not conduct a search with the Corporate Affairs Commission. Counsel relied on Daodu v. NNPC (1998) 2 NWLR (pt. 538) 355 SC for the proposition that the burden of proof is on the party who asserts a fact under Section 137 of the Evidence Act. Counsel argued that nothing is written on the contract about Superscreen being a subsidiary of the Defendant, and that the Claimant's assertion amounts to asking the court to speculate. Counsel relied on Arabambi v. Advance Beverage ind. Ltd. (2005) 19 NWLR (pt. 959) 1 SC for the proposition that a party seeking judgment must produce adequate and credible evidence in support of their pleading, failing which the averment is deemed abandoned.

17.  Learned Counsel further argued that the training agreement between Superscreen and GPC is not in contention and that the Claimant is not a party to it. Counsel relied on UBN v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (pt. 333) 385 SC and NIDB v. De-Easy Life Electronics (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 597) 8 CA for the proposition that where parties have embodied their agreement in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, or subtract from its terms. Finally, Counsel submitted that written addresses, no matter how beautifully drafted, cannot substitute for evidence, and urged the court to dismiss the suit for lack of merit.

 

18. Claimant FWA & ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

19.  Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Momoh-Sanni Kadiri Esq. FCIArb., Adedayo Adeniran Esq., Abdulrasheed Tope Abdulhameed, and Mujeeb Abdulwasiu of ADR Law Practice, submitted that the Claimant has successfully established an employer-employee relationship with the Defendant and is fully entitled to all the reliefs sought

 

20.                        On Issue 1: Whether the Claimant has established an employer-employee relationship with the Defendant.

21.  LCC  submitted that the Defendant's defence that it only had a training agreement with Superscreen Television and acted merely as a trainer fails on three independent grounds.

22. Counsel argued first that the Defendant's evidence is contradictory and must be discountenanced, pointing out that Superscreen Television is merely a business name lacking separate juristic personality and must operate through the Defendant as its owner.

23. Counsel noted that while Prince Bright Eweka asserted in paragraph 12 of his statement on oath that the Defendant's duty was to train staff and employees, he admitted under cross-examination that they did not train the Claimant. Counsel relied on Mogaji v. Cadbury,       Onubogu v. State,  Ike v. Ofokaja, and  Akanmu v. Adigun for the proposition that where a witness gives inconsistent and contradictory testimonies on material facts, the court must disregard the entirety of the evidence as unreliable.

24.Counsel argued secondly that the Defendant failed to tender the alleged training contract, which was asserted to limit its liability. Counsel relied on Odunsi v. Bamgbala(1995) 1 NWLR (Pt 374) 641, Akinfosile v. Ijose (1960) SCNLR 447, and Anyah v. A.N.N. Ltd. (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt 247) 319@331 for the proposition that pleadings cannot stand for evidence and any assertion in pleadings unsupported by evidence must be discountenanced, in line with the burden of proof under Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act.

25. Counsel argued thirdly that positive, unrebutted evidence firmly establishes the employer-employee relationship. Counsel submitted that the Defendant paid the Claimant's salary, and that the Defendant's witness admitted under cross-examination that they do not pay trainees they are engaged to train, meaning that the payment of salary is a direct incidence of employment. Counsel pointed to Exhibit C7, which is a payment schedule showing salary payments made by GPC Media Ltd to the Claimant, as undisputed proof of employment.

26.Counsel further submitted that the Defendant deducted and remitted the Claimant's PAYE tax. Counsel relied on N.D.D.C. v. R.S.B.I.R(2020)3 NWLR (Pt 1711) 371 for the proposition that the statutory obligation to deduct and remit PAYE tax falls exclusively on employers under the Personal Income Tax Act. Counsel pointed to Exhibit C8, which is an LIRS monthly PAYE remittance schedule dated 15th August 2019 emanating from GPC Media Ltd, listing the Claimant as an employee.

27. Counsel also pointed to Exhibit C9, which is the Electronic Tax Clearance Certificate bearing the Defendant's company name in respect of the Claimant, as further proof.

