IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE E.N. AGBAKOBA

 

 

DATED 28^TH JULY 2022                                                   SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/210/2013

 

BETWEEN:

UNITY BANK PLC.              …………………………………………                   CLAIMANT

 

AND

1.     ALIYU YUSUF

(Representing all Defunct Banks of the North Staff that were carried over to Unity Bank Plc.)

2.                 JULIUS MCDUL

3.                 SAMSON ACHIMUGU                    ………  DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS

(Representing all former staff of Bank of the North before Merger with Unity Bank Plc.)

 

REPRESENTATION

AKPAMA EKWE Esq. with A. E. EZETULUGO Esq. for the Claimant

K. C. MUOEMEKA Esq. for the Defendants

 

 

JUDGEMENT

1.                  The Claimant via a General Form of Complaint, Statement of Facts and other frontloaded process dated and filed 19^th August, 2013 commenced this suit against the Defendant seeking the Honorable Court for the following reliefs:

 

1.     AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves, servants, agents, and/or privies howsoever described from picketing the Claimant or doing anything or act whatsoever that will interrupt, interfere or in any way disrupt with the Claimants operations in all its branches.

 

2.     A DECLARATION that the Claimant is not in any way liable to the defendants.

 

3.     A DECLARATION that the 50% payment of pension and gratuity by Bank of the North shareholders was full and final payment.

 

4.     The cost of filing this suit.

 

2.                  The persons sued as defendants were; Nigeria Labour Congress; Association of BON Ex-Staff (represented by Usman D. Usman); and Aliyu Yusuf (representing all Bank of the North Staff that were carried over to Unity Bank). Subsequently, the Claimant discontinued the case against NLC and Usman D. Usman. The Claimant filed Statement on Oath of Mohammed Ja’afarEsq and later by motion substituted same Statement on Oath with that of Ibrahim Yakubu. This Statement on Oath was filed on 23^rd November 2017 and the said Ibrahim Yakubu testified as Claimant sole witness CW in line with the complaint.

 

3.                  By way of defense, the Defendants/Counterclaimants on 10^th May 2018 filed their Further Amended Joint Statement of Defense and Further Amended Joint Counterclaim. At this time, additional parties namely-the 2nd and 3rd defendants had been joined in the case by order of this court. 

CLAIMANT’S CLAIM

 

4.                  The Claimant claimed in summary that the Defunct Bank of the North and New Nigeria Bank all merged with Unity Bank based on the then CBN directive to recapitalize banks to NGN25billion. That based on this, parties to the merger formulated a merger scheme (MS) and that the scheme stated that all staff liabilities must be handled by each constituent bank before the merger. That a Merger Implementation Agreement (MIA) was also entered into by all parties to the merger and which agreement provided also that all trade union liabilities shall be the responsibilities of Bank of the North and New Nigeria Bank. That while this was on, senior and junior staff of the defunct Bank of the North declared a trade dispute and this made the then Minister of Labour and Productivity to refer the dispute to Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and an award was made. The industrial dispute bothered on refusal of Bank of the North to implement the 2002 Collective Agreement in the industry and IAP ordered Bank of the North to pay same. Rather than pay, the 19 Northern State Governors that own Bank of the North coerced ASSBIFIE and NUBIFIE BON domestic committees to enter into an illegal contract to waive judgment of the Industrial Arbitration Panel and to also waive 50% of all staff terminal benefits so as to empower Bank of the North have enough capital going into the merger).

 

5.                  It is the case of the Claimant that ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE BON domestic committees waived all their rights and entitlements under judgment of the Industrial Arbitration Panel on implementation of the 2005 Collective Agreement and also waived 50% of their terminal benefits. They claimed that representatives of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE (BON domestic committees) entered into agreement in this connection with the share-holders of Bank of the North. They claimed that two separate but similar agreements were entered into- one for management staff, and another for ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE. That based on the above, everyone was paid in line with the said agreement. That notwithstanding the payment and the agreements, BON Pensioners on 8th July 2013 picketed Bank of the North claiming the remainder 50% that was purportedly waived and this made Bank of the North to enter into agreement on July 2013(exhibit C7) to pay the sum of NGN1,680,934,809.00 as representing the purportedly waived 50%. That based on this new agreement, Unity Bank had paid 30% of this money.

 

6.                  The Claimant stated that the Defendants have threatened to picket the Claimant bank on 23^rd August 2013 if the purportedly waived 50% is not paid. In the Amended Reply/Defense to Counterclaim, the Claimant stated that the case filed by management staff of BON where judgment was given to the said management staff by the National Industrial Court but the said judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on appeal.

7.                  The Claimant stated that although they previously owed an outstanding 50% terminal benefits, that based on agreements entered into on 9th July 2013, the bank had paid everyone the outstanding balance that was waived. The only issue the claimant had was that it was agreed that after payment of that very agreed sum, no one under any guise should make further claims. The Claimant stated that the Joint Counter Claim of the Defendants is a claim by individuals as they do not have the authority of BON Pensioners to represent the pensioners of defunct Bank of the North Ltd. And that the purported letter from one Umar H. Umar is a forged document. Claimant claim that Unity Bank Plc. has paid the said outstanding 50% entitlement in line with the agreement of the parties and any person that claims not to have received his or her payment should complain through the agreed channel.

 

DEFENDANT’S DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM

 

8.                  Defendant’s case as seen in their last amended joint statement of defense and last amended joint counterclaim is that their severance benefits were not completely paid and as such, ONLY part was paid and the balance remain unpaid. That in paying terminal benefits, the indices used in computation are-basic salary, housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch subsidy and that these sub- heads must be paid 100%. That rather than pay using the above indices, the bank used only basic salary and jettisoned housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch subsidy. The Claimant bank only paid 50% of the basic salary and put up an offensive defense that the remainder 50% was purportedly waived by BON domestic committees of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE in an agreement signed with share-holders of the bank.Defendants averred that they were never consulted to make any negotiations for waiver and that they never empowered the said incompetent domestic committee members to make any such negotiations and to worsen matters, no congress nor meeting of members was held to ratify and accept the waiver, It is the case of the defendants that no one has the rights to waive their rights without their consents. The entitlements of the defendants under the 2005 Collective Agreement and which rights were affirmed by Industrial Arbitration Panel were also claimed to have been waived by the same domestic committee under the same offensive agreement.Defendants averred that the only body that is competent to negotiate terminal benefits is the National body of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE, and not the Domestic Committees of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE, and the purported waiver to the extent that it was negotiated by BON domestic Committee members of ASSBIFI and NUBUFIE, is void ab initio due to lack of capacity. That BON had previously neglected to pay the defendants their entitlements under the 2002 Collective Agreement and this led to industrial dispute that was referred to Industrial Arbitration Panel. That judgment was given by the IAP in favour of the defendants. That the judgment of that IAP together with 50% terminal benefits of the defendants are what the bank is saying were purportedly waived.

 

9.                  The defendants stated that they cannot technically be called BON Pensioners for reasons that they are ex-staff and were in active service before the merger and were members of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE. The defendants stated that Management staff are not unionized based on Article 1 of the Procedural Agreement and then the constitutions of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE. The defendant then categorically stated that what the bank owe them are as follows=50% redundancy on basic salary amounting to a total of NGNI,606,946,377.50 (since only 50% was paid and the balance was claimed to had been purportedly waived); 100% redundancy on housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch subsidy which amounted to a total of NGN2,230,650,084.44 (since even at the time of payment of the initial 50%, these sub-heads were dubiously removed in the computations) and the sum total of exposure going by careful computation is NGN3,836,596,461.94.The Defendants averred that as per management staff, the indices used in computation of terminal benefits are basic salary and housing allowance ONLY. The additions of transport allowance and lunch subsidy are applicable to ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE members. The defendants after payment of the disputed 50% carried out computation of entitlements of all members including the management staff. They stated that to be entitled to gratuity, a staff must put in a minimum of 5years of service while to be entitled to pension, a staff must put in a minimum of 10 years in service (this is also in the collective agreement). The total debt stood at NGN3, 836,596,461 .94. The defendants stated that 3 management staff and two senior staff separately sued the bank for their own entitlements and as such, their entitlements were removed from the total claims. That the sum total of moneys due to these 5 persons amounted to NGN34, 356,836.45 and if this amount is deducted, the balance is NGN3, 802, 39,625.49. That the final claim of the defendants is this sum of NGN3, 802, 39,625.49. The details of the breakdown and computations are contained in a booklet (exhibit D12) that was tendered in evidence.It is the case of the defendants that the bank’s attention was timeously drawn to nullity of the purported waiver agreement via a letter noting lack of capacity of local representatives to negotiate terminal benefits. The defendants stated that NDIC in its routine examinations in 2007 confirmed existence of the debt and directed Unity Bank to pay the defendants. Unity Bank was directed by NDIC to pay this money from proceeds of BON Ltd bad debts that were recovered by Unity Bank. Rather than pay as directed, Unity Bank transferred a total of NGN5.6billion from BON Legacy Accounts to boost its profits and left the defendants dry and empty. 

 

10.             It is the case of the defendants that all liabilities of the defunct Bank of the North have become the direct liability of Unity Bank. It is the case of the defendants that ahead of the merger, CBN under its statutory regulatory powers issued a guideline for merger by all banks and this regulation clearly stated that all persons to be affected by consolidation should not be paid below the industry standard. This is contained in Section 9 (2) of the Guidelines. That guideline is titled “CBN Guidelines and Incentives for Consolidation in the Banking Industry”. The industry standard in this context is contained in the 2005 Collective Agreement. The defendants stated that while paying only 50% terminal benefits, the bank collected 100% of loans the bank gave staffers without giving a waiver on those loans and that sanctioning the waiver will tantamount to injustice, inequity and unlawfulness.

 

11.             In their counterclaim, the defendants stated that they were all former members of Defunct Bank of the North with the instructions of their members to represent them in the case. The summary of the grievances of the defendants were that their entitlements under the 2005 Collective Agreement together with 50% of their terminal benefits and the judgment of Industrial Arbitration Panel were waived by incompetent persons without their consent. That the waiver amounted to illegally re-negotiating the judgment of the Industrial Arbitration Panel.

 

12.             The defendants stated that the Board of Directors of the bank later owned up the truth and passed a resolution on the nullity of the waiver. That in this resolution, the bank later admitted the nullity of the waiver. In their statement of defense, the defendants stated that the counterclaim is not statute barred since the counterclaim falls under the exceptions to statute bar being that; It borders on part payment; the waiver of 50% terminal benefits without consent of staffers was illegal and unjust; the waiver of 50% while deducting 100% loans given to staffers was malicious, callous, unjust and inequitable; and that the bank has admitted the illegality and nullity of the waiver.

 

In their reply to defense to counterclaim, the defendants made it clear that; 

 

13.             There were three (3) distinct groups in the struggle to wit-those who were already pensioners before the consolidation, those carried over and given fresh appointments into Unity Bank after the consolidation, and those who completely lost everything and became redundant as a result of the consolidation. That the defendants belong to the second and third categories.

 

WHEREFORE the defendants/counterclaimants counterclaim as follows:

 

a.      A DECLARATION that the counter-claimants are entitled to full implementation of the 2005 collective agreement with regard to payment of terminal benefits of staffers of the defunct Bank of the North Limited.

 

b.      A DECLARATION that the purported agreement executed between the shareholders and management of the defunct Bank of the North Ltd on the 7^th and 16^th both of February, 2006 respectively with officials of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE, Bank of the North Ltd domestic unit waving 50% benefits of the counter-claimants is a nullity.

 

c.      A DECLARATION that Unity Bank Plc. is bound by the collective agreement of 2005 and should pay the defendants a full redundancy benefits which is made up of basic salary, housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch subsidy in accordance with the collective agreement of 2005, as the claimant (Unity Bank PLC) had inherited all assets and liabilities of the defunct Bank of the North Ltd by virtue of the merger.

