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NICN - JUDGMENT

 IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

                                       IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

                                                    HOLDEN AT ABUJA


       BEFORE HER LADYSHIP HON. JUSTICE O.A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE

DATE: SEPTEMBER 29, 2026                                        SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/321/2025                                                          

BETWEEN:

  1. MUSTAPHA SHEHU IBRAHIM

  2. AMIR IBRAHIM ADAMU

  3. ISHAQ SANI GWARZO

  4. SUNDAY JEREMIAH

  5. YAKUBU GARBA BUGAI                                       

  6. STEPHEN KOLAWOLE MARCUS                     CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS

  7. NURUDEEN IBRAHIM KAFINTA

  8. ADESOGO OLUSANMI                                

  (For themselves and as representing 167 other

    Retired staff of the Central Bank of Nigeria

  

AND

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA                                       - DEFENDANT/APPLICANT

 REPRESENTATION


Abubakar Shuaibu Muhammed for the Claimants.

Temitope Saliu for the Defendant, with Ayata Kawu, E.O Umeh and E.M Likanga.                                                                                                 

                                                       

RULING

Introduction and claims

[1] The Claimants filed this complaint on 17th October 2025 against the Defendant seeking the following reliefs:

  1. A Declaration that by the terms and conditions of the Early Exit Policy under which the Claimants retired from the services of the Defendant and the existing medical policy of the Defendant as at the time of the retirement of the Claimants the Claimants are entitled to the provision of the medical services for themselves and their spouses for life.


  1. A Declaration that the Defendant’s new medical policy having being formulated after the Claimants retired from the services of the Defendant cannot apply to the Claimants in retrospect.


  1. A Declaration that the retrospective application of the Defendant’s new medical policy which deny medical services to the Claimants was done malafide, and therefore wrongful, illegal, null and void and of no effect to the Claimants whatsoever.


  1. An Order directing the Defendant to forthwith resume provision of medical services for life to the Claimants and their spouses.


  1. An Order directing the Defendant to pay, forthwith, the Claimants the sum of ? 5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as refund for the medicals expenses the Claimants have incurred since they were illegally removed from the provision of medical services by the Defendant on account of the new medical policy.




  1. An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimants the sum of ?500, 000, 000.00(Five Hundred Million Naira) only as general and aggravated damages for the emotional trauma associated mental distress, opprobrium and psychological agony suffered by the Claimants, as a result of the wrongful and unlawful denial of medical services to them and their spouses.


  1. An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of ?10, 000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira Only) as the cost of this suit.



  1. Interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 30% per annum from the day of the Judgment or such other time the court may direct until the liquidation of the judgment sum by the Defendant.

[2] The Defendant entered a conditional appearance, a filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection (NPO) on 13th January 2026, and a statement of defence on 3rd March 2026.  This ruling is in respect of the NPO.

[3] The Notice of Preliminary Objection is brought pursuant to Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004; section 52(1) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 2007, Section 51 of the Banks And Other Financial Institutions Act 2020; Order 3 Rules 1, & 4 and Order 17 Rule 12 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 praying for the following orders:

  1. An Order of this Honourable court striking out the suit of the Claimant against the Defendant/Applicant for lack of jurisdiction.


  1. And for such further order or orders as this Honourable Court deems fit to make in the circumstances of this case.

 [4] The grounds upon which the Objection is brought are as follows:

  1. The Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present action against the 1st Defendant. The originating process filed by the Claimant is tainted with several fundamental irregularities which have rendered the action irredeemably incompetent and robbed the Honourable Court of the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the suit as presently constituted.


  1. The Claimants’ suit as constituted is statute barred. The substratum of the Claimants’ grievance in this suit is premised on the Defendant’s reviewed Medical Policy, which purportedly came into effect on April 1, 2025. By virtue of the provisions of section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004, the Claimants had three months from April 01, 2025 to challenge the Defendant’s policy.



  1. The Claimants, however, commenced this suit on 17 October 2025, a period of over six months from the operative date of the Defendant’s Medical Policy. Any purported right or cause of action of the Claimants against the Defendant has become extinguished by effluxion of time and unenforceable against the Defendant.


  1. The Claimants also failed to disclose a commonality in the cause of action to sustain an action in representative capacity. There are no collective rights and /or interests between the named Claimants who were employed at different times and different cadres with different contractual relationships with the Defendant thereby precluding a collective right to commence an action against the Defendant.