28.Furthermore, Counsel argued that the Defendant is estopped from denying liability because it acknowledged the debt. Counsel pointed to Exhibit C3, which contains the minutes of a meeting on 19th September 2017 where the Defendant admitted the indebtedness, and Exhibit C4, which shows a subsequent part payment of N200,000 made by the Defendant. Counsel also noted that demand letters (Exhibits C5 and C6) were addressed to GPC Media Ltd and received by its officers without any denial.

29.                        Counsel relied on Pina v. Mai-Angwa for the proposition that where a clear and direct accusation is made against a person in circumstances warranting instant denial, silence or failure to deny constitutes an admission by conduct.

 

30. On Issue 2: Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought  

31.    LCC submitted that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N450,000 as outstanding salary arrears for nine months from March 2017 to November 2017 at the rate of N50,000 per month. Counsel relied on Honika Sawmill (Nig.) Ltd. v. Hoff for the proposition that while the employee must prove the employment and stipulated salary, the onus is on the employer to prove payment of the salary. Counsel argued that since the Claimant proved her employment and non-payment via bank statement (Exhibit C2), and the Defendant failed to prove payment, the sum of N450,000 is due and payable under Section 1(1) of the Labour Act.

32. On the relief for salary in lieu of notice, Counsel submitted that the Claimant was orally instructed by the Head of Programs on 6th January 2021 to stop coming to work, and that she was never given any written notice or payment of N50,000 in lieu of notice as required by her employment letter (Exhibit C1). Counsel relied on Oforishe v. N.G.C. Ltd. (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 35 for the proposition that where an employer terminates an employment contract without giving the required notice or payment in lieu, the employee is entitled to recover the equivalent of the notice period as damages.

33. Regarding the personal property, Counsel submitted that the Claimant brought her personal microwave oven to the office in 2015 and was gifted a table-top fridge by the then Chief Operating Officer, Mr. Akwari. Counsel submitted that the Defendant's manager, Prince Bright Eweka, prevented the Claimant from retrieving these items in June and July 2021, and that since the Defendant failed to prove ownership, the detention of the property is unlawful. Counsel urged the court to order the return of the items or payment of their monetary equivalent of N75,000 for the oven and N82,000 for the fridge, totalling N157,000.

34. On the claim for general damages, Counsel submitted that the Claimant suffered great financial hardship and distress due to being left without pay for nine months and being terminated without notice. Counsel relied on Yalaju-Amaye v. A.R.E.C. Ltd (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 422 and Direct on PC Ltd. v. Binkam (Nig.) Ltd (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 50 for the proposition that general damages flow naturally from the breach complained of and are awarded to compensate for the direct consequences of a wrongful act without requiring specific proof of loss.

35. Counsel urged the court to award N3,000,000 as general damages. Finally, on costs, Counsel submitted that under Order 55 of the Court Rules, costs follow the event and urged the court to award N2,000,000 as cost of the action.

 

COURT DECISION

36. In civil cases, the burden of proof lies on the party who asserts a fact, as provided by Section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The standard of proof required is a preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities, pursuant to Section 134 of the same Act. Consequently, the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving the existence of an employer-employee relationship with the Defendant, GPC Media Ltd, the non-payment of her salaries from March to November 2017, the termination of her employment without notice or payment in lieu of notice, and the unlawful detention of her microwave oven and table-top fridge. If the Claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the Defendant to substantiate its specific defence that it acted merely as an independent contractor providing training services to an independent entity called Superscreen Television and was not the employer of the Claimant. To discharge this burden, the Claimant testified as CW1, adopting her written depositions.

37. To resolve the controversy between the parties completely, the Court consolidates the issues raised and adopts the two issues formulated by the Claimant as they comprehensively encompass the Defendant's sole issue.

 

38. The first issue for determination is whether the Claimant has established an employer-employee relationship with the Defendant. To resolve this issue, this Court must look past the formal labels and letterheads to dissect the administrative, financial, and regulatory realities of the parties' relationship.

39.The Defendant has set up a defence of lack of privity of contract, contending that the Claimant's letter of employment was issued on the letterhead of Superscreen Television, which it asserts is a separate entity, and that its own involvement was strictly limited to that of an independent training contractor.

40. In legal and economic reality, an employer cannot shield itself behind an unincorporated trading name or a convenient administrative arrangement to escape statutory and contractual obligations to its workforce.