 

d.      A DECLARATION that the suit of the claimant is lacking in merit, vexatious and an attempt to delay the defendants entitlements.

 

e.      A DECLARATION that the Claimant (Unity Bank Plc.) is indebted to the counter- claimants in the sum of N1,605,946,377.50 as outstanding 50% balance sum for redundancy on basic salary alone and a further sum of N2,230,650,084.44 as unpaid 100% redundancy on Housing allowance, Transport allowance and Lunch subsidy and in all totaling N3,836,596,461.94 and when the sum of N34,356,836.45 due to 5 members of the counter-claimants with judgment in Suit NO. NICN/ABJ/175/2013 is deducted there-from gives a balance sum of N3, 802,239,625.49 as the claimant’s current financial exposure and debt owed the counter-claimants.

 

f.        An award of the sum of N3, 802,239,625.49 against the claimant and in favour of the counter-claimants as unpaid terminal benefits owed the counter-claimants by the claimant.

 

g.      An award of the sum of N50Million as cost of action.

 

h.      An award of N500Million as general damages.

 

i.        An Award of 10% post Judgment interest on the entire judgment sum from the date of judgment till same is fully liquidated.

 

j.        AN ORDER dismissing the claimant’s suit with cost of N5Million.

 

14.             At the trial which commenced on the 12^th December 2018, the Claimant called a sole witness Ibrahim Yakubu a Legal Practitioner who testified as CW1. CW1 adopted his two Witness Statement on Oath both filed on 23^rd November 2017 and 2^nd August 2018 respectively. 

 

The Witness also tendered the following documents;

 

1.      Exhibit C3 is titled “RECOMMENDATIONS”. 

2.      Exhibit C4 is the agreement of 7th February 2006 which was entered into by Kogi State government and other share-holders of BON. 

3.      Exhibit C5 is the BON agreement with management staff.

4.      Exhibit C7 is the agreement for payment of outstanding 50% to Pensioners of Bank of the North. 

5.      Exhibit C8 is a report on payment of outstanding payoff to pensioners of former BON. 

6.      Exhibit C9 is Court of Appeal judgment wherein the bank claimed that the waiver agreement was held to be legal. 

7.      Exhibit C10 is a document showing the names of nominees of Pensioners for purposes of sorting out the purportedly waived 50%. 

 

The Claimant witness was cross-examined and discharged thus closing the Claimant’s case.

 

15.             The Defendants/Counterclaimants on the 8th day of July 2019 entered their defence and called two witness one Julius McDull and Aliyu Yusuf who testified as DW1 and DW2 respectively. DW1 adopted his Witness Statement on Oath deposed to on 9^th November 2018.

 

DW1 then tendered the following Exhibits; 

1.      Exhibit D2 is the writ of summons.

2.      Exhibit D3 is the scheme of merger between Unity Bank, Bank of the North and NNB International Bank. 

3.      Exhibit D4 is the agreement for payment of outstanding 50% to Pensioners of Bank of the North.

4.      Exhibit D5 

5.      Exhibits D6 is a report on payment of outstanding payoff to pensioners of former BON.

6.      Exhibit D7 is a document with which the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants were authorized to proceed to represent the class of aggrieved staff called “Association of BON Ex-Staff before merger with Unity Bank”. 

DW1 was cross-examined and discharged.

 

16.             DW2 resumed his testimony on the 5^th March 2020. DW2 adopted his two Witnesses Statement on Oath deposed to on 10th May 2018 and 9^th November 2018 respectively. DW2 then tendered the following Exhibits;

1.      Exhibit D9 is the judgment/award made by Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) in favour of the defendants on the 27^th day of January 2006. 

2.      Exhibit D10 and D11 are ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE Constitutions respectively.

3.      Exhibit D12 is a comprehensive compilation of all persons who were staff of Defunct Bank of the North as at the time of merger and consolidation with Unity Bank.

4.      Exhibit D13 is a Court judgement in favour of management staff that instituted a separate case at the National Industrial Court. 

5.      Exhibit D14 is a letter from the National Union of NUBIFIE to the law firm of J.B. Majiyagbe& Co on the incapacity of local/domestic units of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE to negotiate/renegotiate terminal benefits of members. 

6.      Exhibit D15 is ASSBIFI’s National Secretariat Letter of caveat emptor” to Unity Bank. This letter was written before the merger and was captioned “CAVEAT EMPTOR”. 

7.      Exhibit D16 is CBN Guidelines and Incentives on Consolidation in the Nigerian Banking Industry. 

8.      Exhibit D17 is ASSBIFI/ NUBIFIE Letter titled “COLLECTIVE GRIEVIANCES: MOMENT OF HARD TRUTH”. 

9.      Exhibit D18 is titled “THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT.” 

10. Exhibit D19 is Unity Bank board resolutions to address lingering industrial dispute

11. Exhibit D20 is titled “RE: FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF IAP AWARD”. 

12. Exhibit D21 is a letter from NDIC to Unity Bank on 8th July 2010 on the outstanding benefits of members. 

13. Exhibit D22 is a circular passed by the Defunct Bank of the North on 20th February 2006 directing payment of 50% pay-off to all staff and ex-staff and the deduction of 100% staff commitments

14. Exhibit D23 is evidence that the status of the defendants had always existed in this case. Exhibit D23 and Exhibit D2 both serving the same purpose. 

 

17.             The DW2 was cross-examined by the Claimant’s counsel and discharged. At this point the Defendants/Counterclaimants closed his defence and the Court adjourned for adoption of final written address by both parties. 

 

18.             The Defendant/Counterclaimants filed his Final written which on the 7^th February 2022. The Final Written address was frank by Muoemeka & Company (Law Vanguard) Suite B402 Global Plaza, Jabi, Abuja. 

 

19.             The Claimant filed his Final Written Address however he filed an application extending time within which to file his Final Written Address which was granted and regularized by the Court on the 11^th March 2022, which was franked by AkpamaEkwe Esq. &Co., 18 Massenya Street, Off Cotonou Crescent, Wuse Zone 6, Abuja. 

 

20.             The Defendant/Counterclaimants filed his Reply on Points of Law however he filed an application extending time within which to file his Reply on Points of Law which was granted and regularized by the Court on the 27^th April 2022. 

 

DEFENDANTS’/ COUNTERCLAIMANTS’ SUBMISSIONS

 

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

 

21.             Defendants/Counterclaimants in addressing the Court raised three issues for determination, they are;

 

1.     Whether from the special facts and circumstances of this case, the counterclaim of the defendant is statute barred and if answered in the negative, whether this court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the said counterclaim.

 

2.     Who amongst the claimant and the defendants/counterclaimants have proved their case on the balance of probabilities and therefore entitled to the judgment of this court

 

22.             On Issue One, Learned Counsel to the Defendants/Counterclaimants submitted that the counterclaim of the defendants judging from the special facts and circumstances of this case is not statute barred. He submitted that there is no law that is absolute. The limitation laws are also not absolute and therefore they admit to exceptionsCounsel posed the question what are the exceptions to limitation laws? He submitted that via settled case laws, the exceptions to limitation laws are, admissions; part-payment; acknowledgment; deliberate concealment; malice; fraud and mistake; where victim is under a disability; and continuous injury.Counsel submitted that when there are discussions and negotiations and an admission is made, the party making the admission will not be allowed to renege from the admission and limitation laws will not apply to extinguish the rights and claims of the innocent party. NWADIARO V. SPDC (NIG) LTD (1990) 5 NWLR PT. 150 PG322339; UNIBEN V. ADETORO (1991) 4 NWLR PT 185 @375; OKORO V. OSIM & ORS (2012) LPELR-14420 (CA) PGS34-35, PARAS.F-B; KOKOORIN V. PATEGI LOCAL GOVT. (2009) 15 NWLR (PT.1164) PG205; SPDC (NIG) LTD V. MEBURU (2013) LPELR-21889 (CA) PER TSAMMANI JCA @PG.36 PARAS.B-E.Counsel stated that the Claimant vide exhibit D19 made far reaching admissions and indictments unto itself and Defunct BON. And the admissions are many and runs from pages 5 up to page 7 of exhibit D19.He further stated that the Claimant admitted that the waiver agreements (exhibits C4 and C5) are nullities and unenforceable. They admitted at page 6 item (3) that Unity Bank failed to carryout due diligence and had the bank carried out due diligence, it would have noticed the nullity of exhibits C4 and C5 in good time (the waiver agreements). They also admitted that the Domestic Committees that signed exhibits C4 and C5 had no capacity to do so. And lot more admission where made by the Claimant.

 

23.             Counsel submitted that it is not always that the Court permits the law of limitation to debar a bona fide claim; one of such exceptions is where there has been admission of liability during negotiation and all that remains is the fulfillment of the agreement.SPDC LTD V. MEBURU (2013) LPELR-21889(CA) (Pp. 36 paras. B); KOKOORIN v. PATIGI LOCAL GOVT (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt.1 164) p.205.Counsel submitted that additional exceptions to limitation laws are where the facts border on part-payment, acknowledgment, deliberate concealment, malice, fraud and mistake, and where the victim is under disability. In all these instances, limitation laws will not apply. OLARA V. ADEGBITE (2012) LPELR-7937(CA).

 

24.             On the issue of fraud as an exception to limitations law, Counsel cited DUZU & ANOR V. YUNUSA & ORS (2010) LPELR-8989(CA) Per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JCA (P. 37, paras. B-D),where the court held thus; 

“...established judicial principles of law have in their wisdom identified and recognized that in appropriate circumstances and cases, fraud where established would provide an effective exception to the general rule that time begins to run from the date when the cause of action accrued for the purpose of a limitation law. See AREMO II V. ADEKANYE (supra), ADMINISTRATORS! EXECUTORS V. EKESPIFF (2009) 3 NSQLR 364, OGOH V. ENPEE LTD (2004) 17 NWLR (PT.903) 449.” 

 

OCTOPUS TRUST (NIG) LTD & ORS V. AMCON (2019) LPELR-47277(CA).

25.             On where a party after admission of guilt renege from the admission as an exception to limitation law, Counsel cited OKORO V. OSIM & ORS (2012) LPELR-14420(CA) Per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA ,JCA (Pp. 34-35, paras. F-B), where the Court held thus;

“... The law is that the fact that parties are or were engaged in negotiations in respect of the property in dispute would not stop the limitation law from applying except where the defendant reneged on an admission made during negotiations. See NWADIARO v. S.P.D.C. (NIG) LTD. (1990) 5 NWLR (150) 322 at 339; UNIBADAN v. ADETORO (1991) 4 NWLR (185) 375.”

 

26.             Counsel again submitted that where there is negotiation and an admission and one party renege from the admission, the case can never be statue barred. OKORO V. OSIM & ORS (2012) LPELR14420 (CA) PGS34-35, PARAS.F-B); KOKOORIN V. PATEGI LGA (2009)15 NWLR (PT.1164) PG.205; SPDC V. MEBURU (2013) LPELR-21889 (CA) PARAS.B-E.

 

27.             On the principle of law regarding malice, deliberate concealment, mistake and continuing injury, Counsel cited OSIMEN V. ZENITH BANK PLC & ORS(2019) LPELR-47878(CA) Per TIJJANI ABUBAKAR ,JCA (Pp. 43-44, paras. A-D),is a classicus where the Court of Appeal held;

 

“The law is clear that there are exceptions to the application of the Limitation Laws. In OBOT & ORS Vs. SPDC NIG. LTD (2013) LPELR-20704 (CA) Pg. 51-52, Para. D - D, this Court held that: “There are some exceptions to the limitation law set by various limitation statutes. These statutory limitations cover cases such as fraud, deliberate concealment by the defendant, or mistake. There are also other circumstances which amount to exceptions to the limitation law. These include circumstances where there is a continuing injury or fresh damage arising from the same injury. Each fresh damage arising from the same injury or continuing injury, gives rise to a fresh cause of action. In AREMO II Vs ADEKANYE (2004) ALL FWLR (PT 224) 2113 at 2132 -2133 the Supreme Court per Edozie JSC said: “... where there has been a continuance of the damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time, as often as damage is caused... For example if the owner of mine works them and causes damage to the surface more than six years before action, and within six years of action, a fresh subsidence causing damage occurs, without any fresh working by the owner, an action in respect of the fresh damage is not barred as the fresh subsidence resulting in injury gives a fresh cause of action...” See also A. G. OF RIVERS STATE Vs. A. G. OF BAYELSA STATE (2012) LPELR9336 (SC) per GALADIMA, JSC; NNPC Vs. ZARIA & ANOR (2014) LPELR22362 (CA) Pg. 56, Para. E - G; INEC Vs. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVT. & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC) Pg. 57-59, Para. C - C and NWANKWO & ANOR Vs. NWANKWO (2017) LPELR-42832 (CA) Pg. 21-23, Para. F - E.”