  1. Furthermore, the nomenclature and the constitution of the parties as disclosed on the originating processes is vague, ambiguous, bereft of exactitude and incapable of conferring jurisdiction on the Honourable Court. The Claimant commenced the action in a representative capacity with only 8 named Claimants and several unknown persons who are described as “167 retired bank staff of the Central Bank of Nigeria”.


  1. There has been no explicit description of the names, addresses, grievances or proper disclosure of the identity of the “167 retired bank staff of the Central Bank of Nigeria” or their nexus with the Defendant to provide the Defendant with the reasonable opportunity to respond adequately to their alleged claims.


  1. In addition, the Claimants abysmally failed in establishing bad faith or malice against the Defendant in the commencement of this suit. By virtue of the combined provisions of Section 52 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act and Section 51 of Banks and other Financial Institutions Act, the Claimants are estopped from challenging an action of the Defendant which was executed in good faith.


  1. The Defendant’s review of its medical policy, which is the fulcrum of the Claimants’ action was legitimate and effected by the Defendant in good faith and pursuant to the statutory powers of the Defendant. The Claimants’ originating process is devoid of any allegation of bad faith made against the Defendant and this has stripped the Honourable Court of Jurisdiction to adjudicate on this suit as presently constituted.


  1. The Claimants have also failed to premise the suit on a binding contractual agreement capable of enforcement against the Defendant. The singular premise of the Claimants’ action is on a unilateral policy issued by the Defendant which is subject to change periodically.


  1. The absence of a contractual agreement conferring rights on the Claimants’ against the Defendant renders the Claimants’ action unenforceable against the Defendant. 


  1. The Claimants’ action is plagued with irredeemable defects and is liable to be struck out by the Honourable Court.

[5] The Objection is supported by an affidavit sworn to by Kalu Okore and a written address. The Claimants/Respondent filed counter affidavit deposed to by Mustapha Shehu Ibrahim on 23rd March 2026 and a written address. The Defendant/Objector filed a further affidavit and a reply on points of law on 3rd March, 2026. The parties adopted their written addresses and made oral submissions.

Defendant/Objector’s submission 

[6] The Defendant submitted one issue for determination:

Whether this Honourable Court is imbued with the vires to consider and adjudicate on this Suit as presently constituted having regard to the fundamental defects and irregularities manifest in the originating processes?

[7] Learned counsel on issue 1, submitted that jurisdiction is the blood that gives life to the survival of an action in a court of law and without jurisdiction, an action would be like an animal that has been drained of its blood. He submitted that the Court must first determine whether the Claimants' originating processes are competent to invoke its jurisdiction before embarking upon the substantive issues, so as to avoid wasting judicial time on proceedings ultimately liable to be declared void. He cited Uti v. Onoyiwe(1991) SCNJ; Magaji v. Matari (2000) 8 NWLR (PT.670) 722 @734 Paras B-C. It was his submission that this action is fundamentally defective having been caught by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA). He referred to  section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act, and submitted that the Central Bank of Nigeria, being a statutory corporation established by an Act of the National Assembly is a Public Officer entitled to the protection of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, citing Central Bank of Nigeria v. Gabriel Oodo & Anor (2021) 18 NWLR CA/A/1185/2018; Central Bank of Nigeria v. Amao (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 407. 

[8] Learned counsel stated that the Defendant's reviewed medical policy took effect on 1st April 2025, and this action was commenced on 17 October 2025. It was his submission that the cause of action accrued 1st April 2025, and this action was instituted more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action, which makes the action statute-barred, unenforceable, and liable to dismissal. He cited Tajudeen v. C.I.P.S.B. (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1184) 325; Wulangs v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2021) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1802) 247; L.L.S.P.I.A. Ltd. v. M.T. Tuma (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1784) 347; Oni v Fayemi (2020) 15 NWLR 59 SC; Useni v. Atta & Ors (2023) LPELR-59880 (SC).

[9] Learned counsel contended that this suit is improperly commenced by Complaint instead of an application for Judicial Review, and that due process in the commencement of proceedings is an integral component of jurisdiction. He submitted that proceedings commenced by an incompetent procedure are liable to be struck out citing Jimoh v. Aleshinloye (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 277. He further submitted that the substance of the Claimants reliefs is a challenge to the legality and validity of the Defendant’s revised medical policy and the alteration of the retiree medical scheme which constitute review of an administrative decision. He argued that the proper mode of commencement is Judicial Review under Order 3 Rules 1, 2 and 4 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, rather than commencement by Complaint. He cited Olaitan & Anor v. Standards Organisation of Nigeria & Ors (2023) LPELR-60776(CA), Madukolu & Ors v. Nkemdilim (1962) LPELR-24023(SC); Anyanwu v. Emmanuel & Ors (2025) LPELR-80882(SC). 