41. On the question of the legal personality of business names, the law is clear that an unregistered trading name or business style has no independent juristic life. It cannot sue, be sued, or enter into contracts of employment separate from the natural or corporate person who owns and operates it.

42. It is therefore key to determine who the actual employer was, this Court must weigh the documentary evidence of the Claimant against the oral testimony of the Defendant's witness. The Claimant testified as CW1, adopting her written depositions. In her witness statement on oath, CW1 testified that "Suprescreen Television is, at best, an unincorporated trading name, which does NOT have its own independent legal personality. However, the Defendant is one and the same with Superscreen Television; the latter is not capable of existing on its own but must be owned by either a natural person or an artificial entity which in this case, it is owned by the Defendant."

43. She further testified that "Admittedly, my employment letter has the letterhead of “Superscreen”. However, the Defendant has for many years held itself out as the owner and the manager in charge of the business, Superscreen Television and it is estopped from stating otherwise."

44. To substantiate this, the Claimant relied on her letter of employment, Exhibit C1; her bank statement of account, Exhibit C2; the minutes of a staff meeting held on 19 September 2017, Exhibit C3; a list of staff and part-payments made, Exhibit C4; an email remittance schedule showing the deduction and remittance of her Pay-As-You-Earn tax by GPC Media Ltd, Exhibit C9; and a photocopy of her Electronic Tax Clearance Certificate, Exhibit C10.

45. In its defense, the Defendant called its Manager, Prince Bright Eweka, who testified as DW1. In his witness statement on oath, DW1 deposed that "the claimant was not an employee of the claimant, the Claimant‘s claim hereof is absolutely false and she is put to the strict proof of same."

46. DW1 further deposed that "the defendant is an entity of its own separate from Superscreen Television station. The defendant is not the owner of Superscreen Television and it is an independent contractor in its relationship with Superscreen Television."

47. He also stated that "the duty of the defendant in accordance with the contract with Superscreen Television was to train its staff and employee and nothing more" and that "the defendant due to its line of engagement managed and trained the claimant in consonance with its terms of agreement with superscreen Television."

48. Under cross-examination, however, the testimony of DW1 took a dramatically different turn and the testimony of DW1 completely collapsed. When asked specifically whether the Defendant ever trained the Claimant, DW1 admitted that "they did not train the Claimant."

49. When questioned about the alleged written contract between GPC Media Ltd and Superscreen Television, DW1 admitted that he did not have a copy of the contract, stating "No" when asked if he could produce it.

50. Furthermore, DW1 admitted under cross-examination that "GPC Media Ltd does not pay trainees they are engaged to train," conceding that the actual employers of such trainees bear the payment obligation. Finally, when confronted with the Tax Clearance Certificate, Exhibit C10, DW1 identified the document and admitted that the employer's name appearing on the Claimant's Tax Clearance Certificate was indeed "GPC Media Ltd."

51. A critical evaluation of these competing testimonies reveals that the Claimant's version is highly credible and completely supported by uncontroverted documentary evidence, while the Defendant's version is riddled with fatal material contradictions.

52. DW1's deposition that the Defendant "managed and trained the claimant" directly contradicts his admission under cross-examination that "they did not train the Claimant."

53. It is a basic rule of evidence that where a witness gives inconsistent and contradictory testimonies on material facts, the court must disregard the contradictory portions as unreliable, as a party cannot blow hot and cold on the same issue.

54. The Defendant's assertion that it was merely an independent contractor engaged to train staff is further demolished by its failure to produce the alleged training contract.

55. If such a contract existed to limit the Defendant's liability, it was within the Defendant's power to produce it. Under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the court is entitled to presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The Defendant's failure to tender the training contract leads to the irresistible presumption that no such contract existed, or if it did, its terms would not support the Defendant's defence.

56. Furthermore, DW1's admission that the Defendant does not pay trainees, coupled with Exhibit C7 and Exhibit C4 which show direct salary payments by GPC Media Ltd to the Claimant, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Defendant paid the Claimant in its capacity as her employer.

57. More fundamentally, the payment of salaries and the deduction of statutory taxes are the hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. DW1 admitted under cross-examination that "GPC Media Ltd does not pay trainees they are engaged to train." Yet, Exhibit C4 shows direct salary part-payments made by GPC Media Ltd to the Claimant, and Exhibit C9 shows the deduction and remittance of PAYE tax from her salary by GPC Media Ltd. Most damaging to the Defendant's case is Exhibit C10, the Claimant's Electronic Tax Clearance Certificate, which DW1 admitted under cross-examination bears "GPC Media Ltd" as her employer.  Under Sections 81 and 82 of the Personal Income Tax Act, the statutory obligation to deduct and remit PAYE tax and to apply for a staff Tax Clearance Certificate falls exclusively on an employer. By deducting PAYE tax, remitting the same to the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service, and obtaining a Tax Clearance Certificate for the Claimant under its corporate name, the Defendant held itself out to the revenue authorities and the world as the Claimant's employer.

58. Under Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the Defendant is estopped by conduct from denying that it was the Claimant's employer. On the first issue, I find that the Claimant has established that an employer-employee relationship existed between her and the Defendant, GPC Media Ltd, operating under the trading name Superscreen Television.

59. The second issue for determination is whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

60. The Claimant's first relief is for the sum of N450,000 representing outstanding salary arrears for nine months, from March 2017 to November 2017, at the rate of N50,000 per month. The Defendant's response was a bare denial of indebtedness founded solely on the premise that it was not the Claimant's employer. Having established that the Defendant was the true employer, the burden of proof shifts to the Defendant to show that it paid the Claimant's salaries for the disputed period. In employment contracts, while the employee must prove the employment and the agreed salary, the onus of proving payment of wages lies squarely on the employer. The Defendant did not produce any bank vouchers, pay slips, or ledger entries to show payment of salaries for the months of March 2017 to November 2017. Conversely, the Claimant's bank statements, Exhibit C2, show no salary deposits for this period. Furthermore, Exhibit C3, the minutes of the staff meeting of 19 September 2017, reveals that the Defendant's management met with the unpaid staff, admitted its indebtedness, and undertook to pay a portion of the outstanding sums, which was followed by a part-payment of N200,000 as reflected in Exhibit C4. The Defendant's failure to prove payment of the remaining balance of N450,000 leaves the Claimant's claim for arrears of salary unchallenged and fully established. The Claimant is therefore entitled to the sum of N450,000 as arrears of salary.

61. The Claimant's second relief is for the sum of N50,000 as salary in lieu of notice of termination. The Claimant testified that on 6 January 2021, the Head of Programs of the Defendant orally instructed her to stop coming to the office and promised that the Defendant would get back to her, which it never did. She testified that she was not given the contractually required one-month written notice of termination or paid one month's salary of N50,000 in lieu of notice as stipulated in her employment letter, Exhibit C1.

62. The Defendant did not deny the factual occurrence of this oral disengagement, resting its entire defence on the fact that it had no authority to issue a notice of termination because it asserted its status as a non-employer. Where an employer terminates an employment contract without giving the required notice or payment in lieu, the employee is entitled to recover the equivalent of the notice period as damages. The oral termination of the Claimant's employment without written notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice constitutes a breach of the employment contract and Section 11 of the Labour Act. The Claimant's claim for N50,000 as salary in lieu of notice is therefore granted.

62. The Claimant's third relief is for the release or monetary value of her detained personal property, specifically a microwave oven valued at N75,000 and a table-top fridge valued at N82,000. CW1 testified that she brought her personal microwave oven to the office in 2015 for her personal use, and that she was gifted a table-top fridge by the then Chief Operating Officer, Mr. Akwari. She stated that she left these items behind in January 2021 upon being told to stop coming to work, expecting to be recalled, but when she returned in June and July 2021 to retrieve these items, the Defendant's Admin Manager, prevented her from doing so, stating that "some people said the items belonged to the Defendant."

64. The Claimant supported this with her WhatsApp chats with the admin manager marked as Exhibit C8. The Defendant's witness, DW1, merely denied knowledge of these facts. The Defendant failed to call the admin manager to rebut these specific allegations of detention, nor did it present any proof of purchase or ownership of the microwave oven and table-top fridge. A bare denial of knowledge cannot defeat positive, detailed, and documentary evidence of detention. Consequently, the Claimant's evidence that her personal properties were detained by the Defendant remains uncontroverted. The Claimant's valuation of the fairly used microwave oven at N75,000 and the table-top fridge at N82,000, totalling N157,000, was unchallenged by any counter-valuation from the Defendant and is accepted by this Court as reasonable. The Defendant is ordered to return these items to the Claimant, or in the alternative, pay their monetary value of N157,000.

65. In addressing the Defendant's legal argument on the privity of contract, the Court finds that the Defendant's reliance on the separate juristic personality of Superscreen Television is legally untenable. An employer cannot escape its contractual and statutory liabilities to its employees by interposed trading names while simultaneously acting as the administrative, financial, and tax-remitting mind of the business.

66. By paying the Claimant's salaries, executing statutory PAYE tax deductions, and applying for the Claimant's Tax Clearance Certificate, GPC Media Ltd acted as the de facto and de jure employer of the Claimant. going by the facts and evidence before this court, Superscreen Television is an unregistered trading name and, as such, lacks the capacity to sue, be sued, or enter into contracts of employment independent of its corporate owner. The plea of lack of privity of contract is therefore dismissed.

67. Regarding the claim for general damages, the Claimant seeks N3,000,000 for the financial hardship and distress she suffered due to being left without pay for nine months and being terminated without notice. General damages flow naturally from the breach complained of and are awarded to compensate the injured party for the direct consequences of a wrongful act without requiring specific proof of loss. In employment matters, the measure of damages for wrongful termination is typically the salary for the notice period. However, where there is a distinct tortious act such as the unlawful detention of the employee's personal property, or where the employer engages in unfair labour practices by withholding earned salaries for consecutive months while keeping the employee in service, the court has the equitable jurisdiction to award general damages to cushion the hardship and distress.

68. The withholding of nine months' salary of a worker is a severe infraction of her right to fair remuneration. Having considered the circumstances, the claim of N3,000,000 is excessive. An award of N500,000 is adequate and reasonable general damages for the hardship, distress, and detention of her property.

69. Finally, the Claimant seeks N2,000,000 as the cost of this action. Under Order 55 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, costs are at the discretion of the Court and follow the event. The Claimant was compelled to litigate from 2023 to 2026 to recover salaries earned as far back as 2017. She is entitled to reasonable costs, which I assess at N500,000.

70. On the second issue, I find that the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought to the extent of the sums and orders granted herein.

71. Overall, the Court makes the following net evidential findings: First, there existed a valid employer-employee relationship between GPC Media Ltd (trading under the name and style of Superscreen Television) and the Claimant, Ogechi Maureen Femi-George.

--Second, the Defendant is indebted to the Claimant in the sum of N450,000 representing unpaid salary arrears for nine months from March 2017 to November 2017.

Third, the Claimant's employment was terminated by the Defendant on 6 January 2021 without the contractually mandated notice, entitling her to N50,000 as salary in lieu of notice.

-Fourth, the Defendant unlawfully detained the Claimant's personal microwave oven and table-top fridge, and the Claimant is entitled to their uncontroverted monetary equivalent of N75,000 and N82,000 respectively, amounting to N157,000.

71. In the circumstance, judgment is entered for the Claimant. For the avoidance of doubt, this Court makes the following orders:

a. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of N450,000 (Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) representing outstanding salary arrears for nine months from March 2017 to November 2017.

b. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of N50,000 (Fifty Thousand Naira) representing salary in lieu of notice of termination of employment.

c. The Defendant is ordered to immediately release and return to the Claimant her personal table-top fridge and microwave oven, or in the alternative, pay to the Claimant the sum of N157,000 (One Hundred and Fifty-Seven Thousand Naira) representing their monetary value.

d. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as general damages for the financial hardship, distress, and unlawful detention of her property.

e. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of N500,000 (Five  Hundred Thousand Naira) as costs of this action.

f. The sums awarded  shall be paid within 30 days, failure of which  interest at the rate of 10% per annum  would accrue  until the entire judgment sum is fully liquidated.

 

72. Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 

____________________________

HON. JUSTICE JOYCE A. O. DAMACHI

JUDGE

 

 

 

APPEARANCES

Momoh-Sanni Kadiri Esq. FCIArb. &  Adedayo Adeniran Esq.  ….for Claimant

Emmanuel Ogbitse Esq. ….For Defendant