 

28.             On the principle that part payment is not statute barred, Counsel cited OLORA V. ADEGBITE (2012) LPELR-7937(CA) Per CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, JCA (Pp. 21-22, paras. F-C),where the court held as follows;

 

“It is important to state that the law of limitation admits of certain exceptions. Section 3 of the Limitations Law provides:- “The provisions of this Part of this Law shall have effect subject to the provisions of Part 3 of this Law which provide for the extension of the periods of limitation in the case of disability, acknowledgment, part-payment, fraud and mistake.” Section 21 of the law provides:- “If on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Law, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of six years from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation had expired.” Aremo v. Adekanye (supra).”

 

29.             Learned Counsel further submitted that limitation laws will not apply is where the wrong doing is continuous and re-ignited. Counsel stated that after the agreement was entered into, the bank claimed that the defendants threatened to picket the bank on the 21st day of August 2013 (see paragraph 26 of the statement of facts). However, the bank at paragraph 15 of the reply/defense to the counterclaim stated that the defendants were covered by the payment and have been paid. The unlawful refusal to pay as well as the malicious exclusion of the defendants from payment in 2013 are continuous and accordingly fall under the exceptions to limitation laws. The cause of action therefore continued up until 2013. Meanwhile, this case was filed on the 19” of August 2013. The threat to picket the bank on the 21st day of August 2013 made the bank to file this case on the 19th day of August 2013 and got restraining orders against the defendants.

 

30.             On the principle that continuous wrong doing fall under exceptions to limitation laws Counsel cited TANKO & ORS V. KUSHERKI (2018) LPELR-46965(CA) Per ADAMU JAURO, JCA (P. 22, paras. D-F) where the court in consideration of whether the law on limitation of action applies to cases of continuous damage/injury held as follows;

 

“It is true that the Law of Limitation of action recognizes some exceptions, thus where there has been continuance of the damage, a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as damage is caused. See BattishillVs Reed (1856) 18 CB 696 at 714; West-Leigh Colliery Co. Ltd VsTunnidiffeHanepson Ltd (1908) AC 27; Amachere&Anor. VsThe Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (2011) LPELR - 4474 (CA).”

 

AREMO II V. ADEKANYE & ORS (2004) LPELR-544(SC).

 

31.             On Issue Two it is Counsel’s submission that civil cases are won on the balance of probabilities. Imaginary scale is provided for the litigants and the evidence of each party is put on different sides of the imaginary scale. These pieces of evidence are given probative values and the scale with higher evidence tilts and preponderates against the other. Judgment is therefore entered for the party whose scale preponderated. UNITY BANK PLC V. ADAMU & ORS (2013) LPELR-22047(CA); EHWRUDJE V. WARRI LOCAL GOVT & ANOR (2016) LPELR-40052(SC); ENWEZOR V. ENWEZOR & ANOR (2012) LPELR-8544(CA).

 

32.             To show that the defendants proved their case on the balance of probabilities, Learned Counsel approached same from the following perspectives;

 

                                i.            The legal duty doctrine.

                             ii.            The import of Articles 5(b) and 8 of the Main Collective Agreement (exhibit D18).

                           iii.            The import of Articles 4(b) and 5(a); Rule 2, Part 1 section 2 of the Procedural Agreement (exhibit D18); and Rule 19 (iv a) of NUBUFIE Constitution.

                           iv.            The bindingness or otherwise of CBN Guidelines for Consolidation (exhibit DI 6)

                              v.            The validity or otherwise of the agreements waiving 50% terminal benefits of members (Exhibits C4 and C5).

                           vi.            Whether the rights and benefits conferred on members by judgment of the Industrial Arbitration Panel can be taken away by a mere defective agreement without the consent of the members involved.

                         vii.            Whether Domestic Committees of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE can purport to enter into agreements vide exhibits C4 and C5 without recourse to National body and thereby purport to bind pensioners, management staff (who are non-members) and other ASSIBIFI and NUBIFIE members and if answered in the negative, whether the said exhibits C4 and C5 are not null and void.

                      viii.            Whether paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 15 of the further amended consequential reply/defense to the counterclaim are not admissions and indictments on the claimant bank and if answered in the affirmative, whether the claimant bank can be allowed to assert the contrary.

                           ix.            Whether in the face of the bank’s admissions (under paragraph 15 of the further amended consequential reply/defense to counterclaim) to had paid the defendants the withheld 50% terminal benefit, the bank is not duty bound to prove means of payment of same to the defendants.

                              x.            The areas of inconsistencies in the pleadings and testimonies of the claimant bank; their setting up of different stories and new case and the consistent refusal of PWI to answer questions under cross examination.

                           xi.            The principle of distinguishing.

                         xii.            The failure of defense counsel to cross examination on vital areas.

 

ON THE LEGAL DUTY DOCTRINE AND ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION

 

33.             Learned Counsel contended that this is the problems in consideration-the bargain promises and the legal duty. He argued that Legal duty rule is found in two (2) different pre-existing contractual duty cases. The first type is where one party is under a contractual duty to perform and the other party promises to pay more money for the same performance. The second type is where a debtor owes money to a creditor and the creditor agrees to accept less money in full discharge of the debtor’s obligation. Under the legal duty rule, the debtor’s payment of a lesser amount is NOT CONSIDERATION for the promise to accept less money in full discharge of the debt because, in paying the creditor a lesser amount of money, the debtor is only doing what he has a pre-existing legal duty to do. As a result, after the debtor has paid the lesser amount, the creditor can sue for the rest of the money despite the agreement to accept less money in full discharge of the debtor’s obligation. The promise or agreement to accept a lesser amount is therefore not binding and enforceable. He cited the cases ofPINNEL’S CASE (1802) 5 CO Rep 117; FOAKES V. BEER (1884) LR 9 APP CAS 605; D&C BUILDERS LTD V. REES (1966) 2QB 617; COLLINS V. GODEFROY (1831) IB & AD 950.Counsel stated that the agreement to waive 50% terminal benefits apart from being incompetent by reason of lack of capacity on those who signed them, the same are neither binding nor enforceable under the legal duty rule. The bank furnished no consideration to the Domestic Committee members nor to the defendants in return for the promise/agreement to waive 50% and take a lesser amount in full discharge of the total money owed. Every agreement must have four essential elements of-offer, acceptance, consideration, and intentions to create legal relationship.

 

34.             Counsel citing the case OLUPO V. POLARIS BANK (2019) LPELR-(CA) submitted thus;

 

“It is trite that parties are bound by agreements entered into, especially agreements in commercial settings such as a bank loan. If such agreements are to be varied by another agreement, there must be sufficient consideration. See Grover v. Intl Textile Ind. (Nig) Ltd (1976) LPELR-1342(SC). This flows from the ancient and settled principle of law to the effect that one of the fundamental elements of a binding agreement is thefurnishing of sufficient consideration. See: Best Nigeria Ltd v. Blackwood Hodge Nigeria Ltd (2011) LPELR-776 (SC); Ama & Anor v. Ariyo & Anor (2017) LPELR-42888 (CA); and Stanbic IBTC Bank v. Longterm Global Capital Ltd &Ors (2018) LPELR-44053 (CA).”

 

ON THE IMPORT OF ARTICLES 5(b) AND 8 OF THE MAIN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT D18); THE IMPORT OF ARTICLES 4(b) AND 5(a); RULE 2, PART I SECTION 2 OF THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT D18); AND RULE 19 (iv,a) OF NUBUFIE CONSTITUTION

 

35.             Learned Counsel stated Article 5(b) of the Main Collective Agreement provided as follows;

 

1.      “In the event of redundancy arising in any member establishment and before any employee is declared redundant, there shall be consultation between the National Secretariat of the union and the secretariat of the Association”. 

 

2.      And Article 4(b) of the Procedural Agreement provides as follows; “All formal negotiations between the Association and the Union shall be effected by a joint Negotiating Council acting under its constitution and Rules as stated in Appendix “A” of this agreement”.

 

3.      Then Article 5(a) of same Procedural Agreement provides as follows; “There shall be a Joint Negotiating Council made up of the representatives of the Association and the Union”

 

36.             Counsel submitted that it is trite law that once someone is a member of an association and submits to the association, he is bound by the constitution of that Association. Therefore the Domestic Committee members that signed exhibits C4 and C5 are bound by ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE constitutions and cannot act ultra vires the same constitutions. ANAELO & ORS V. MADUAGWUNA & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44884(CA).

 

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARTICLE 5 & ARTICLE 8 OF THE MAIN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT

 

37.             Counsel contended Article 8 pre-supposes a situation where there is NO pension and gratuity in place. It means that a particular financial institution(s) has NO pension and gratuity scheme in place. Where this is the case, the domestic units will negotiate with management on what the pension and gratuity scheme should be using the total emoluments concept. Article 8 has NOTHING to do with redundancy. After a pension and gratuity scheme is put in place under Article 8, redundancy may occur in future after several years of work. Where such redundancy occurs, Article 8 ceases to apply and what would apply to the redundancy is issue is Article 5.

 

ON THE BINDINGNESS OR OTHERWISE OF CBN GUIDELINES FOR CONSOLIDATION (EXHIBIT D16). 

 

38.             It is Counsel’s submission that all banks are bound to comply with the guidelines, directives, orders and regulations of the CBN. The CBN has a statutory duty to issue guidelines and directives of binding force on all banks. As provided in Section 33(1) (b) of CBN Act. LIBERTY BANK & ORS V. CBN & ORS (PP. 36-45 PARAS. C).

 

39.             Counsel stated that in line with its statutory powers to regulate, the CBN moved to recapitalize banks to the tune of NGN25,000,000,000.00(twenty-five billion naira). Some banking institutions could not afford this money and this led to consolidation, merger and acquisition. In order to protect workers in these banks and ensure a seamless era, the CBN issued a guideline for consolidation (Exhibit D18). 

 

ON THE VALIDITY OR OTHERWISE OF THE AGREEMENTS WAIVING 50% TERMINAL BENEFITS OF MEMBERS (EXHIBITS C4 AND C5)

 

40.             Counsel submitted that in the face of Article 5(b) of The Main Collective Agreement (exhibit D18); Articles 4(b) and 5(a) of the Procedural. Agreement; Rule 2, Part 1, Section 2 of the Procedural Agreement (exhibit D18); and Rule 19 (iv,a) of NUBUFIE Constitution, the waiver agreements are INVALID. These waiver agreements are null and void and of no legal effects whatsoever. Counsel argued that although the domestic committee that signed these agreements were not competent persons, no congress nor meeting nor resolution was ever held to ratify the illegality. Had either the National body or the members themselves in a congress ratified the illegality, the same would be binding on members. Counsel cited the case OPEBIYI & ORS V. NOIBI & ORS (1977) LPELR-2748(SC) (Pp. 19-20, paras. E-B) Per BELLO, JSCwhere the court in consideration of whether an agreement entered into by a member of a corporation aggregate or a stranger is binding on the corporation held as follows;

 

“It is an elementary rule of the law of contract that an agreement entered into by a member of a corporation aggregate, who is not duly authorised by the corporation, or by a stranger to the corporation is not binding on the corporation. The same principle of law applies to an arbitration agreement We refer to Russel on Arbitration, p. 30 where the learned author wrote thus: “Corporation aggregate, subject to the restrictions mentioned above, may be parties to arbitration as well as individuals. The act, however, must be that of the corporation as a whole. A dean without his chapter, or a mayor without his commonalty, or the master of a college or hospital without his fellows cannot, by a submission, bind the corporation for the same reason that he cannot bind it by any other contract.”