[10] Learned counsel submitted that the Claimants failed to comply with the provisions of section 52 of the Central Bank Act, and section 51of the Banks and Other Financial Institution Act 2020. He submitted that the combined provisions of prohibit the commencement of an action against the Defendant in circumstances where the Defendant has acted in good faith and in accordance with the powers vested on it. He submitted that a person aggrieved by the Defendant’s act must establish bad faith with respect to the act or omission of the Defendant. That failure to establish bad faith robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the action citing Oyewo v. Gov.,of Ekiti State (2023)17 NWLR (Pt.1912)47; NDIC v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR(Pt.766) P.272 at 297-298 Paras G-A. 

[11] Learned counsel submitted that a representative action allows one or more individuals to sue or be sued on behalf of a large group of people sharing a common interest and grievance, citing Apeh v. PDP (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt.1510)153 @ 171-173; Ogamioba & Ors v. Chief Ogene & Ors (1961) ALL NLR 59@62;(1961)1 SCNLR 115.  He submitted that there must be an ascertainable class who will benefit from the judgment, who have common interest in respect to the subject matter of the action. That the Claimants reference to themselves as representing 167 retired staff of the Central Bank of Nigeria is a vague description as it is crucial for the identity of parties before a court to be disclosed before the court can assume jurisdiction citing Best Vision Cent. Ltd v. U.A.C.N.P.D.C. Plc (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt.838) 594.

[12] Learned counsel finally submitted that the Claimants action and the reliefs they are seeking are hinged on unenforceable claims as the Defendant’s medical policy at the time of their retirement is not a binding contract, and the Court cannot grant reliefs in favour of persons who are not parties in a suit citing Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu II (1991)6 NWLR (Pt.200) 708 at 784.

Claimants/Respondents submissions

[13] The Claimants submitted one issue for determination:

Whether the instant suit as presently constituted is competent and maintainable in        law?

[14] Learned counsel submitted that the Claimants action arises from a contract of employment and that Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to contracts of employment or contracts of service citing National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors v. Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors (2019) 2 NWLR(Pt.1656)247. He submitted that the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria and its employees is one of master and servant rather than employment with statutory flavor referring to Adedeji v Central Bank of Nigeria(2023)5 NWLR 531, Mr. Victor Omotosho Ekundayo v. Federal Inland Revenue Service & Ors (unreported) Suit no: NICN/ABJ/82/2021. Counsel submitted that Section 2(a) prescribes that actions against public officers must be instituted within three months of the act complained of, except where there is a continuance of damage or injury, in which event time begins to run from the cessation of the continuing injury.

[15] Learned counsel argued that the Defendant relied exclusively on authorities decided in the context of garnishee proceedings in Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, which are distinguishable from the present employment dispute, and that authorities interpreting the status of the Central Bank of Nigeria for purposes of garnishee proceedings cannot automatically determine whether the Bank qualifies as a public officer under the Public Officers Protection Act. That in the context of banker-customer relationships and Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, the Central Bank of Nigeria was not a public officer requiring the consent of the Attorney-General before garnishee proceedings could be commenced citing Central Bank of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt.1618)294, 346-347 ParasB-A.

[16] Learned counsel referred to Section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act and Section 318(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and submitted that the Central Bank of Nigeria is an agency of the Federal Government established by the Central Bank of Nigeria Act; and that it is the staff of Central Bank of Nigeria that qualify as public officers not the agency itself.  It was his submission that that assuming without conceding that the Central Bank of Nigeria qualifies as a public officer, the Public Officers Protection Act no longer applies to labour and employment disputes following the constitutional expansion of the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court by section 254C (1)(b), (f)-(h) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration) Act, 2010. It was his contention that assuming POPA applies to the present action, the denial of medical services is a continuing injury. He argued that the Claimants were denied medical services on 17th July 2025, and that time begun to run from that day, and each successive denial gives rise to a fresh cause of action citing the Supreme Court decision in Attorney-General, Rivers State v. Attorney-General, Bayelsa State & Anor (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123, Hon. Runyi Kanu (JP) & Ors v. Attorney-General & Commissioner for Justice, Cross River State & Ors (2013) 32 NLLR (Pt. 91) 63 (NIC).

[17] Learned counsel referred to Order 3 Rule 2 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and submitted that the court expressly permits proceedings relating to matters falling within the its exclusive jurisdiction under section 254C(1)(a)-(k) and (m) and (j)(i) of the Constitution to be commenced by Complaint. He argued that this dispute concerns the interpretation and application of a collective agreement, namely the Early Exit Programme (EEP) negotiated through the Joint Consultative Council and commencement by Complaint was the appropriate procedure not judicial review citing Ohakim v. Agbaso (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 172. Counsel further argued that assuming without conceding that judicial review was the appropriate procedure to commence the action, commencement by the wrong originating process constitutes only a procedural irregularity and does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. He cited N.E.L.M. Ltd. v. Omotusi (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1541) 314; Adebayo v. Johnson (1969) 1 NMLR 82; Jev v. Iyortyom (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 575; Akeredolu v. Abraham (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628).

[18] Learned counsel submitted that section 52 of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act and section 51 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) protect only acts performed by the Central Bank in the exercise of its statutory regulatory and supervisory functions over financial institutions, and not disputes arising from contracts of employment. He cited N.D.I.C. v. C.B.N. (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 766) 272, C.B.N. v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294; C.B.N. v. Akinbami (2012) LPELR-7909(CA). He argued that the Claimants pleadings sufficiently disclosed bad faith, citing S.B.N. v. C.B.N. (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1137) 237. Counsel stated that the Defendant unilaterally altered the terms of the Early Exit Programme after retirement, failed to communicate the policy change in advance, and continued to deny medical benefits promised under the retirement package, thereby sufficiently pleading bad faith.

[19] Learned counsel submitted that the essence of suing in representative capacity is to avoid multiplicity of action on the same subject matter. That if the interest as well as the grievance are common a representative action would be in order provided the reliefs sought is in it nature beneficial to those whom the Respondent represent, and he cited S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. v. Oruambo (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1866) 433 Pp 473-474, Paras H-A, Adefulu v. Oyesile (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 377, Ighedo v. PHCN Plc (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1623) 51. He submitted that the Claimants have a common interest, a common grievance; and reliefs beneficial to the entire class as they were all promised lifetime medical benefits; were denied those benefits by the Defendant; and seek identical reliefs. It was his submission that the Early Exit Programme constituted a binding contract as there was a valid offer; acceptance; and valuable consideration, thereby creating a legally enforceable contract whose terms cannot be unilaterally varied by the Defendant. 

Reply

[20] Replying on point of law, learned defence counsel submitted that although the Claimants relied on the case of CBN v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294, and the definitions contained in section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act and Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution, they failed to controvert the reasoning of the Appellate decisions that the Defendant Bank qualifies as a Public Officer within the contemplation of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act because it includes persons known to law inclusive of artificial persons, public bodies or body of persons corporate or incorporate as well as statutory bodies or persons citing  A-G Rivers State v. A-G Bayelsa State (2013)3 NWLR (Pt.1340) 123; Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G (2001)16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458, Wulang v. C.B.N. (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt.1802)195. Counsel submitted that continuance of injury or damage means continuance of the legal injury and not merely continuance of the injurious effects of a legal injury, citing I.N.E.C v. Ogbadibo Local Govt. (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt.1498)167.

Decision 

[21] I have heard the parties on the Objection and have considered their submissions and the authorities cited. This action is challenged on the jurisdictional grounds of limitation of action, mode of commencement of action, non-compliance with the CBN Act and BOFIA, multiplicity of causes of action and misjoinder of parties. I will begin with the Defendant’s submission that this action was instituted outside the limitation in Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and is therefore statute barred. Jurisdiction is a fundamental issue, the life-blood and bedrock of all trials, see Yau- Yau v APC (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt 1941) 403 SC; and it is the authority of the Court to adjudicate over the questions that gave rise to the cause of action. Without jurisdiction, the trial will amount to an exercise in futility and a nullity, see Okolonwamu v Okolonwamu (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt 1676) 1 at 21, para A; GTB v Toyed (Nig) Ltd (2016) LPELR-4181 (CA), Odom v P.D.P (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt 1456) 527 at 548, paras C-D.