 

41.             Counsel contended that where an agreement is entered on behalf of a 3rd party without authorization, the 3rd party has to ratify the agreement and in the absence of ratification, the same is not binding on the 3rd party. He further contended that the rights, benefits and entitlements conferred on members by judgment of Industrial Arbitration Panel (Exhibit D9) cannot be waived and signed away under exhibits C4 and C5 (the waiver agreements) without consent and authorization of members who are the beneficiaries. The domestic committees who signed away entitlements conferred on members by the judgment of National Industrial Court have no right to do so and the waiver is incompetent, null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever. He submitted that the judgment was never appealed against by the bank that was the looser. In the eye of the law, the award is still valid and subsisting. AMADI V. NWOSU (2014) LPELR-24428(CA) (PP. 63-66, PARAS. E-A).

 

42.             ON WHETHER DOMESTIC COMMITTEES OF ASSBIFI AND NUBIFIE CAN PURPORT TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS VIDE EXHIBITS C4 AND C5 WITHOUT RECOURSE TO NATIONAL BODY AND THEREBY PURPORT TO BIND PENSIONERS, MANAGEMENT STAFF (WHO ARE NON-MEMBERS) AND OTHER ASSIBIFI AND NUBIFIE MEMBERS AND IF ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, WHETHER THE SAID EXHIBITS C4 AND C5 ARE NOT NULL AND VOID

 

43.             Counsel contended that the waiver agreements (exhibits C4 and C5) were entered into by BON shareholders, ASSIBIFI (domestic committee) and NUBIFIE (domestic committee). He argued that the Pensioners were not privy to these agreements and cannot be bound by the agreements. Whether these incompetent agreements can be entered into without recourse to the National Body has been extensively discussed elsewhere in this final address and we adopt all such line of arguments and authorities to apply herein. From all indications, the waiver agreements are nullity. Counsel submitted only bind parties to the agreement. MAKWE V. NWUKOR & ANOR (2001) LPELR-1830(SC).

 

ON WHETHER PARAGRAPHS 4, 8, 9, 10, 12 AND 15 OF THE REPLY TO LAST AMENDED JOINT COUNTERCLAIM ARE NOT ADMISSIONS AND INDICTMENTS ON THE CLAIMANT BANK AND IF ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, WHETHER THE CLAIMANT BANK CAN BE ALLOWED TO ASSERT THE CONTRARY

 

44.             Counsel submitted that the listed paragraphs constitute heavy indicts on the claimant bank. It was at this points that the truth come out. By these paragraphs, the claimant bank tried to absolve itself from blames and wrong doings by claiming to have paid the withheld 50% terminal benefits to all creditors. They claimed that it was agreed that the bank should pay NGN1, 680,934,809.02 as full and final payment of the withheld 50% terminal benefit and that no one under any guise would bring any subsequent claims. Based on the above, agreements were signed and the sum of NGN1, 680,934,809.02 was paid to all disengaged staff (including the defendants).Counsel argued that paragraph 15 of the reply/defense to statement of defense is an affirmative statement. And by this statement and others, the claimant bank admitted and made it clear that they had paid the withheld 50% terminal benefits. In claiming to have paid the money, they have admitted to the nullity of the waiver agreements. Counsel submitted that payment of the money is an act of admission and facts admitted need no further proof. NAIGE V. AHAMAD & ANOR (2019) LPELR-48136(CA); OLUMIDE & ANOR V. AREMU & ANOR (2019) LPELR-48761(CA) (PP. 15-16 PARAS. B-B); ALIYU V. BULAKI (2019) LPELR-46513(CA) (PP. 40-42 PARAS.B-B); GUTING V. DAVWANG (2013) LPELR-21921(CA) (PP. 85-86 PARAS. D-D)Learned Counsel again argued that although the bank admitted to nullity of the waiver agreements and claimed to have paid the outstanding 50% that was withheld, the defendants have maintained that they were not paid and this throws the evidential burden of proof back to the bank who is duty bound to produce evidence of payment. Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011(as amended).KANGU V. UBN PLC (2014) LPELR-41112(CA); OLALEYE V. TRUSTEES OF ECWA (2010) LPELR-4743(CA) (PP.23 PARAS. D); USMAN V. BABA (2013) LPELR-22136(CA) (PP. 30 PARAS. F-F).

 

ON THE AREAS OF INCONSISTENCIES IN THE PLEADINGS AND TESTIMONIES OF THE CLAIMANT BANK; THEIR SETTING UP OF INCONSISTENT AND DIFFFRENT STORIES AND NEW CASE PLUS THE CONSISTENT REFUSAL OF PWI TO ANSWER QUESTIONS UNDER CROSS EXAMINATION.

 

45.             Counsel submitted that it is a settled principle of law that parties must be consistent in their pleadings and story lines. Parties are not allowed to set-up inconsistent stories and divergent pleadings. The inference that can be drawn from a party who is inconsistent in its pleadings is that the party is lying to the court. NNPC PENSION LTD V. VITA CONSTRUCTION LTD (2016) LPELR-41259(CA) (Pp. 13-14, paras. F-A) Per TANI YUSUF HASSAN, JCAwhere the court in consideration of whether a party must be consistent in the presentation of his case held as follows; “For the streams of justice to remain pure, counsel must at all times be consistent in the presentation of his case”. PACERS V. DANCING SISTER (2012) 1 SCNJ I AT 6 AND ADEOSUN V. EKITI STATE (2012) 1 SCNJ 260.”NIGERIAN AVIATION HANDLING CO. LTD V. YINKA WORLD INVESTMENT LTD & ANOR (2012) LPELR-13743(CA); ODEH & ANOR V. AHUBI & ORS (2015) LPELR-41783(CA) (PP. 47 PARAS. B); ZIBIRI & ANOR V. AMUDAH (2018) LPELR-44823(CA) (PP. 27 PARAS. E).

 

THE FAILURE OF COUNSEL DURING CROSS-EXAMINE ON VITAL POINTS AND DISCREDIT DEFENSE WITNESSES

 

46.             Counsel stated that vital questions were not asked about the detailed contents of exhibits D12, D16, D18 and D19. He submitted that the implication of not asking vital cross examination questions on these documents is that the claimant bank accepted the facts contained in these exhibits. The failure to make such cross examinations are fatal to the case of the claimant because these pieces of evidence will go in as unchallenged testimony and the courts are bound to act on such evidence. AYIUWE V. C.O.P (2017) LPELR-42646(CA) (PP. 32 PARAS. B); HARUNA V. KANO STATE (2020) LPELR-50869(CA) (P. 65, PARAS. C-F).

 

CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSION 

 

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

 

Claimant in addressing the Court raised three issues for determination, they are;

 

1.     Whether the Counter Claim by the Defendants is not statute barred.

2.     Whether the Claimant has not proved its case before this court.

3.     Whether the Defendants have proved their Counter Claim

4.     Whether the counter claim of the Defendants is competent in view of the case of Isaac Dabo & Anor v. Unity Bank Plc. (Appeal No. CA/A/463/2015)

 

47.             On Issue One (1) Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the counter claim by the defendants is statute barred. He contended that by an agreement dated 7th February, 2006 between shareholders of Bank of the North Limited and ASSBIFI & NUBIFIE and another agreement dated 16th February, 2006 between the management of Bank of the North Ltd and ASSBIFI & NUBIFIE, all the staff of Bank of the North Ltd including serving staff, ex-staff and management staff agreed to accept 50% of their entitlement as full and final thereby waiving the remaining 50% of their entitlement.He submitted that in determining whether the Counter Claim is statute barred what is required is for the court to look at the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim (in this case the Counter Claim) only, to ascertain the alleged date the wrong in question which gave rise to the cause of action was committed and then compare the date with the date on which the Writ of Summons (in this case the Counter Claim) was filed. KEYES GLOBAL LEASING LTD. V. BASSEY (2020) 17 NWLR (PT. 1753) 363 © 377.The Counsel contended that the claimant instituted the action in August, 2013. The Defendants filed their counter claim on the 10^th of May, 2018. He submitted that the Defendants’ Counter Claim is a separate claim for the purpose of the limitation act. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, Cap 522, Laws of FCT, provide that: “for the purpose of this Act, a claim by way of set-off or counter claim shall be deemed to be a separate action and to have been commenced on the same date as the action in which the set-off or counter-claim is pleaded”.

 

48.             The Counsel submitted that the cause of action arose the moment the claimant paid the first 50% and refused to pay the balance of 50% after disengagement of the Defendants. Defendants who did nothing after the refusal to pay the balance of their terminal benefit are statute barred and cannot maintain the counter claim. The Defendants counter claim is therefore statute barred and cannot be maintained in this court. This court lacks the jurisdiction to hear this case.KASIM V. NNPC (2013) 10 NWLR (PT 1361) 46 AT 69; BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC V. AKINYOSOYE (1995)1 NWLR (PT. 374)722 AT 730; POATSON GRAPHIC ARTS TRADE LIMITED ANOR V. NIGERIAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (2019)7NWLR (PT. 1672) 447 @ 478.The Counsel again submitted that if the counter claimants have good cause of action they would have pursued it with reasonable diligence. This counter claim therefore implied cruelty than justice. He submitted that the cause of action does not accrue when a demand is made, but from when the right to the benefit falls due, that is, at retirement/termination. KASIM V. NNPC (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1361) 46 AT 71.mCounsel argued that in determining whether the Counter Defendant acknowledged the indebtedness to the Counter Claimant, reference must be had to Section 37 (1) of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 Laws of the FCT, which provides as follows:

 

                                            i.                        “(1) Where —

(a)             A right of action has accrued to recover a debt; and

(b)            The person liable therefore has acknowledged the debt,

                                         ii.                        The right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment”.

 

49.             He further argued that for the Counter Claimants to take advantage of the provision of section 37 (1) (a) and (b) of the Limitation Act, the Counter Claimants must show that the acknowledgement was made to the Counter Claimants as provided by Section 44 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act which provides that:

 

            “An acknowledgment under section 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 or 43 of this Act-

 

a. Shall be made to the person or the agent of the person whose right or claim is being acknowledged”.

 

50.             Counsel submitted that the purported acknowledgment in Exhibit D19 titled “PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE COMPLAINTS OF DEFUNCT BANK OF THE NORTH (BON) LIMITED PENSIONERS,” was not made to the Counter Claimants. The said board paper therefore does not amount to acknowledgment under Section 37 of the Limitation Act.He further submitted that no acknowledgement or admission of any debt was ever made by the Claimant. To constitute acknowledgment of a debt for the purposes of limitation law, there must exist either: (a) an express unconditional promise to pay the debt; or (b) a clear acknowledgement of the debt. MERCANTILE BANK (NIG.)LTD. V. FETECO (NIG.)LTD. (1998) 3 NWLR (PT. 540) 146 AT 156; OLAOGUN ENT. LTD. V. S.J. & M. (1992) 4 NWLR (PT. 235) 361 AT 387-388. And to render the limitation law inoperable, the acknowledgment must be absolute and unconditional and must be one from which a promise to pay the debt can be inferred. THADANI & ANOR. V. NATIONAL BANK NIGERIA LTD. & ANOR, INFRA; DAMIANA AJIKE V. LAWRENCO ANTONIO CARDOSO & ANOR. 5 WACA 134-135.He further submitted the law is that in order to constitute a fresh accrual of action, the acknowledgment of a debt or claim must be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgement or his agent and addressed directly to the person entitled to payment of the debt or his agent. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN V. ALHAJI KASALI ADETORO (1991) 4 NWLR (PT. 185) 375 AT 385; NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES COMMISSION V. OLUWO (2001) 3 NWLR (PT. 699) 99 AT 109-110; THADANI & ANOR V. NATIONAL BANK & ANOR (1972) 7 N.S.C.C 28 AT 31.Claimant Counsel argued that the undated document which is purported to be an acknowledgment was a proposal made by some persons to the board of directors of Unity Bank and not to the Counter Claimant and therefore cannot qualify as an acknowledgment of debt made to the Counter Claimant. He submitted that the law is that an undated document is useless, incompetent and inadmissible in law and cannot be acted upon. An undated document is inadmissible in law and not enforceable. A document which bears no date of execution or date when it comes into effect or operation is uncertain, invalid and unenforceable. AMIZU V. NZERIBE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 118) 755 AT 770,ANYAOHA V. OBIOHA (2014) 6 NWLR (PT. 1404) 445 AT 475; OGBAHON V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF CCC & ANOR.(2002) 1 NWLR (PT. 749) 675; AMIZU V. NZERIBE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT 118) 755;C.B.N V. AHMED (2004) 15 NWLR (PT. 897) 591 AT 610;WALTER V. SKYLL (NIG) LTD (2001) 3 NWLR (PT. 701) 438 AT 470.Counsel urged that Exhibit D19, titled “PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE COMPLAINTS OF DEFUNCT BANK OF THE NORTH (BON) LIMITED PENSIONERS,” is inadmissible and unenforceable and should therefore be expunged from the records of the court. ISMAIL V. F.R.N. (2020) 2 NWLR (PT. 1707) 85 @ 112, PARAS. G-H

 

51.             Counsel argued that contrary to the Defendant/Counterclaimant’s argument Section 48 (1) (a) and (b) of the Limitation Act provides that:

 

“(1) Where —

 

(a)             A right of action has accrued to recover a debt; and

 

(b)            The person liable therefore makes a payment in respect thereof

The right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the payment.”

 

52.             He submitted that for the Counter Claimants to benefit from the above provision the Counter Claimants must show that the right of action has accrued and the purported part payment was made after the accrual of the right of action. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. HARRIS (2017) 11 NWLR (PT. 1575) 54 @ 79.

 

53.             On Issue Two (2) Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant has proved its case before this court. In support of the Claimant’s case, the Claimant, cited paragraphs 13 to 17 of the statement of facts in their pleadings.Counsel stated that the contention of the Defendants is that the domestic chapter of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE that granted the waiver had no right to grant the waiver and therefore not binding on the Defendants. And in response argued that the Claimant tendered in evidence the judgment of the court of appeal in the case of Unity Bank Plc V. Mr. Isaac Dabo and Anor (Appeal No.CA/A/463/2015). The said judgment was admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit C9. The main issue before the Court of Appeal in that case was whether the said agreement to waive 50% entitlement base on the two agreements dated February, 2006 and 16th February, 2006, was binding on the Respondents in that case. Counsel submitted that the decision by the Court of Appeal is binding on this Honourable Court. The agreements dated 7th February, 2006 and 16th February, 2006, being interpreted by the Court of Appeal are the same agreements before this court. The parties are equally the same. In Exhibit D13, the judgment of the trial court in the case of Isaac Dabo, tendered by the Defendants, Isaac Dabo sued as “representative of Ex-staff of Defunct Bank of the North Ltd.” Under cross examination DW1 admitted that Isaac Dabo was one of the serving Staff carried over to Unity Bank Plc.Counsel posed the question; if Isaac Dabo sued as representative of ex staff, who are the present Defendants in this case. He submitted that both former staff of Bank of the North before merger with Unity Bank Plc. and those who were carried over to Unity Bank under a new contract are all ex-staff of Bank of the North Limited and represented by Isaac Dabo in the case decided by the Court of Appeal. It is pertinent to note that the merger took place in 2006 and as at 2013 when the case of Isaac Dabo was filed all former staff of Bank of the North Limited have automatically become ex-staff of Defunct Bank of the North Ltd. The decision in the Isaac Dabo case is therefore binding on the parties in He further submitted that the Defendants who accepted the case of Isaac Dabo, decided by the National Industrial Court, as binding on its members and even tendered it in court as exhibit C13 cannot reject the decision of the Court of Appeal in the same case. They cannot reprobate and approbate at the same time. That so long as it is the same agreements interpreted by the Court of Appeal that are before this court for interpretation, this court is bound to follow the decision of the court of appeal in Isaac Dabo V. Unity Bank Plc., the parties notwithstanding. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. OLAYATO ARIBO (2018) 4 NWLR (PT. 1608) 130 AT 170. Counsel stated that both claimant and the Defendants have agreed in this case that their relationship is governed by the collective agreement tendered in this case. Article 8 of the “Procedural and Main Collective Agreement. He submitted with that the case has nothing to do with declaration of redundancy which is provided for in Article 5 of the collective agreement. As the provision of redundancy can only be invoked where according to Article 5 (a) of the Main Collective Agreement, there is “involuntary loss of employment through no fault of the employee caused by an excess of manpower or a contraction of available work through causes beyond the control of the Employer.Counsel submitted that the case at hand does not fall under any of the above situations. In the case at hand the employer was killed by government policy. The shareholders as provided under the Company and Allied Matters Act were compelled to step in to salvage the situation. The monetary compensation alluded to by the Defendants can only occur where an employee is declared redundant. For the defendants to enjoy this benefit, they most show to the court a letter from the claimant declaring such employee redundant.Counsel submitted that the law is that once the terms of contractual agreements between parties are clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of courts to construe such agreements/contracts in line with the clear intention of the contracting parties. ADEDEJI V. OBAJIMI (2018) 16 NWLR (PART 1644)146 AT 165.Counsel further submitted that the provisions of the Collective Agreement relied upon by all the parties in this case are very clear and unambiguous. Neither the parties nor the court can add to or vary those provisions. DRAGETANOS CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD. V. FAB MADIS VENTURES LTD & ANOR (2011) 16NWLR (PT.1273) 308 at 364 to 365.

 

On Issue Three (3) Counsel submitted that the defendants have not proved their counter claim. 

 

54.             Counsel argued that the issue in the agreement of February, 2006, was how to pay pension and gratuity. The local chapter of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE, as the domestic unit of the Union has the power to negotiate pension and gratuity base on total emolument. And the Defendants counter claim also contains a claim for 100% redundancy benefits. Counsel then submitted that the case has nothing to do with declaration of redundancy which is provided for in Article 5 of the collective agreement. There is no evidence before the court to show that any member of staff was declared redundant.Counsel further argued that the provision of redundancy can only be invoked where according to Article 5 (a) of the Main Collective Agreement, there is “involuntary loss of employment through no fault of the employee caused by an excess of manpower or a contraction of available work through causes beyond the control of the Employer”. He submitted that the defendants cannot still take the benefit of the redundancy provision because there was a pension and gratuity scheme in place in the Defunct Bank of the North Limited.  Also the Defendants have failed to prove their claim for 50% pension and gratuity and 100% redundancy benefit.

 

55.             Learned Counsel submitted that the defendants who were members of the domestic union and who benefited from the agreement by collecting the 50% paid cannot turn around in the words of DW2, “immediately challenge the agreement after payment of the 50%. It is wrong and unconscionably to challenge the agreement after taking the benefit from the agt. AWOJUGBAGBE LIGHT INDUSTRIES LTD V. CHINUKWE (1995) 4 NWLR (PT. 390) 379.

 

56.             On Issue Four (4) Counsel submitted that the counter claim of the defendants is incompetent in view of the case of Isaac Dabo&Anor v. Unity Bank Plc. (Suit No. NICN/ABJ/175/2013).

 

57.             Counsel argued that it is an abuse of court process for two suits with the same subject matter and between the same parties to run paripasu. Moreover, the court of appeal has made a pronouncement on one in Appeal No. CA/A/463/2015. This court cannot sit on appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeal.He further contended that Exhibit D13, the judgment of the National Industrial Court in the case of Isaac Dabo v. Unity Bank Plc., shows that Suit No. NICN/ABJ/175/2013 was instituted by “Mr. Isaac Dabo and Mr. Ishaku P. Sawa (suing as representatives of Ex-staff of Defunct Bank of the North Ltd). The question now is for who the counter claim was instituted. The answer to this question can be found in paragraph 39 of the counter claim where it is stated that “All the Defendants were former staff of defunct Bank of the North Plc”. Counsel further argued that the main contention in Isaac Dabo’s case was the waiver granted by the domestic chapter of ASSBIFI and BUBIFIE in the agreement of 7th February and 16th February, 2006. And also in the present case the contention by the counter claimant is still the agreement of and 16th February, 2006 and the items waived in the said agreements.

 

58.             Counsel submitted that Ex-staff of the defunct Bank of the North Ltd cannot re-litigate on an issue that has gone up to the Court of Appeal. The doctrine of res judicata stipulates that a matter base on the same issue and between the same parties cannot be re-litigated. The Court of Appeal has given judgment on whether the waiver granted in the agreements of 7th and February, 2006, is binding on the Defendants and this court cannot sit on appeal on the judgment of the Court of Appeal.Counsel argued that the 50% pension and gratuity claimed by the counter claimant and the 100% redundancy in five salary items of basic salary, transport allowance, housing/rent allowance, and utility allowance are the counter claimants’ rights and privileges under the 2005 Collective Agreement that was equally waived in the agreements dated 7th and 16th February, 2006. He then submitted that the ex-staff of Bank of the North Ltd cannot maintain two separate actions base on the waiver granted by the agreements of 7^th and 16^th February, 2006. Counsel stated that all ex-staff means every ex-staff of BON Ltd. All former staff of BON before the merger refers to the same group since the merger was the ceremonial burial of BON, there is therefore no ex-staff after the merger. The two parties in the two different cases therefore represent one and the same group. The counter claimants have been paid base on the judgment of the court of appeal, any order to pay by this court will amount to grave injustice as the counter claimant will be paid twice.Counsel argued that the 5 ex-staff that filed the case of Isaac Dabo sued in a representative capacity. In a representative action all the members of the group represented are deemed to be parties in the suit. He cited paragraph 4331 at pages 2007 to 2008 of Sasegbon’s Laws of Nigeria Vol. 17, where the learned author cited with approval the Supreme Court decision in RE: EGBO 11. (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 744) 41 at 58, where it was held thus:

 

            (1) “The original application for mandamus was to all intents and purposes,             therefore a representative action. Where a case is prosecuted in a representative             capacity, the death of the person or persons suing on behalf of the group or             community is no bar to such a case being continued in a representative capacity             by others having interest in the matter, who have applied to be substituted for    the deceased representative.

 

            This is because a person who sues in a representative capacity does so for the             benefit of the group or community he is representing and himself. This principle             also applies to an action being defended in a representative capacity. In a             representative action both the named plaintiff as well as the unnamed Plaintiffs             and the named defendant as well as the unnamed defendants are all parties and             if the former dies any of the latter can apply to the Court to substitute the demised Plaintiff or Defendant to prosecute or defend the case.”

 

59.             Counsel argued that Isaac Dabo and others represented all the ex—staff of the Defunct Bank of the North Ltd. The N 1,680,934,809.02 paid by the claimant was for all ex-staff. There is nothing in the booklet of all ex-staff, exhibit D12, to distinguish the purported pensioners from other ex-staff. The money paid was for pension and gratuity of all ex-staff. Counsel submitted that the court does not have the magical skills to know who is a pensioner that benefitted from the money. As there is nothing in the booklet of all ex-staff to know who is a pensioner.Counsel further submitted that the claimant who has paid the ex-staff of Defunct Bank of the North base on the agreement of July, 2013 and the judgment of the Court of Appeal, is not liable to the Defendants in this case. And the counter claim of the Defendants is therefore incompetent on the face of the uncontroverted evidence of payment to BON ex-staff. The claimant cannot be made to pay twice for the same liability. The judgment of the court of appeal in the case of Isaac Dabo is therefore binding on this court. Counsel stated that contrary to the argument of the counter claimant that they are not part of Pensioners forum, exhibit D19, the proposal to the Board of Unity Bank tendered and heavily relied upon by the Counter Claimant, the petition to Central Bank of Nigeria, the Industrial Arbitration Panel report, the NDIC report, all tendered by the counter claimant show that the pensioners forum has been the body fighting for the outstanding 50% of pension and gratuity from inception. He submitted that whether the counter claimants are called pensioners’ forum or not, what is important is that why the case of Isaac Dabo (supra) was instituted by and on behalf of ex-staff, this present counter claim is also instituted by and on behalf of the same ex-staff of Bank of the North Limited.Counsel contended that the computation of their names according to the statement of defence/counter claim shows that the names of the five staff indicated on the face of the writ in Isaac Dabo’s case were included in the calculation. Now that these five ex-staff are excluded from the computation, how will the court determine other ex-staff that have benefitted from the payment made due to the judgment of the court in Isaac Dabo’s case, considering the fact that the action was a representative action for and on behalf of all ex-staff of the bank?Counsel finally submitted that the Court of Appeal has upheld the agreement of 7th and 16th February, 2006, which the Defendant is challenging, to be binding on the parties. The court under the doctrine of stare decisis is bond to follow this decision. DAVIDSON V. PDP (2019)6 NWLR (PT.1668)330 AT 343 PARA F-H. 

 

60.             Counsel stated that the Defendants have argued strenuously that certain facts were not available to the Court of Appeal in the case of Isaac Dabo. He then submitted that it is not the facts available to the court that is used in determining whether a court is bond by the doctrine of res judicata. What this court needs to look out for is whether the issues and parties are the same. The Defendants cannot deny the fact that the issues before the two courts and parties are the same. NJOKU V. DIKIBO (1998)1 NWLR (PT. 534) 496@ 509.Counsel argued that the evidence in the two cases are the same, which is the agreement dated 7th February, 2006 and another agreement dated 16th February, 2006. The same agreements, which have already been adjudicated upon by this same National Industrial Court are still the subject matter of the counter claim. He submitted that the counter claim is incompetent and should be dismissed. Section 54 of the Evidence Act, 2011.IKE V. OGBOAJA (1993)6 NWLR (PT. 301) 39. 

 

DEFENDANTS’/ COUNTERCLAIMANTS’ REPLY 

 

61.             In replying the Claimant, the Defendants’/Counterclaimants’ submitted the law is settled that final addresses no matter how elegantly written cannot take the place of evidence. OYERINDE V. ACCESS BANK PLC (2014) LPELR-23461(CA) (PP.23 PARAS. B).

 

Defendants’/Counterclaimants’ formulated the Five issues for determination in replying the Claimant;

 

a.      Whether in the face of Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN, a contract of employment/service is regulated by the said Act and assuming but without conceding the question is answered in the affirmative, whether action brought under an instrument under seal is incompetent for reason that it was brought within 12 years when the cause of action arose

 

b.     Whether in the face of the cases of; University of Ibadan V. AihajiKasaliAdetoro (1991)4 NWLR (pt.185) 375@385; National Universities Commission V. Oluwa (2001) 3 NWLR (pt.699) 99@109-110; Thadani&Anor V. National Bank &Anor (1972) 7 NSCC 28@31 (as relied upon by the claimant) in juxtaposition with exhibit C7, a fresh cause of action had not accrued on the 9th day of July 2013 when the said exhibit C7 was made and if answered in the affirmative, whether the claimant can be heard to contend that the counterclaim is statute barred bearing in mind the provisions of Section 44 Limitation Act

 

c.      Whether the judgment of Court of Appeal in the case of Isaac Dabo (exhibit C9) is distinguishable from this extant case and if answered in the affirmative; whether the plaintiff’s argument that this extant case is an abuse of court process for reasons that the parties in exhibit C9 are the same with this case is an argument that can be entertained at the final address stage

 

d.     What are the differences or otherwise between Articles 5 and 8 of exhibit D18 (the Main Collective Agreement of 2005) and which of the provisions apply in this case

 

e.      Whether the date on which exhibit Dl 9 was made is not contained in the paper number of the document and even if answered in the affirmative, whether the plaintiff who committed a blunder by not inserting date on a document it made (exhibit D19-the board resolution) can benefit from its sins and wrong doing for not inserting date and therefore challenge the validity of the said document

 

62.             On Issue One (1) Learned Counsel to the Defendants’/Counterclaimants’ argued that the relevant law that calls for interpretation here is the FCT Limitation Act and no other law. The Limitation Laws of various states and court cases interpreting the Limitation Laws of various states are all inapplicable.

 

63.             The contract that existed between the plaintiff and the defendants is a contract of service which is also called contract of employment. Counsel submitted that the counterclaim is not statute barred judging by the provisions of Section 11 of the Limitation Act, Cap 522 LFN (Abuja). The plaintiff gave a wrong rendition of the Limitation Act by relying on Section 7 and submitted that the counterclaim becomes statute barred after 6 years. Section 7 of the Limitation Act deal with “Simple contract and quasi contract, and not contract of service/employment”. Contract of employment and simple contract mean different things.

 

64.             Counsel submitted that preponderance of judgments in the National Industrial Court is to the effect that Contract of Employment cannot be statute barred. The Limitation Act CAP 522 LEN (Abuja) did not include contract of employment as matters that can be statured barred. To this end, the National Industrial Court as a special labour court has repeatedly held that Limitation Act is inapplicable in contract of employment. NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION & FISCAL COMMISSION (NRMAFC) V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON (2019 2 NWLR (pt.1656)247; GODSON IKECHUKWU AKUMAH V. FISRT BANK NIGERIA LTD with Suit number NICN/LA/553/2018; LILIAN NNENNA AKUMAH V. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA LTD with suit NICN/LA/402/20I8. In both cases, the National Industrial Court held that Limitation Act is inapplicable in contracts of service.

 

65.             Learned Counsel submitted that Limitation laws apply only to simple contract and a contract of employment or contract of service is not a simple contract. There is absolutely nothing in the length and breathe of Limitation Act Cap 522 to suggest that contract of service was intended to be statute barred. Section 7 of Limitation Act only made reference to simple contract and quasi contract and the plaintiff wrongly classified the employment of the defendants as simple contract and quasi contract and thereby gave a wrong rendition to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. As Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition at page 525 defined employment contract as follows- “An agreement or contract between employer and employee in which the terms and conditions of one’s employment are provided”. At page 1245, same dictionary defined quasi contract as follows- “An obligation which law creates in absence of agreement; it is invoked by courts where there is unjust enrichment”.  ASCOT FLOWLINESS LTD V. BV INTEGRATED PROJECTS LTD (2015) LPELR-25680(CA).

66.             Counsel posed a question whether in the face of Limitation Act, Cap LFN 522, and a contract of employment/service is regulated by the said Act. He stated that assuming but without conceding the question is answered in the affirmative, whether an accrued brought under an instrument under seal is incompetent for reason that it was brought within 12 years when the cause of action arose.

 

67.             Counsel submitted that the law is that actions brought upon an instrument under seal shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years. That is to say, actions brought upon an instrument under seal becomes statute barred after 12 years. What then is an instrument? Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition at page 801 gave so many definitions to an instrument and which definitions are thus;

            =“A formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or             lease”

            =“A writing that satisfies the requisite of negotiability”

            =“A writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or contract”

 

68.             Counsel stated that the following documents and exhibits in this extant case qualify as instruments to wit; The Procedural Agreement-that is the 2005 Collective Agreement (exhibit D18); The Offensive Waiver Agreements dated 7^th February 2006 and 16th July 2006 (exhibits C4 and C5); The Agreement of 9^th July 2013(exhibit C7) and the judgment of Industrial Arbitration Panel (exhibits D9 and D20).

 

69.             Counsel argued that the cause of action arose in 2006 and which cause of action was re-ignited and additionally accrued in 2013 through exhibit C7 which is the agreement dated 9^th July 2013 under which the bank agreed to pay the 50% that was purportedly waived. It was failure to pay in line with exhibit C7 that led to further picketing after the first picketing. And by virtue of Section 3 Limitation Act, the counterclaim though filed in 2014 dates back to 2013 and was filed in 2013. Whether calculating from 2006 when the cause of action firstly arose or from 2013 following fresh accrual of the cause of action under exhibit C7, the counterclaim was filed within 12 years as required by Section 11 of Limitation Act. Section 11 is titled “Actions barred after certain periods of 12 years.

 

70.             He further argued that the instrument under which the arbitration award was entered was made under seal (that is the 2005 collective agreement). The award was tendered as exhibits D9 and D20. An action brought to enforce entitlements under an arbitration award becomes statute barred after 12 years. The defendants seek to enforce their rights and entitlements under exhibits D9 and D20, D18 and C7.

 

71.             Counsel posed the question what then qualifies as an instrument under seal? He cited legendary Professor ItseSagay in his book “Nigerian Law of Contract”, 2nd Edition which was published by Spectrum Law Series at page 2 defines contract under seal as “A contract under seal or deed, must be in writing or maybe typed on paper or parchment. A deed is supposed to be executed, i.e., completed and given full legal effect by the signing, sealing and delivery of it by the party executing, to the other party”. 

 

72.             On Issue Two (2) Counsel argued that three sets of persons were claimants to the Defunct Bank of the North at the wake of consolidation to wit-those who were pensioners and already receiving pension before consolidation, those who were rendered redundant and lost their jobs as a result of the consolidation, and those who lost their jobs but were carried over to Unity Bank on fresh appointments. In other words, their previous employment with Bank of the North was also extinguished. For convenience, the BANK repeatedly referred to these three (3) classes of claimants jointly as PENSIONERS.

 

73.             He further argued that in their pleadings conclusive the bank also refer to the defendants as PENSIONERS but in the real sense, the defendants are different from the other group that were already pensioners before acquisition of Bank of the North. 

 

74.             Counsel submitted that exhibit D7 is more than an acknowledgment of debt. It is an open admission. It was refusal or neglect to implement the contents of this exhibit that led to threats for additional picketing. This exhibit is an instrument under seal and signed by the bank. By virtue of exhibit C7, a fresh contractual agreement had been created and warranting an accrual of cause of action. THADANT & ANOR N. NATIONAL BANK & ANOR (1972)7 NSCC 28@31.

 

75.             Learned Counsel finally submitted that exhibit C7 resuscitated and resurrected the cause of action in 2013. There are fresh accruals of cause of action on the said 9th July 2013. By the said exhibit C7, the bank admitted owing the purportedly waived 50% terminal benefits and entered into agreement to pay. The bank also admitted the existence of balance payment and entered into agreements with the bigger body that binds all the creditors which is BON Pensioners.

 

76.             On Issue Three (3) Counsel submitted the judgment of Court of Appeal in the Isaac Dabor case does not strictly apply to this extant case. The only reason why the Court of Appeal held the offensive waiver agreements (exhibits C4 and C5) as binding in the Isaac Dabor case was the mere fact that the Claimant’s in that case admitted the bindingness of the agreements in paragraph 14 of their statement of claim. 

 

77.             Counsel posited that in brevity, a ratio decidendi is different from the holding of the court. The ratio decidendi of that holding of the court is contained in paragraph 14 of the statement of fact of the plaintiff in that case (which was reproduced at pages 21 to 22 of the judgment of court). Ratio Decidendi means the reason for the court’s decision. The reason for the decision of the court in that case is the “admissions” of the plaintiff in that case to the bindingness of the offensive exhibits C4 and C5). The ratio in that case does not bind the defendants in this case. For what amounts to ratio decidendi.NUC V. ALLI & ANOR (2013) LPELR-21444(CA) (PP. 42-43 PARAS. D); L.M. ERICSSON NIG LTD V. AQUA OIL NIG LTD (2011) LPELR-8807(CA) (PP. 32-33 PARAS. D).

 

78.             Counsel argued that in the extant case, the defendants vehemently and repeated pleaded the nullity of the waiver agreements (exhibits C4 and C5) and cited relevant provisions of The Main Collective Agreement (Article 5 of exhibit D18) in aid. They also relied on the various admissions of the bank itself, including the Board Resolutions (exhibit D19) to that effect. To that extent, these cases are distinguishable because the admissions of the ex-staff in exhibit C9 does not bind the defendants in this case. He submitted that parties are bound by their pleadings and the pleadings of a stranger in one case cannot bind a party in a different case. For the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings and the pleadings of parties in one case cannot bind parties to a different case. OBURU V. IRA (2002) 10 NWLR (PT.775) 297 @308 PARA.D; SALAUDEEN V. MAMMAN (2000)14 NWLR (PT.686)63@75 PARA. B.

 

79.             Counsel contended that based on precedent, the bank is also duty bound to pay the defendants on same moral grounds which the Court of Appeal has ordered. Since the Court of Appeal had ordered the enforcement of exhibit C7 and payment of money under the said exhibit C7 and since the bank had long paid Isaac Dabo and 4 other aggrieved members based on the said exhibit C7 and the judgment of Court of Appeal, judicial precedent/stare decisis will apply to enforcement payments in favour of the defendants against the bank. 

 

7UP BOTTLING COMPANY V. ABIOLA SONS LTD (1989) 4 NWLR (PT.114)229 @240 PARAS.E-F); ADEDAYO V. PDP (2013)7 NWLR (PT.1382)1 @40 PARAS.B-D.

 

80.             On Issue Four (4) Learned Counsel argued that in an attempt to escape from justice the bank offered a horrible rendition of Articles 5 and 8 of the Main Collective Agreement(exhibit D18). Article 5 is titled “REDUNDANCY”. He stated that the Claimant read Article 5 but gave a wrong and preposterous rendition to the said Article 5. And also the arguments of the plaintiff are not supported by their pleadings. This case borders on redundancy and the pleadings of the defendants point to this fact.

 

81.             Counsel submitted that parties are bound by their pleadings. He argued that the Claimant bank did not join issues with the defendants on these facts of redundancy. The defendants led unchallenged evidence on these facts and the bank did not ask any cross- examination question on these facts. He submitted that the court is bound to act on the unchallenged evidence of the defendants. As the testimony of the defendants on redundancy and to the effect that they lost their jobs due to the merger and acquisition was unchallenged. AIRTEL NETWORKS LTD V. PLUS LTD (Pp. 55 paras. D-D); KOLOKO & ANOR V. NKWONTA (Pp. 19 paras. C)

 

82.             Counsel submitted that failure of the bank to cross-examine defendant witnesses on matters of redundancy must be deemed as admissions of those pieces of evidence. OHIMOGBO V. IDIH (2018) LPELR-46852(CA) (Pp. 22 paras. B); AKPAGHER V. GBUNGU (2015) 1 NWLR (pt.1440)209, where the court held that where a witness is not subjected to cross-fire of cross examination to impeach a vital point, the net effect is that the failure is deemed an admission of all such facts. NBA V. ITEOGU (2006)13 NWLR (PT.996)219 @236 PARA. E; NIGERIA CUSTOMS V. BAZUAYE (2006)3 NWLR (PT.967)303

 

83.             Counsel also submitted that the wordings of Article 5 of the Main Collective Agreement are clear and unambiguous. Thus the provisions must be given their literal meanings of interpretation. ABEGUNDE V. ONDO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY & ORS (2015) LPELR-24588(SC) (Pp. 41 paras. C).

 

84.             Counsel argued that exhibit D16 is the CBN Directive on Merger and Consolidation. Exhibit D16 is titled “Guidelines and Incentives on Consolidation in the Nigerian Banking Industry”. This document provides the entitlement to be given to persons that may be affected by the consolidation, merger and acquisition policy as directed by the CBN during the era of Chukwuma Charles Soludo as the then Governor of CBN. At Section 9(2), it provided that anyone affected by the consolidation should not be paid below the industry standard. And the industry standard is as contained in Article 5 of the Main Collective Agreement which is 100% terminal benefits as against the 50% that was paid by the plaintiff bank. My lord, the plaintiff bank failed to cross-examine the defendant witnesses on the contents of exhibit D16. This failure is an obvious admission of the contents of exhibit D16.

 

85.             Counsel submitted that pleadings of the defendants on redundancy and the plaintiff woefully failed to cross-examine the defendant witnesses on whether or not there was redundancy but felt comfortable to argue same in their final written address. This failure is deemed an admission of all such facts. For the principle that failure to cross-examine on important areas is an admission.ADESULE V. MAYOWA (2013)13 NWLR (pt.1263)135@170 paras. E-F; YONWUREN V. MODERN SIGNS LTD (2021)14 NWLR (pt.1795)122; YONBISH V. MWANMUT (2020) 9 NWLR 

 

86.             Counsel further stated that the contents of Articles 5 and 8 are related and interwoven. They are so deeply connected and extreme caution and carefulness must be taken in order to bring out the clear meaning in Article 8. The drafters of Article 8 are not members of the National Assembly and are also not lawyers and caution must be taken to bring out the clear meanings of Articles 5 and 8. He submitted that it is also trite law in canons of interpretation that related sections must be mutually conflated in order to bring out the real and true meaning. In brevity, related sections must be read together and not in isolation from each other. The law is also settled that the principle of interpretation for statutes are the same with other documents or enactments (inclusive exhibit D18 in this case). IBRAHIM V. FULANI (2010) I7NWLR (pt.1222)241@271, paras.B-D; ADELEKE V. O.S.H.A. (2006) I6NWLR (pt.1006)608; TUKUR V. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1989)4 NWLR (pt.117)517; OGBONNA V. AG OF IMO STATE & ORS (1992) LPELR-2287(SC) (Pp. 55 paras. A)

 

87.             On Issue Five (5) Counsel submitted that exhibit D19 has a date. The document speaks for itself. He contended that the date of the said exhibit is as contained in the paper number of the document and at the column titled “Board paper NO”. The paper number was reproduced as= UB/BM/06/2011/23/02B. My lord from this reference, the date the document was produced is on 23rd June 2011. The date can be inferred from the reference number and this conclusively explains why the plaintiff chose not to insert further date in the document. The document was admitted without objection. He submitted that the issue of date on the document must be resolved in favour of the defendants because failure to either join issues on the date or ask cross examination questions on same are fatal to the plaintiff. They are deemed admissions. On the implications of not asking cross examination questions on vital areas we again refer my lord to the case of OHIMOGBO V. IDIH (supra); AKPAGHER V. GBUNGU (supra); NBA V. ITEOGU (supra); NIGERIA CUSTOMS V. BAZUAYE (supra).

 

88.             Counsel submitted that the principles of equity will not allow a party to benefit from his own wrong doing. The plaintiff who is the maker of exhibit D19 ought to have dated exhibit D19. They committed a blunder in not dating exhibit D19. It is their sole error, sins, omissions and transgressions in not dating exhibit D19. It must be noted that while exhibit D19 was signed, the date can be inferred from the reference number (paper number). The same plaintiff who committed the blunder now argues that the same exhibit D19 is a worthless document. They want to benefit from their own sins of not dating exhibit D19. Counsel submitted that the law is settled that a party cannot benefit from his own wrong doing. The case of UBA PLC V. SALMAN (2018) LPELR-45698(CA) (PP. 35-39 PARAS.A-A); ENEKWE V. INT’L MERCHANT BANK OF NIG LTD. & ORS (2006) LPELR-1140(SC) (PP. 37 PARAS. A); SALEH V. MONGUNO & ORS (2006) LPELR-2992(SC) (PP. 31 PARAS. C).

 

89.            Counsel stated that the content of exhibit D19 was meant for the defendants at the wake of the agitations. The same Claimant that produced exhibit D19 is the same person that is belatedly arguing that the defendants cannot rely on exhibit D19. By so arguing, the Claimant is trying to defraud the court. He submitted that the Claimant are trying to defraud this court and on what amounts to defrauding a court. ADIMORA V. AJUFO & ORS (1988) LPELR-182(SC) (Pp. 16 paras. E); ONUCHUKWU V. NNOLI & ANOR (2013) LPELR-21223(CA) (Pp. 19 paras. A) 

 

90.             On the            18^th May, 2022 parties adopted and adumbrated their respective processes and this matter was adjourned for this judgement.

 

Court’s Decision

 

91.             Having carefully summarized the position of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this ruling and  mentions shall them as and when the need arises.

 

92.             The issues for determination in this suit to my mind are 1) whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs being claimed.  And 2) if the is any merit to the Defendants counter claim

 

The claimants reliefs are as follows:

 

1.   AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves,       servants, agents, and/or privies howsoever described from picketing the Claimant or       doing anything or act whatsoever that will interrupt, interfere or in any way disrupt       with the Claimants operations in all its branches.

 

2.   A DECLARATION that the Claimant is not in any way liable to the defendants.

 

3.   A DECLARATION that the 50% payment of pension and gratuity by Bank of the       North shareholders was full and final payment.

 

4.   The cost of filing this suit.

93.             The Claimant following the then CBN directive to recapitalize banks to NGN25billion. that the Defunct Bank of the North and New Nigeria Bank all merged with Unity Bank That based on this, parties to the merger formulated a merger scheme (MS) and that the scheme stated that all staff liabilities must be handled by each constituent bank before the merger. That a Merger Implementation Agreement (MIA) provided also that all trade union liabilities shall be the responsibilities of Bank of the North and New Nigeria Bank.That while this was on, senior and junior staff of the defunct Bank of the North declared a trade dispute and this made the then Minister of Labour and Productivity to refer the dispute to Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and an award was made. The industrial dispute bothered on refusal of Bank of the North to implement the 2002 Collective Agreement in the industry and IAP ordered Bank of the North to pay same. Rather than pay, the 19 Northern State Governors that own Bank of the North coerced ASSBIFIE and NUBIFIE BON domestic committees to enter into an illegal contract to waive judgment of the Industrial Arbitration Panel and to also waive 50% of all staff terminal benefits so as to empower Bank of the North have enough capital going into the merger).

 

94.             It is the case of the Claimant that ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE BON domestic committees waived all their rights and entitlements under judgment of the Industrial Arbitration Panel on implementation of the 2005 Collective Agreement and also waived 50% of their terminal benefits. They claimed that representatives of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE (BON domestic committees) entered into agreement in this connection with the share-holders of Bank of the North. They claimed that two separate but similar agreements were entered into- one for management staff, and another for ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE. That based on the above, everyone was paid in line with the said agreement. That notwithstanding the payment and the agreements, BON Pensioners on 8th July 2013 picketed Bank of the North claiming the remainder 50% that was purportedly waived and this made Bank of the North to enter into agreement on July 2013(exhibit C7) to pay the sum of NGN1,680,934,809.00 as representing the purportedly waived 50%. That based on this new agreement, Unity Bank had paid 30% of this money.

 

95.             The Claimant stated that the Defendants have threatened to picket the Claimant bank on 23^rd August 2013 if the purportedly waived 50% is not paid. In the Amended Reply/Defense to Counterclaim, the Claimant stated that the case filed by management staff of BON where judgment was given to the said management staff by the National Industrial Court but the said judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on appeal.

 

96.             The Claimant stated that although they previously owed an outstanding 50% terminal benefits, that based on agreements entered into on 9th July 2013, the bank had paid everyone the outstanding balance that was waived. The only issue the claimant had was that it was agreed that after payment of that very agreed sum, no one under any guise should make further claims. The Claimant stated that the Joint Counter Claim of the Defendants is a claim by individuals as they do not have the authority of BON Pensioners to represent the pensioners of defunct Bank of the North Ltd. And that the purported letter from one Umar H. Umar is a forged document. Claimant claim that Unity Bank Plc. has paid the said outstanding 50% entitlement in line with the agreement of the parties and any person that claims not to have received his or her payment should complain through the agreed channel.

 

1.   AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants either by themselves,       servants, agents, and/or privies howsoever described from picketing the Claimant or       doing anything or act whatsoever that will interrupt, interfere or in any way disrupt       with the Claimants operations in all its branches.

 

2.   A DECLARATION that the Claimant is not in any way liable to the defendants.

 

3.   A DECLARATION that the 50% payment of pension and gratuity by Bank of the       North shareholders was full and final payment.

 

4.   The cost of filing this suit.

 

In relief 1 the claimant is seeking an injustion in perpetutity to retstain the defendants from picketing the claimants.

 

Relief 2 is for a legal pronouncement that the Claimant bear no liability to the Defendants’ and in

 

Relief 3 the claimant seeks that the court pronuce that they had fully paid of their liability to the defendants in the 50% already paid,

 

Section 41 Trade Union Act (Picketting )

 

97.             Ogiefo v. Isesele i &ors (2014) LPELR-22333(CA)  (Pp. 55 paras. A)"Instructively, in 'the case of ADENIRAN VS. ALAO (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.223) 350, cited and relied upon by the Appellant under issue No.2, it was held by this court, thus:

 

A court of law cannot grant a perpetual injunction on a mere prima facie case. Perpetual injunction cannot be granted on speculation or conjecture on the part of the trial judge that the plaintiff seems to have proved his case. Perpetual injunction, because of its very nature of finality can only be granted if the plaintiff has successfully proved his case on the balance of probability or the preponderance of evidence."  Per SAULAWA ,J.C.A in Ogiefo v. Isesele i & ors (2014) LPELR-22333(CA)  (Pp. 55 paras. A)

 

Udo v. Anyankana (2016) LPELR-41192(CA)  (Pp. 13-14 paras. C)"The two counsel are ad idem that an order of perpetual injunction is a necessary consequential relief where declaration of title is made in favour of a party. According to the Supreme Court:

 

98.             The grant of the relief of perpetual injunction is a consequential order which should naturally flow from the declaratory order sought and granted by Court. The essence of granting a perpetual injunction on a final determination of the rights of the parties is to prevent permanently the infringement of those rights and to obviate the necessity of bringing multiplicity of suits in respect of every repeated infringement. See GOLDMARK

NIGERIA LTD & ORS v. IBAFON COMPANY LTD. (2012) 49 NSCQR 1763 at 1820."  Per OYEWOLE ,J.C.A in udo v. anyankana (2016) LPELR-41192(CA)  (Pp. 13-14 paras. C)

 

99.             Picketing is a lawful act,  cannot be strained against Trade union right and oreserve Section 42 extend this right to two or more so for this reason the Court cannot grant relief 1.

 

Declaratory reliefs

 

100.         In EKANEM V. A.I.G.P. (2008) 5 NWLR (PT. 1079) 97 AT P. 111, PARA. Cit was held that "A declaratory order of court simply proclaims the existence of an event or a legal situation. It may contain a specific order to be carried out and it may not necessarily direct the carrying out of the order.Also in ALAO V. AKANO (2005) 11 NWLR (PT.935)160it was held that ''A plaintiff who seeks a declaratory relief must show that he has an interest or right which forms the foundation for that right. The plaintiff must establish a right in relation to [AKUNNIA V. A.-G., ANAMBRA STATE (1977) 5 SC 161; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS V. DARMAN (1982) 3 NCLR 915.]" Per Omage, JCA which the declaration can be made.''Per MUSDAPHER, J.S.C (P. 11, paras. B-C). "A declaratory relief is one that seeks the pronouncement of the court as to the status of a named matter, thing or situation. See: NWAGU V. FADIPE(2012) LPELR-7966(CA)ENEKWE VS I.M.B. (NIG.) LTD. (2007) ALL FWLR (349) 1053 AT 1073 H; ALIMS NIG.LTD V. U.B.A. PLC (2007) ALL FWLR (348) 971 AT 981. It is a discretionary relief." Per Kekere-Ekun, J.C.A (P. 16, paras. F-G).

 

101.         AGBAJE V. FASHOLA (2008) 6 NWLR (PT. 1082)"It is trite that in cases where declaratory reliefs are claimed as in the present case, \ the  claimant  must satisfy the Court by cogent and reliable proof or evidence in support of his right.  In this case the claimant has not put before the court anything on which the court can rely, to find a legal right  to interest as of right, the claimant’s claims therefore all fail

 

WHEREFORE the defendants/counterclaimants counterclaim as follows:

 

1.      A DECLARATION that the counter-claimants are entitled to full implementation of the 2005 collective agreement with regard to payment of terminal benefits of staffers of the defunct Bank of the North Limited.

2.      A DECLARATION that the purported agreement executed between the shareholders and management of the defunct Bank of the North Ltd on the 7^th and 16^th both of February, 2006 respectively with officials of ASSBIFI and NUBIFIE, Bank of the North Ltd domestic unit waving 50% benefits of the counter-claimants is a nullity.

3.      A DECLARATION that Unity Bank Plc. is bound by the collective agreement of 2005 and should pay the defendants a full redundancy benefits which is made up of basic salary, housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch subsidy in accordance with the collective agreement of 2005, as the claimant (Unity Bank PLC) had inherited all assets and liabilities of the defunct Bank of the North Ltd by virtue of the merger.

4.      A DECLARATION that the suit of the claimant is lacking in merit, vexatious and an attempt to delay the defendants entitlements.

5.      A DECLARATION that the Claimant (Unity Bank Plc.) is indebted to the counter- claimants in the sum of N1,605,946,377.50 as outstanding 50% balance sum for redundancy on basic salary alone and a further sum of N2,230,650,084.44 as unpaid 100% redundancy on Housing allowance, Transport allowance and Lunch subsidy and in all totaling N3,836,596,461.94 and when the sum of N34,356,836.45 due to 5 members of the counter-claimants with judgment in Suit NO. NICN/ABJ/175/2013 is deducted there-from gives a balance sum of N3, 802,239,625.49 as the claimant’s current financial exposure and debt owed the counter-claimants.

6.      An award of the sum of N3, 802,239,625.49 against the claimant and in favour of the counter-claimants as unpaid terminal benefits owed the counter-claimants by the claimant.

7.      An award of the sum of N50Million as cost of action.

8.      An award of N500Million as general damages.

9.      An Award of 10% post Judgment interest on the entire judgment sum from the date of judgment till same is fully liquidated.

10. AN ORDER dismissing the claimant’s suit with cost of N5Million.

 

102.         In  reaction to the Defendant Counter claimants reliefs the Claimants raised 4 issues ,

1.     Whether the Counter Claim by the Defendants is not statute barred.

2.     Whether the Claimant has not proved its case before this court.

3.     Whether the Defendants have proved their Counter Claim

4.     Whether the counter claim of the Defendants is competent in view of the case of Isaac Dabo&Anor v. Unity Bank Plc. (Appeal No. CA/A/463/2015)

 

103.         Issue 1 and 4 are threshold jurisdictional matters and so I will resolve them fores.

 

Statute barred

 

Limitation laws

104.         In National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 ors v. Ajibola Johnson & 10 ors [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247, His Lordship Ariwoola, JSC at 271 sounded the death knell on the applicability of the Public Officers Protection law to contracts of service. In his words:

 

a.                  I have no slightest difficulty in holding that the appellants are not covered by the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act as to render the respondents’ action statute barred.

 

b.                  In sum I hold that the learned justices of the court below are right in holding that the appellants do not enjoy the umbrella of Public Officers Protection Law in the contract of service involving the respondents…

 

 

From SUIT NO. NICN/LA/164/2014 Mrs. Adebola Ogunsanwo Vs.Polaris Bank Limited                  JULY 9, 2019

 

105.         The argument as to statute-barred shall accordingly be discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. This aside, the defendant may wish to note that National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 ors v. Ajibola Johnson & 10 ors [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247 at 270 - 271 has only recently held that the limitation law does not apply to contracts of service.

 

106.         The 4^th raises a question of abuse of Court proves : that the counter claim of the defendants is incompetent in view of the case of Isaac Dabo & Anor v. Unity Bank Plc. (Suit No. NICN/ABJ/175/2013).

 

107.       In Suit No. FHC/L/CP/1689/2015: Ecobank Nigeria Ltd V. Honeywell Flour Mills Plc. filed on 9/11/2015 constituted an abuse of Court process as vehemently contended by the Appellant or did not constitute an abuse of Court process as equally vehemently contended by the Respondent. Now, the term 'abuse of Court process' is often seen to be synonymous with multiplicity of suits, but though that in a way is a correct proposition of the law, yet abuse of Court process is much more than mere multiplicity of suits. In other words, multiplicity of suits is not the only way by which abuse of Court process could be constituted. Simply put, and for lack of a precise or concise definition, the term 'abuse of Court process' denotes the improper use of the process of Court to achieve unlawful ends or the employment of the judicial process to the annoyance or irritation or injury of the person of another and thus it can safely pass as a doctrine of law without any precise or concise definition. This is rightly and arguably so because what would constitute or amount to abuse of Court process is very diverse, imprecise and thus subject to infinite or indefinite considerations. In considering whether or not an action constitutes an abuse of Court process, the Court is to critically consider the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case in which the issue of abuse of Court process is raised to determine whether in the peculiar circumstances of the affected case, the act of the party complained of constitutes an abuse of court process. Happily, over the years authorities have become legion, as are replete in the law reports, providing some form of guide in carrying out the consideration whether or not an abuse of Court process has been occasioned by the process of a party. See Saraki V. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156. See also Daniel V. FRN (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 570; Harriman V. Harriman (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 6; Ukachukwu V. PDP (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1396) 65; CPC V. Ombugadu (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1385) 66; Chime V. Onyia (2009) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1124) 1; Abubakar V. Bebeji Oil and Allied Products Ltd. (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 319; Adesokan V. Adegorolu (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 293; Umeh V. Iwu (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 225. The corollary to the above fluid state of uncertainty and imprecise definition of the term 'abuse of Court process' is ironically the settled certainty that the factual situations or categories of facts or circumstances that may constitute or amount or give rise to abuse of Court process are never closed and therefore, has no exhaustive list thereof and thus would largely depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. See Ette V. Edoho (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 601 @ p. 609. See also PDP V. Obi (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1128) 327 @ pp. 339 - 340; Umeh V. Iwu (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 225; Benkay Nig. Ltd. V. Cadbury Nig Plc. (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 338

 

ABDU YUNUSA INDABAWA v. GARBA MAGASHI & ANOR - (2016) LPELR-41626(CA)

 

Meaning of the term abuse of court process

 

108.       "What is an abuse of Court process or abuse of judicial process? Generally, an, abuse of Court process contemplates multiplicity of suits between the same parties with regard to same subject matter on the same issue in same or another Court. The Courts, in a plethora of judicial decisions, have had defined or described the phrase or terminology "abuse of Court process" or "abuse of judicial process". For instance in UMEH vs. Iwu (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 225) @ 2450 the Supreme Court per Muhammad, J.S.C defined it thus: "The term "abuse of Court process" and "abuse of judicial process", are one and the same thing. I once observed that: "Abuse of Court process simply means that the process of the Court has not been used bona fide and properly. It also connotes the employment of judicious process by a party in improper use to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice". See the case of Expo, Ltd. v. Pafab Enterprises Ltd. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 591) 449 at 462 where it was stated that an abuse of Court process is a multiplicity of same action in same Court or even before another Court or Courts being pursued simultaneously by the plaintiff/applicant as the case may be." Per BDLIYA, J.C.A. (Pp. 5-6, Paras. E-E).

 

109.         From the foregoing the Counterclaim I find is abuse of process and therefore is hereby struck out , The claimant case lacks merit and counter claim is incompetent case dismissed,

 

110.         This is the Court’s judgement and it is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

 

.....................................

HON. JUSTICE E. N. AGBAKOBA

JUDGE, COURT 3

ABUJA