[22] A Court is only competent to entertain a case where the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction, and the case comes before the Court initiated by the due process of law upon the fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See Madukolu v Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341, Ogbuji v Amadi (2022) 5 NWLR (Pt 1822) 99 SC NWLR (Pt.1201) 80 at 101-102, Hope Democratic Party v Obi (2011) 12 MJSC 67, Oloriode v Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390, Duru v Yunusa (2010) 10. The effect of a limitation law is that legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. It removes the right of action leaving the Claimant with an unenforceable claim, see Aba v The Board of Directors NIPOST & Anor (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1878) 475 SC Yau-Yau v APC supra.

[23] The Defendant submits that this suit is caught by the limitation in Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) and as such the action is statute barred. Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act CAP P41 LFN 2004 is reproduced as follows:

(2) where any action, prosecution or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority-

(a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three (3) months next after the ceasing thereof.

[24] The Public Officers Protection Act applies to both natural and artificial persons, see Ibrahim v Judicial Service Commission [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 1, Offboche v Ogoja Local Government Council (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt 739) 458 at 489-490. Also see section 18 (1) Interpretation Act CAP 123 LFN 2004 for the definition of public officer, section 19 Part I and II of the 5th Schedule of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), Abacha v A-G Federation (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt 1783)129 SC. On the authorities, the Defendant is a Public Officer who is covered by the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act in the exercise of its public or official duties, see Central Bank of Nigeria v Gabriel Oodo & Anor (2021) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1809) 461, Central Bank of Nigeria v Ainamo (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt 1672) 407.

[25] In deciding whether this case is statute barred or not, the Court has to look at the originating process and the evidence alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action, and comparing that date with the date the Complaint was filed. If the date on the Complaint is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law (Public Officers Protection Act), the action is statute barred, see Abdullahi v Loko (2023) 6 NWLR (Pt 1881) 445, Karshi v Gwagwa (2022) 9NWLR ( Pt. 1834) 139, JFS Investment Ltd v Brawal Line Ltd & Ors (2010) LPELR 1610 (SC), Elabanjo v Dawodu (2006) 6-7 SC 24, Yau- Yau v APC supra. A cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of its proceedings it cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation law has elapsed. See Egbe v Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt 47) 1 at 20, Udoh Trading Coy Ltd v Abere (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt 723) 114, Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria v Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt 1044) 1 at 18, Ethiopian Airlines v Afribank Nig Plc (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt 1008) 245.

[26] From the pleadings of the Claimants, and the affidavit evidence before the Court on this objection, the Claimants describe themselves as (Retirees) and Ex-Staff of the Defendant who were not aware of the change in the Defendant’s medical policy until July 2025. The Defendant’s reviewed medical policy took effect from 1st April 2025. The cause of action therefore accrued on 1st April 2025 when the Defendant’s reviewed medical policy took effect. This action was instituted on 17th October 2025 outside the three (3) months period of accrual of cause of action provided in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. 


[27] The Claimants have submitted that there is a continuance of damage, and have  referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in A-G Rivers State v. A-G Bayelsa State & Anor [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 144 – 150 on the test on continuance of damage or injury. In this instance, for the exception to apply, the Claimants would need to be in employment; for otherwise, the claim that the deprivation to medical services continues would not stand. The Claimants have voluntarily retired from the Defendant; and are no longer its employees or in service. This case does not fall within the exception of continuance of damage in Section 2(a) of the POPA.

[28] The position of the law is that where a Claimant who might have had legitimate cause of action brings such an action outside a limitation period created by statute, the action is statute barred and he loses his right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such action has lapsed. The effect of an action that is statute barred is that it renders the action barren, sterile and incompetent, see Dr. Moses Anolam & 7 Ors v Federal University of Technology Owerri & Ors (2025) LPELR-80027 SC; Aba v The Board of Directors NIPOST & Anor (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt 1878) 475, Karshi v Gwagwa supra, Michael Idachaba & ors v University of Agriculture, Makurdi & 4 Ors (2021) LPELR-53081 (SC), Oko-Jaja v FCSC & Ors (2022) LPELR- 57627 (CA), Wulangs v CBN (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt 1802) 195 CA.


[29] This action is statute barred against the Defendant. The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and determine this matter; and I so hold. There is no need to consider the other grounds of objection raised by the Defendant/Objector. 


[30] This suit is dismissed. Each party is to bear its own costs.


Judgment is entered accordingly.

        ______________________________

           Hon Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae