
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE E. N. AGBKOBA
DATED: 3RD NOVEMBER, 2022 SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/291/2019
BETWEEN
DR. SOLOMON KEHINDE OLOWOOKERE ………… CLAIMANT
AND
UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN ……….. DEFENDANT
REPRESENTATION
S. O. BANJO Esq. with C. O. IKEM-MGBEMENA Esq. and D. O. VIANANA Esq. for the Claimant.
A. O. ABDUL Esq. with SAFINAT LAMIDI Esq. and ADESEWA ADEGBILE Esq. for the Defendant.
JUDGEMENT
1. The Claimant via a an Amended General Form of Complaint, Statement of Facts and other frontloaded process dated and filed 11th February 2020 instituted a suit against the Defendant seeking the Honorable Court for the following reliefs:
a. A DECLARATION setting aside the constitution, composition, and findings of the Disciplinary Committee which tried the Claimant upon which his letter of dismissal was founded for lack of competence to try a criminal allegation of rape or sexual assault.
b. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant by a letter dated June 27, 2019, did not follow due process of law and procedure.
c. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the first Defendant by a letter dated June 27, 2019 is null, void and of no effect, having being in breach of the right to fair hearing as guaranteed by the 1999 constitution.
d. A DECLARATION that the employment of the Claimant with the first Defendant is showered with statutory flavour, and regulated by law.
e. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is still in the employment of the first Defendant.
f. AN ORDER re-instating the Claimant back to his employment and in his position prior to the purported dismissal.
g. AN ORDER directing payment of the Claimant unpaid salaries and other benefits including promotion from June 27, 2019 till his re-instatement as follows:
h. Salary at the rate of N134.141.09 (One hundred thirty-four thousand, one hundred forty-one naira, nine kobo) (Net salary) per month from July 2019 till reinstatement.
i. Earned allowances from years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 till judgement and reinstatement.
j. Payment to the Claimant by the Defendant, of a sum N150,000,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) as damages for the suffering, trauma, injury and other inconveniences suffered by the Claimant as a result of his purported and wrongful dismissal by the first Defendant.
k. N500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as the cost of this proceeding.
2. In response to the suit commenced, the Defendant first filed a Memorandum of Appearance dated 16th March 2020 and filed 18th March 2020, followed by a their Statement of Defence and all frontloaded document dated 16th March 2020 and filed 18th March 2020. Claimant did not file a Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence.
3. Before proceeding, I will give a brief summary of the complaints of the Claimants and the defenses of the Defendants to the complaints.
CLAIMANT’S CASE
4. The Claimant, an employee of the Defendant was appointed as an Assistant Lecturer by the Defendant, vide a letter dated 12th day of November, 2014. His appointment with the Defendant was confirmed vide a letter dated 25th September, 2017. His duties as an academic Staff of the Defendant include, teaching of students, Staff Adviser for the Department of Arts Education and level Adviser to the students in the Department of Arts Education. And these duties brought him into constant relationship with the students, especially in the Department. On the 29th day of June, 2019, he was served with a letter of dismissal by the Defendant dated 27th day of June, 2019 effective same day. Prior to the service of the letter of the dismissal he was served with query dated March 12, 2019.
5. The query alleged him to have forcefully and sexually assaulted a female student in Department of Arts Education. He made a response sequel to the said query dated 14th March, 2019 which was subsequently followed by the initiation of Disciplinary proceedings. In his responses to query and at the Disciplinary Committee proceedings, he denied the alleged rape or other act of sexual assault. He stated that he was denied fair hearing during the sitting at the Disciplinary Committee. As he was not allowed to listen and hear the evidence given against him by the witnesses called by the Committee, neither was he allowed to cross-examine the said witnesses. He was not given access to the document used against him and he was not allowed to see any of such document neither was he given access to the report of the disciplinary committee; nor did he sign any such report which would enable him to know the findings of the committee.
DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE
6. The Defendant on the other hand pleaded that the Claimant’s appointment/employment with the Defendant has ceased because he has been dismissed from the Defendant. Defendant pleaded that Claimant by his letter of appointment was appointed as an academic staff and his job is mainly to teach student. The Claimant admitted commission of an act of misconduct to wit; sexually assaulting one Eunice Adebayo a student in his department, showing her, her scores in a continuous assessment he was delegated to invigilate and mark and altering her score in a continuous assessment to a higher score. The Defendant pleaded that it issued a query to the Claimant and invited him on allegation of misconduct which is not limited to sexually assaulting a student in his department but included allegation of act unbecoming of a public officer to wit; showing scores of a continuous assessment to the student and also altering a mark scored by a student in her continuous assessment. The Claimant admitted the commission of the allegation of this misconduct and pleaded to the relations of the student that is Eunice Adebayo for forgiveness alleging that it as a devil’s act. The Defendant pleaded that the Claimant was afforded fair hearing. And Prof. L.T Ajibade who is the Dean of Student Affairs and a Senate representative at the Staff Disciplinary and Appeal Committee of the Defendant had no influence other than being a member of the committee. The Defendant stated that there was no single witness that gave evidence behind the Claimant and that witnesses mentioned by the Claimant were all called as a result of their connection to the allegation of misconduct for which the Claimant was being invited by the SDAC of the Defendant. All the witnesses that gave evidence before the Defendant’s Staff Disciplinary and Appeal Committee in connection with the allegation of misconduct levied against Claimant did so in the presence of the Claimant and that the Claimant was never denied the opportunity of asking question or cross examining them. The Defendant pleaded that the Claimant was aware of his alleged act that was tagged act unbecoming of him as a public officer and that he responded to the said allegation. And the query served on the Claimant did not alleged him of committing rape but rather alleged him of sexually assaulting a female student in his department. The Defendant finally pleaded that the dismissal and procedure that led to the dismissal of the Claimant followed due process as contained in the act and regulation of the Defendant. And therefore it is not owing the Claimant any arrears or entitlements and neither is it owing any allowance.
7. At the trial, the Claimant testified as CW1, he adopted her Witness Statement on Oath deposed on the 11th February 2020 which was then admitted in evidence as Exhibit CW1. The Witness also tendered the following documents;
1. Claimant’s letter of appointment dated 12th November, 2019 admitted and marked Exhibit C2.
2. Claimant’s letter of Confirmation of appointment dated 25th September 2016 admitted and marked Exhibit C3.
3. Claimant’s letter of promotion to the post of lecturer II dated 06th June, 2018 admitted and marked Exhibit C4.
4. Query dated March 12, 2019 issued by the Defendant to the Claimant admitted and marked Exhibit C5.
5. Claimant’s reply to the Defendant’s query of March12, 2019 dated March 14, 2019 admitted as Exhibit C6.
6. Letter of invitation to appear before staff disciplinary and appeal committee dated April 1st, 2019 given to the Claimant admitted as Exhibit C7
7. Letter of dismissal dated June 27, 2019 given to the Claimant by the Defendant admitted as Exhibit C8.
8. Letter of appeal dated 6th August, 2019 written by the Claimant to the Defendant admitted as Exhibit C9.
8. The Claimant was cross-examined by the Defendant’s counsel and the Claimant closed his case.
The Defendant on the other hand chose not to call evidence. Parties were directed to file final written addresses in line with the provisions of Order 38 rule 20
CLAIMANT’S FINAL SUBMISSION
9. In addressing the court, the Claimant raised two issues for determination. They are;
1. Whether the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant followed the due process of law.
2. Whether the Claimant was given fair hearing in the determination of his case by the Defendants.
10. On Issue One, Learned Counsel to the Claimant informed the Court that the query to the Claimant is instructive on this point. The query clearly shows the allegation is sexual assault which facts constitutes offences under section 268, 282, 283 and 285 of the Penal Code Law and also section 31 and 32 of the Child Right Law both of Kwara State. Counsel submitted that documentary evidence is the yardstick to measure the velocity of oral evidence. As documentary evidence where applicable is the best form of evidence. OLASUPO V. MARAKINO (2014) ALL. FWLR (PT. 725) 593 at 595; AKINBISADE V. STATE (2006) 27 NSO.LR S.C 38/2003 INTERDRILL (NIG) LTD V. UBA (2017) LPELR SC.4/2007; ARIJE V. ARIJE (2018), 12 SCM1.It is Learned Counsel’s submission that sexual assault is a crime, which ought to be tried by competed criminal court not withstanding that the alleged act may also constitute a misconduct which may be dealt with by an internal mechanism. SHOKEFUN V AKINYEMI (1980) 5-7 SC (1980) ANCR, 153. AWAL V. NITEL PLC (2019) SCM 19. Defendant Counsel submitted the case of RAYMOND DANGOTE V C.S.C PLATEAU STATE 2001 9 NWLR (P. 717)132, where it was the view of the Supreme Court that an administrative body may only deal with a misconduct by an official bothering on an allegation of crime, if the official admits guilt of the act and if the contract of employment empowers the employer to so do. Defendant Counsel argued that there is also no evidence before this court that of any document empowering the Defendant to dismiss the Claimant on an allegation of misconduct bothering on crime. He submitted again that it is a constitutional requirement that proof of crime must be beyond reasonable doubt by a competent court. DR. G.O SOFEKUN V CHIEF N.A AKINYEMI (1980) ANLR 153. FSC V.LAOYE (1989)2NWLR (PT.106) 652; GARBA V UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (PT18)550.
11. Counsel argued that the provisions of the revised condition of service for senior staff, University of Ilorin 2014, chapter 8:1.2. (b) 20 and 8.1.2. (b) 21 of which reference is made in the query is not before this court and cannot be relied upon. He submitted that a party cannot rely on evidence even in cross examination, if the relevant facts are not pleaded in his pleading. ALH. M.K. GUJA V FIRST BANK &ANR. (2011) LPELR.8971 (C.A).
12. Claimant’s Counsel informed the Court that the facts in this instant case must be distinguished from that of IMONIKE V. UNITY BANK SC.68/2003 delivered on May 20, 2011 where the Supreme Court held that an employee may be dismissed on a crime of fraud without resource to prosecution. In that case, there was evidence before the court and that the employer in Art 5 (d) of the condition of service, had power to dismiss an employee on an allegation of dishonesty, bothering on fraud. He argued that in this instant case there is no evidence before this court empowering the Defendant to act on such allegation of misconduct which had a criminal flavor. It is Counsel’s submission that an act unbecoming of a Public Officer is a wild act, attaching to no particular act or conduct. The particulars of such act must be clearly stated to enable the accused officer or actor know with certainty what the allegation against him is.
13. On Issue Two, Learned Counsel submitted that it is a cardinal principle of law with constitutional flavor that a person who goes through any form of trial on any allegation, must be given fair hearing. Counsel cited Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution where it states as follows “in the determination of his civil rights and obligation, including any question or determination by or against any government authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to preserve its the independence and impartiality” Counsel cited Section 36 (3) of the 1999 Constitution which states that “the proceedings of a court or the proceedings of any tribunal relating to matters mentioned in such section 1 of this section including the announcement of the decision of the court or tribunal shall be held in public.” He then submitted that Court or tribunals have been held to include administrative panel or committees and administrative panels and committee such as the Defendants investigative panel and disciplinary committee are under obligation to observe the 1999 constitution including the rules of fair hearing therein. NDUKWE V. LPDC (2007) S.C 48/2003, February 9, 2007; CROSS RIVER V. ASARI YOUNG NSCQR.56 .2013, 577; ADENIYI V. GOVERNING COUNCIL OF YABA (1993); LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DSICIPLI NARY COMMITTEE V. FAWEHINMI (1985) 2 NSCC. 1988
14. Counsel argued that the report of the staff disciplinary and appeal committed filed but not tendered by the Defendant clearly shows that the Claimant was denied fair hearing. The document is not evidence before the court, but the court is entitled to look at all the documents before it. He submitted Section 167 (7) of the Evidence Act state that evidence withheld is presumed to be against the party withholding it. Therefore admitted and requires no further prove. There is no dispute on the facts which are admitted. NRMFC V. JOHNSON (Supra); OMEGA MARITIME & ENERGY LTD V. PRODOS LTD (2018) LPELR 44695 (C.A). Counsel again submitted that the effect of non-compliance or observance of the rules of fair hearing in any proceedings is fatal. And when a breach of the right to fair hearing is established, it affects the entire proceedings thereby rendering the decision of any court or tribunal null and void. NWABUAZE V LAGOS STATE [2018] 12 SCM 56, F.R.N V. AKABUEZE (2010) LPELR. 1272 (SC). OGUNDOYIN VADEYEMI (2001). Counsel informed the Court that the Claimant is entitled to all the damages claimed in this case. The Defendant is liable to pay all outstanding earned allowance, as part of it duties under the terms of appointment of the Claimant as a lecturer. The Defendant is also liable to pay the Claimant damages for the pains suffered as a result of the purported dismissal. The Claimant had evidence of the injury and other inconvenience suffered by him which the Defendant has not denied and which facts are consequently deemed admitted. He submitted that a litigant is entitled to the award of general damages upon the success of his case. ACB LTD V. IMO NEWS PAPERS LTD NSCQLR.5. (2001)549.
DEFENDANT’S FINAL SUBMISSION
15. In addressing the court, the Defendant also raised two issues for determination. They are;
1. Whether having regard to the incurable defective Amended witness’s written statement on oath of the Claimant adopted before this Honourable Court, the Claimant could be said to have led any evidence to support his claim to have warranted the grant of the Claimant’s claim by this Honourable Court.
2. Whether the Claimant has placed cogent, credible and reliable materials before this Honourable Court to entitle him to grant of declaratory reliefs sought before this Honorable Court.
16. On Issue One, it is Counsel’s submission that for a witness’s written Statement on oath to be valid, such witness’s written statement on oath must comply with the provisions of Section 13 of Oaths Act. Counsel informed the Court that perusal of the said witness’s written statement on oath would reveal that the said written statement on oath did not comply at all with the provisions of Section 13 of the Oaths Act as same does not contain or have Oath Clause as required in the First Schedule of the Act. He submitted that any oath that is devoid of this oath clause is incurably bad and cannot be countenanced by any Court. OYEKANMI & ANOR V. MTN (2020) LPELR-50168 (CA); IBE V. UGOCHUKWU (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 404) 1590 at 1604.
17. On Issue Two, Counsel submitted that it is indubitable that the reliefs sought by the Claimant in this case are majorly declaratory in nature and that it is also clear that the Defendant does not have any counter claim against the Claimant. Counsel submitted that the success of the Claimant before the honorable court depends entirely on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the Defendant’s case if there is any. EDOSA V. OGIEMWANRE (2019) 8NWLR (PT. 1673) 1 AT PAGES 14, PARAGRAPHS F-G, 18, PARAGRAPHS C-D, 22-23, PARAGRAPHS H-A; 25, PARAGRAPHS D-.E AND 27, PARAGRAPHS C-D, NDUUL V. WAYO (2018)16 NWLR (PT.1646)538 AT PAGE 586, PARAGRAPHS E-C AND OYEWUSI V. OLAGBAMI (2018) 14NWLA (PT.1639)297 AT PAGE 317, PARAGRAPHS C-D. Defence Counsel further submitted that a declaratory relief would only be granted after the Court had taken all facts and circumstances/evidence laid before it into consideration and became convinced by the materials placed before it that the party that sought such declaratory relief has placed cogent and credible evidence before it and not merely on the weakness or admission of the party against whom such declaration is sought. NACB LIMITED V. ACHAGWA (2010) 11 NWLR (PT. 1205) 339 AT 366, PARAGRAPHS GH, 367, PARAGRAPHS G-E; TADUGGORONNO V. GOTON & ORS (2002) 4 NWLR (PT. 757) 453 AT PAGE 476, PARAGRAPHS C-E; EMENIKE V. PDP & ORS. (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 640) 1261 AT PAGE 1281, PARAGRAPHS E-G. Learned Counsel for the Defendant, again informed that Court that a careful perusal of the Claimant’s reliefs from this Honourable Court will reveal that his principal relief as could be found in paragraph sub (a) of paragraph 35 of his Amended Statement of facts. And all other reliefs are predicated on the above quoted relief whose grant depends on the Claimant’s proving his entitlement to the declaratory relief sought. The Claimant tendered 9 exhibits in this case. However, it would be observed that the Claimant did not tender any document that contains the findings of the Disciplinary committee which the Claimant prays this Honourable Court to set aside.
18. It is therefore Counsel’s submission that the Claimant has failed woefully to prove his entitlement to the relief for setting aside the findings of the Disciplinary Committee because of his failure to bring or tender the said findings before this Honourable Court. And that failure on the part of the Claimant to tender the proceedings and findings of the Disciplinary Committee sought to set aside and which is his Principal relief upon which all other reliefs are anchored has dealt a fatal blow on the case of the Claimant and this failure will a fortiori makes his claim un grantable as this Honourable Court cannot set aside what has not been brought or produced before it. LEKWOT V. JUDICIAL TRIBUNAL ON CIVIL AND COMMUNAL DISTURBANCES IN KADUNA STATE (1997) 8 NWLR (PT. 515) 22 at Page 34, paragraph G; JOSEPH AKUJOBI & ORS V. FESTUS AKUJOBI (2017) LPELR-41685 (CA).
19. Defence Counsel argued that the Claimant’s contention in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of his amended Statement of facts that he was accused of rape which according to him ought to have been tried by a criminal Court. And the Claimant allegation of lack of Fair hearing and his complain about the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee Panel in paragraphs 17-2 8 of his amended Statement of Facts were all negative and unfounded. As the Claimant was shown exhibit C9 which was his Appeal to the Governing Council of the Defendant after his dismissal. The said document is dated 6th of August, 2019 and he was asked to show where he alleged lack of Fair hearing or hearing in the said document, his answer was also in the negative.
20. It is therefore Counsel’s submission that the failure on the part of the Claimant to tender the report of the Disciplinary Committee which he prays this Honourable Court to set aside and on which neck other claims of the Claimant are hanging notwithstanding, has also failed in his bounding duty to place credible and cogent materials before the Honorable Court which if he has done, ordinarily would have entitled him to the declaratory reliefs sought which authorities are replete that it cannot be granted as a matter of course and not even on admission by the Defendant. GE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (NIG.) LTD V. Q OIL AND GAS SERVICES LIMITED (2016) 10 NWLR (PT. 1520) 304 AT PAGE 330, PARAGRAPHS D-E.
21. Counsel assuming without conceding that the Claimant was accused of criminal act, the position of law is very clear that nothing precludes an employer from disciplining an employee alleged to have committed an act that also amount to crime which the said employer, like the Defendant herein views as a misconduct. Counsel submitted that the present position of law is that an employer is not expected to wait till when an employ who commits an act of misconduct which also amounts to crime is tried and convicted for a crime committed by a Court of competent jurisdiction before such employee could be tried and sanction for an act that act which his employer views as a misconduct. EZE V. SPRING BANK PLC (2011) 18 NWLR (PT. 1278)113 PAGES L34, PARAGRAPHS F-H; 135, PARAGRAPHS B —D; ARINZE V. F.B.N LIMITED (2004) 12 NWLR (PT. 888) 663 AT PAGES 676- 677, PARAGRAPHS G —A.
22. Learned Counsel stated that the submission of the Claimant’s counsel in his written address to the effect that the decision of the Defendant not to call evidence in this case amounts to admission of the Claimant’s claim against it. He argued that the submission of the Claimant is highly misconceived. It is misconceived in view of the fact that the Claimant’s major reliefs before this Honorable Court are declaratory in nature and the onus to prove same is basically on the Claimant who is bound to rely on the strength of his case and not even on the weakness of the Defendant’s case should there be any.
23. Counsel submitted that it has been held contrary to the submission of the Claimant that admission by the Defendant cannot even be a reason for granting Claimant’s declaratory relief especially when it is apparent as it in this case that the Defendant has no counter claim against the Claimant. OLADIPO V MOBA LGA (2010) 5 NWLR (PT.1186)117 AT16O PARAGRAPHS E-H, 166 PARAGRAPHS A-B.
CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINT LAW
24. In response, Counsel that the Claimant’s written statement on oath herein constitutes a valid evidence before this court. A statement on oath is a declaration of facts by a witness upon which a party intends to prove his case. He submitted that the Rules of this court is silent on the form a witness statement on oath should take. As Order 3 Rule 9 (C) of the rules states that a complaint shall be accompanied by a written statement on oath of all the witnesses listed to be called by a party. While Rule 10 of Order 3 spells out the format for a complaint, there is no such format for a witness statement on oath. It may therefore be in the form of an affidavit, prose or simply in paragraphs. He again submitted that a statement on oath as a mere disposition. It must however be sworn to before and be signed by the commissioner for oaths. This is the process that gives validity to an oath. CPC v INEC & ORS (2011) LCN 4865(CA). See UDUSEGBE V SPDC NIG LTD (2008) 9 NWLR (PT1093) 593; UDUMA V ARC NSI (2012) 7 NWLR (PT1298)55 AT96—97.
25. Learned Counsel submitted that Section 13 of the Oaths Act relates to voluntary declarations. The Claimant’s Statement on Oath herein is not a voluntary declaration. It is in fulfillment of the requirement of Order 3 Rule 9 of the Rules of this court. It is Counsel’s position that the first schedule to the Oath Act contains several format without a reference to any particular one applicable to a witness statement on oath.
26. Counsel further submitted that the requirement of section 13 of the Oath Act is a matter of form, which non-compliance therewith is an irregularity. It is therefore an irregularity and being an irregularity, Section 4 (2) of the Rules of this court exculpates non-compliance therewith.
27. Counsel submitted that admission of the Defendant in the pleadings alone without oral evidence in support of the Claimant’s case by him. CBN V AMAO & ORS. (2010) 10 SCM 118.
28. In finality Counsel submitted that the evidence of the Claimant in proof of his claims as contain in his adopted statement on oath is in no way contradicted, even under cross examination. The Claimant has therefore discharged the onus placed on him to prove his case on a balance of probability.
29. On the 20th July and 27th October 2023 parties adopted and adumbrated their respective addresses as well as their addresses on the issue raised by the Court suo moto and this matter was adjourned for judgement.
Court’s Decision
30. I have carefully summarized the evidence of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this Judgement and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issues formulated by the parties to wit:
1. Whether the dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant followed the due process of law.
2. Whether the Claimant was given fair hearing in the determination of his case by the Defendants. From the Claimants and
1. Whether having regard to the incurable defective Amended witness’s written statement on oath of the Claimant adopted before this Honourable Court, the Claimant could be said to have led any evidence to support his claim to have warranted the grant of the Claimant’s claim by this Honourable Court.
2. Whether the Claimant has placed cogent, credible and reliable materials before this Honourable Court to entitle him to grant of declaratory reliefs sought before this Honorable Court. From the Defendant
31. Issue formulated by the Court is. In the event that the Court finds with the defendants issue 1 above what is the proper order to be made in the circumstances of this case.
Before I delve into the merits of this case I will address an observation and 2 misconceptions evident in the course of the respective arguments of the Parties. Firstly both parties are attempting to foist this court with a situation akin to rendering a technical knock-out Judgement albeit from different flanks. The claimant, as argued by the defendant, with their unsworn witness statement on Oath on the one side and the defendant with the legal strategy of abandoning their defence, despite this the court is required to eshew technicalities and embrace for substantive justice , with this in mind I proceed
32. Now to the two misconceptions: Firstly, to the claimant that, considering the nature of the allegations against which according to the Claimant, rises to the level of criminality, the claimant maintains that unless and until criminal charges were brought and successfully proved against him that he could not be disciplined, while the Defendants argue that they were well within their rights to act as they did in terminating the Claimant as they did. Well A similar argument, to the effect that in a dismissal based on an allegation of crime, the allegation must first of all be proved before the dismissal can stand or that it is trite that conduct amounting to crime must first of all be a matter for the Court or criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues or action can be raised, was advanced inIke Edward Chukwuemeka v. Enterprise Bank unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/181/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on May 13, 2014. In reviewing the authorities, this is what this Court said at pages 16 to 17 –
The claimant was invariably relying on the old dispensation as evinced by case law authorities such as Biishi v. The Judicial Service Commission** to argue employee, he must first be prosecuted for the offence before disciplinary measures if necessary are taken against him. The new dispensation is, however, exemplified by cases such as Arinze v. First Bank (Nig.) Ltd [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78 CA, which laid down that it is not an immutable principle that where the act of misconduct by an employee also amounts to a criminal offence the employee must first be prosecuted before the employer can exercise his power of summary dismissal of the employee. The Supreme Court in same case, Arinze v. FBN Ltd [2004] 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663 SC affirmed this principle when it held that an employer can dismiss an employee where the accusation against such employee is of gross misconduct involving dishonesty bordering on criminality; and in such a case, it is not required under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that an employee must first be tried in a court of law. That it is, therefore, erroneous to contend that once crime is detected, the employer cannot discipline the employee unless he is tried and convicted first. The Supreme Court went on that in cases of misconduct bordering on criminality, all that is required of an employer before summarily dismissing an employee is to give him fair hearing by confronting him with the accusation made against him and requiring him to defend himself; and to satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be affected directly by the disciplinary proceedings must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to afford him the opportunity for representation in his own defence. The Court of Appeal in ATA Poly v. Maina [2005] 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) 487 CA reiterated and applied this principle. In the instant case, therefore, the argument of the claimant in that regard accordingly goes to no issue; and I so find and hold.
33. Additionally, Damisa v. UBA Plc [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 526 CA held that negligence even without a criminal import can be so gross as to be misconduct of a kind which justifies dismissal. All of this means that the claimant’s reliance on the judgments of DR. G.O SOFEKUN V CHIEF N.A AKINYEMI (1980) ANLR 153. FSC V.LAOYE (1989)2NWLR (PT.106) 652; GARBA V UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (PT18)550. cannot be sustained in the light of the authorities cited above.
34. Secondly the claimant had advanced arguments as to fair hearing or lack thereof relying of Section 36 of the 1999 CFRN (As amended). The position of the law is as was held in U.B.A. PLC v. ORANUBA (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 1390) 1 @ 5 C.A. The fact that a party appeared before a court or a panel does not ipso facto mean that he was given a fair hearing in a matter in which his conduct is called to question. He may have been heard, but there can be no fair hearing if a party did not know what his employer had against him. If the purpose of the hearing is to determine his guilt or the propriety vel non of his conduct, it is not enough that he is heard; the hearing must relate to his defence of the complaint against him. Being the person to be affected by the outcome of the hearing, there is need to afford him the opportunity not just to be heard, but to be heard in his defence of whatever allegation is made against him. See. OSUMAH v. E.B.S. (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 902) 332 referred to.] (P. 39, PARAS. E-G). The Court went on to hold that where allegations have made against an employee, the employer is entitled to set up a panel to investigate the allegations. Such an investigation panel is not a court of trial. It is enough if it gives to any of the persons whose names feature in the inquiry the opportunity of making some representations, oral or written, before it. In the process of investigation, it can receive its information from any source. The panel of inquiry not being a court of trial, none of the persons whose name feature in the inquiry can insist on any right to cross-examine other person who make allegations or present memoranda at the inquiry. Once the panel concludes its inquiry and makes up its mind that any point had prima facie been made out which points to the fault of any person, the employer must first inform such an employee of the case against him and give him the opportunity to refute, explain or contradict it otherwise exculpate himself by making any representations or defence thereto before the employer can lawfully use those points as bases for dispensing with his services. BABA v. N.C.A.T.C. (1991) 5 NWLR (PT. 192) 388 referred to.] (P. 36, PARAS. C-G)
35. It is also important to note that in respect to fair hearing With regard to fair hearing, the
Position of the law as per the recent decision of the Supreme Court in REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V. REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS [2017] 14 NWLR (PT. 1577) 410, where the Supreme Court, relying on BAKARE V. LSCSC [1992] 8 NWLR (PT. 266) 641 AT 699 - 700 and EKUNOLA V. CBN [2013] 15 NWLR (PT. 1377) 224 AT 262 - 263, held that breach of a fundamental right under section 36(1) of the Constitution arises only where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a Court or tribunal established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad-hoc tribunal raised departmentally by parties. In other words, there would be no case of infringement of the right to fair hearing under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution when the decision alleged to have violated one’s constitutional right to fair hearing, is that of a non-judicial body.
While I hold “that a careful reading of REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V. REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS. Supra will reveal that the Supreme Court acknowledged that fair hearing comes in two forms: the constitutional form under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution; and the common law form in terms of the rules of natural justice as expressed in the Latin maxims - audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua”. The former relates to criminal trials in Courts of Tribunals whilst the latter is the yardstick of the domestic tribunes and administrative panels. I also find and hold that “The reliance by lawyers on Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution when challenging the disciplinary processes of employers is accordingly uncalled for and wrong. They have unwittingly taken to the realm of constitutional law what is rightly of the realm of administrative law. Under administrative law, by judicial review, the court can always set aside any disciplinary process that does not adhere to the common law rules of natural justice” The position of the law is as was held in U.B.A. PLC v. ORANUBA (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 1390) 1 @ 5 C.A. The fact that a party appeared before a court or a panel does not ipso facto mean that he was given a fair hearing in a matter in which his conduct is called to question. He may have been heard, but there can be no fair hearing if a party did not know what his employer had against him. If the purpose of the hearing is to determine his guilt or the propriety vel non of his conduct, it is not enough that he is heard; the hearing must relate to his defence of the complaint against him. Being the person to be affected by the outcome of the hearing, there is need to afford him the opportunity not just to be heard, but to be heard in his defence of whatever allegation is made against him. See . OSUMAH v. E.B.S. (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 902) 332 referred to.] (P. 39, PARAS. E-G). The Court went on to hold that where allegations have made against an employee, the employer is entitled to set up a panel to investigate the allegations. Such an investigation panel is not a court of trial. It is enough if it gives to any of the persons whose names feature in the inquiry the opportunity of making some representations, oral or written, before it. In the process of investigation, it can receive its information from any source. The panel of inquiry not being a court of trial, none of the persons whose name feature in the inquiry can insist on any right to cross-examine other person who make allegations or present memoranda at the inquiry. Once the panel concludes its inquiry and makes up its mind that any point had prima facie been made out which points to the fault of any person, the employer must first inform such an employee of the case against him and give him the opportunity to refute, explain or contradict it otherwise exculpate himself by making any representations or defence thereto before the employer can lawfully use those points as bases for dispensing with his services. BABA v. N.C.A.T.C. (1991) 5 NWLR (PT. 192) 388 referred to.] (P. 36, PARAS. C-G)
36. It is also important to note that in respect to fair hearing:
The Position of the law as per the recent decision of the Supreme Court in REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V. REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS [2017] 14 NWLR (PT. 1577) 410, where the Supreme Court, relying on BAKARE V. LSCSC [1992] 8 NWLR (PT. 266) 641 AT 699 - 700 and EKUNOLA V. CBN [2013] 15 NWLR (PT. 1377) 224 AT 262 - 263, held that breach of a fundamental right under section 36(1) of the Constitution arises only where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a Court or tribunal established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad-hoc tribunal raised departmentally by parties. In other words, there would be no case of infringement of the right to fair hearing under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution when the decision alleged to have violated one’s constitutional right to fair hearing, is that of a non-judicial body.
While I hold “that a careful reading of REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V. REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS. [1986] LPELR-1305(SC); will reveal that the Supreme Court acknowledged that fair hearing comes in two forms: the constitutional form under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution; and the common law form in terms of the rules of natural justice as expressed in the Latin maxims - audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua”. The former relates to criminal trials in Courts of Tribunals whilst the latter is the yardstick of the domestic tribunes and administrative panels. I also find and hold that “The reliance by lawyers on Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution when challenging the disciplinary processes of employers is accordingly uncalled for and wrong. They have unwittingly taken to the realm of constitutional law what is rightly of the realm of administrative law. Under administrative law, by judicial review, the court can always set aside any disciplinary process that does not adhere to the common law rules of natural justice”. Now, the point is that a careful reading of Rev. Prof. Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & ors will reveal that the Supreme Court acknowledged that fair hearing comes in two forms: the constitutional form under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution; and the common law form in terms of the rules of natural justice as expressed in the Latin maxims: audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua. I must stressed that since Mr Yesufu Amuda Garba & ors v. University of Maiduguri[1], fair hearing in the world of work has been successfully watered down to just opportunity to be heard. For the world of work, the reliance we often thus see by lawyers on section 36 of the 1999 Constitution is accordingly uncalled for since disciplinary processes in the workplace are composed of domestic or standing ad hoc tribunals. Since these are not Courts or Tribunals established by law, an employer cannot be accused of not complying with section 36 of the 1999 Constitution. However, the employer may be accused of not adhering to the common law rules of natural justice. This is a ratio that can be gleaned from Rev. Prof. Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & ors. [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550; [1986] All NLR 149; [1986] 2 SC 128.The reliance by lawyers on section 36 of the 1999 Constitution when challenging the disciplinary processes of employers is accordingly uncalled for and wrong. They have unwittingly taken to the realm of constitutional law what is rightly of the realm of administrative law. Under administrative law, by judicial review, the court can always set aside any disciplinary process that does not adhere to the common law rules of natural justice.
So the claimant references to Section 36 of the 1999 CFRN is of no import in this matter. I find,
Bulkachawa JCA held in Jibrin v NEPA (2003) LPELR-7267(CA) Pg. 19 thus:
“It is trite that a body whether judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or executive in inception acts judicially when determining the civil rights and obligations of a person…. finding him liable of fault, the body must give him a hearing before any issue can be properly decided.
So the claimant references to fair hearing on the basis of Section 36 of the 1999 CFRN is of no import in this matter. I find are of no moment as the test is one of whether the twin pillars of justice where observed.
37. Now, to the merit of this case. I shall start with the Defendants issues:
1. Whether having regard to the incurable defective Amended witness’s written statement on oath of the Claimant adopted before this Honourable Court, the Claimant could be said to have led any evidence to support his claim to have warranted the grant of the Claimant’s claim by this Honourable Court.
The question of the nature of employment being of statutory provisions was not in dispute considering the provisions of Exhibits C2, C3 and C4 I find and hold that the claimant’s appointment is of statutory flavour. Relief d, succeeds.
38. I shall start with the Defendants action with regards their refusal to call evidence after cross examining CW. The defendants had filed a defence with a list of witnesses and other accompanying process but had after the close of the Claimants case opted not to call their witness and rest on the claimants case, the position of the law with regard to the Defendants witness statement on oath in such a situation is as was stated in the case of MAJEKODUNMI & ORS V. OGUNSEYE (2017) LPELR-42547(CA) (PP. 40-45 PARAS. D)
"To determine this issue, I find it necessary to state the legal status of a Written Statement on Oath. It should be noted that, unlike an affidavit per se, a Written Statement on Oath filed in Court is not evidence, unless it has been duly adopted by the witness at the trial. In other words, a Written Statement on Oath will only be evidence to be used by the Court in the determination of the Plaintiff's Claim, if it has been adopted by the person who deposed to it as his testimony during the trial. If it is not so adopted, it is deemed abandoned and therefore cannot be examined by the trial Judge. An Affidavit on the other hand is the evidence of the witness made in writing. Thus, whether or not the deponent appears in Court, such depositions are capable of being evaluated by the Court as evidence. See Splinsters (Nig.) Ltd & Anor v. Oasis Finance Ltd (2013) 18 NWLR (pt.1385) p.188 at 227 per Izoba, JCA; Agagu v. Mimiko & Ors (2009) 7 NWLR (pt.1140) p.34; Oraekwe v. Chukwuka (2012) NWLR (pt.1280) p.87 at 201;
39. This abandonment notwithstanding, the claimant is still required to prove his case and cannot rely on the absence of a defence to coast to an automatic victory. MR. THOMAS OLUKAYOKE & ORS Vs. TIMBUKTU MEDIA LTD. (unreported) NICN/LA/25/201 1 delivered 6th March 2013. OGUNYADE Vs. OSHUNKEYE [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057). The claimant must adduce evidence worthy of belief as evidence does not become credible merely because it is unchallenged. AKALONU Vs. OMOKARO [2003]8NWLR (Pt.821) 190. LAWRENCE AZENABOR Vs. BAYEREO UNOVERSITY KANO [2011] 25 NLLR (PT. 70) CA at 69 and OGUNYADE Vs. OSUNKEYE supra at 247”. In A.G. OSUN STATE Vs. NLC (OSUN STATE COUNCIL) & 2 ORS (unreported) NICN/LA/275/2012 delivered 19th December 2012 this court held as follows;-“Order 9 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2017 enjoins a party served with a complaint and accompanying originating processes and who intends to file a defence process as provided therein. Order 9(4) therefore recognizes the right of a defendant not to defend an action filed against him or her. And by order 19 rule 2 where the defendant is absent at the trial and no good reason is shown for the absence, the claimant may prove his/ her case as far as the burden of proof lies on him upon her. This Rule, of course accords with the minima evidential requirement, which is t the effect that a plaintiff cannot assume that he is entitled to automatic judgement just because the other party did not adduce evidence.
40. I shall not look to the Claimants case: -Case law has raised various scenarios with regards to a properly executed witness statement on oath such as Failure to sign a witness statement on oath where the documents was duly stamped and the oath words employed was considered an irregularity KAAN INTL DEVELOPMENT LTD V. LITTLE ACORNS TURNKEY PROJECTS LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR-45291(CA) (Pp. 15-20 paras. E) The Court held that “the document was evidently sworn to before 'a duly authorized person', i.e. the commissioner for oaths; see SOLOLA V STATE (2005) 2 NWLR part 937 page 460 and UDUMA V URINSI (2012) 7 NWLR part 1298 which aptly applies to this case” The Supreme Court in the case of BUHARI VS INEC (2008) 12 SCNJ 1 AT 91 held that: "When a deponent swears to an oath, he signs in the presence of the Commissioner for Oaths who endorses the document authenticating the signature of the deponent. Signatures signed outside the presence of the Commissioner for Oaths fall short of the requirement of the statute and such document purported to be sworn before the Commissioner for Oaths is not legally acceptable in Court." MUHAMMAD & ORS V. GANI (2019) LPELR-47190(CA) (Pp. 23-24 paras. C-C) See also Onyechi Erokwu Vs Jackson N. Erokwu (2016) LPELR 41515 and Chidubem Vs Ekenna (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 455) 1692.. Witness Statements on oath that are not sworn before authorizing authorities have been held to be incompetent and inadmissible. And the appellate court went on to order that such document be expunged having failed the statutory test of authenticity and admissibility. BUBA & ANOR V. MAHMUD & ANOR(2020) LPELR-51404(CA) (Pp. 8-9 paras. A-A)See Erokwu vs Erokwu (2016) LPELR 41515."
41. In the instant case the witness statement on oath in question was duly signed and stamped but was bereft of any of the words of attestation. The defendants argue that the lack of oath renders the document a nullity and the claimants’ case should be dismissed suited while the claimants argue for a non suit. Furthermore it is the Claimants contention, that the of rules of this court do not provide a pro forma example of the oath, a witness statement on oath should contain, The defendants ask that the claimant case be dismissed as there is no evidence that is nothing before the court.
42. With regard to the Claimants argument as to lack of specific form, I find that this contention cannot avail him as attestation is question of law, not form and section 13 of the oath Act 1963 as given several samples in its 1stschedule
Thus, in the case Kalu Igu Uduma v. Prince Ama Arunsi & 14 Ors (2010) LPELR - 9133 (CA), Ogunwumiju, JCA said: "I am minded to go a step further and to make a distinction between Affidavit evidence in procedure begun by Originating Summons as against Statement of witnesses on Oath at an election proceeding or proceeding began by Writ and to say that in respect of the latter scenario, where the Written Statement is to be adopted again on Oath by the maker before his Cross-Examination on it, whatever defect in the Original Oath in respect of the witness statement has been cured by the second Oath made in Court before the judex prior to the adoption of the witness statement by the maker and his subsequent Cross-Examination. See the case of Udengha v. Omegara CA/PH/EPT/173/2008 unreported, delivered on 30th March, 2010."
43. Similarly, in the case of Hon. Fabian Okpa v. Chief Alex Irek & Anor (2012) LPELR - 8033 (CA), Ndukwe - Anyanwu, JCA, relying on the case of Akpokemovo v. Aga (2004) 10 NWLR (pt.881) p.394 said: “I am not unminded of the recent judgement that tend the opposite such as where the Court held that we cannot run away from the requirements of the oath act”
44. Bearing in mind that in MTN V. CORPORATE COMMUNICATION INVESTMENT LTD (2019) LPELR-47042(SC), (Pp. 36 paras A)"the front loaded deposition on oath of a witness in support of his pleadings, constitutes his evidence in chief in the proceedings. "Per Kekeren-Eku, JSC (P. 36, paras. A-B)
45. MTN submitted that the signature and stamp of the Commissioner for Oaths on a statement cannot remedy the defect. “He looked at the Written Statements of CW1, and submitted that it is apparent that they lack the oath clause. There is no Paragraph or statement in the two Written Statements showing that they were made "solemnly, conscientiously believing the contents to be true and correct by virtue of the Oaths Act". The legal effect of the absence of such a Paragraph or statement in the Written Statements of CW1 is according to His Lordship Elechi J.C.A. in Guaranty Trust Bank Plc. v. Barrister Ajiboye Ayodeji Abiodun (2017) LPELR-42551(CA), "is not an oath or Affidavit properly so called."
46. The Defendants argue that the signature and stamp of the Commissioner for Oaths on a statement cannot remedy the defect. While the Claimants want the Court to consider the omission of an oath clause in their written statement as an irregularity.
47. The parties hinged their respective arguments on two Court of Appeal case, it is apropos, to my mind that we consider these cases closely.
In ENYI v. PRODECO INT'L LTD (2018) LPELR-44690(CA) (Pp. 4-14 paras. F) “He looked at the Written Statements of CW1, and submitted that it is apparent that they lack the oath clause. There is no Paragraph or statement in the two Written Statements showing that they were made "solemnly, conscientiously believing the contents to be true and correct by virtue of the Oaths Act". The legal effect of the absence of such a Paragraph or statement in the Written Statements of CW1 is according to His Lordship Elechi J.C.A. in Guaranty Trust Bank Plc. v. Barrister Ajiboye Ayodeji Abiodun (2017) LPELR-42551(CA), "is not an oath or Affidavit properly so called."
48. I have taken the liberty of quoting copiously from the case of ENYI v. PRODECO INT'L LTD (2018) LPELR-44690(CA)wher4e the court of appeal considered the Witness Statement on Oath from the High Court which had been thrown out by the High Court judge, and the Court of Appeal had this to say "I need to recall that the process under consideration is the appellant's witness' statement which the learned trial Judge struck out as being incompetent and which in turn led to the striking out of the suit without considering same on its merit or demerit. In his words, the learned trial Judge had found as follows:
I have closely looked at the claimant's written statement in this suit and I hold the firm view that it did not comply, even substantially comply with Oaths Act and does not therefore, in my finding, qualifies (sic) as a statement on Oath as required by the rules of this Court to be adopted as evidence in chief by a witness at the trial of a suit. The claimant's case is therefore unarguable (sic) and incurably defective as the only written statement of the claimant is liable to be struck out and is consequently hereby struck out.
49. To reach his conclusion, the learned trial Judge relied on the authority of NN Bank vs. IBW Ent. (supra) @ p. 454, paras. G-H, where Rowland, JCA., stated as follows:
It is patently clear from the affidavit in support of the motion paper that it does not comply with the First Schedule of the Oaths Act Cap. 333 of the Laws of the Federation 1990......... Since the affidavit in support does not comply with the First Schedule of the Act...... I am of the view that the affidavit is incompetent. [Emphasis mine]. (See page 132 of the record of appeal).
50. Following on the trail of NN Bank Plc. vs. IBW Ent. (supra) are Lonestar Drilling Ltd. vs. Triveni Eng. & Ind. (1991) 1 NWLR Pt. 588; and Maraya Plastics Ltd. vs. Inland Bank Plc. (2002) 7 NWLR Pt. 765, p. 109 which all share the common trait of dealing with affidavits that were not in compliance with Section 13 of the Oaths Act and thus incompetent.
51. One clear distinguishing factor between an affidavit and a written statement on oath is that while the former does not require adoption in Court for same to be relied upon, the latter must be adopted by the witness/maker for reliability to attach to it. In other words, the statement on oath of a witness becomes his evidence-in-chief only when it is adopted in Court by the said witness duly sworn in Court. This is on the strength of such authorities as: Funtua vs. Tijjani (2011) 7 NWLR Pt. 1245) 130; Aregbesola vs. Oyinlola (No. 2) (2011) All FWLR (507) 1292 @ 1413 F - H; Akpokeniovo vs. Agas (2004) 10 NWLR Pt. 881, P. 394; and N.N.S.C. vs. E.S.V (1990) 7 NWLR Pt. 164, P. 526, Para. E.
52. The learned trial Court in reaching its conclusion had reasoned as follows at page 131 of the record of appeal:
I am of the firm view, therefore, that it is act of swearing to the truth of the statement that makes on a statement an oath and thus a written statement or document lacking the words of swearing is only a piece of paper or a statement simpliciter and not a statement on oath as required by law. See Maraya Plastic vs. Inland Bank Plc. (2002) 7 NWLR Pt. 765 P. 109 at 120.
53. Indeed to appreciate the features of the written statement of the plaintiff/appellant which was struck out as incompetent by the trial Court, I deem it expedient to reproduce the said process in part and it reads:
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMANT
I, MR. EBENEZER ENYI, Male, Christian, Civil Engineer and Nigerian Citizen residing at No. 14 Bernard Carr Street, Port Harcourt hereby make Oath and state as follows:
1. I am the Claimant in this suit and I reside at no. 14 Bernard Carr Street Port Harcourt. ....
6. That I was assigned to work with the Defendant's turning machine by the head of the Defendant's welding department on the 21st of August, 2003.
7. That I informed the said head of department that the turning machine given to me appeared to be defective. My observations however were ignored and I was compelled to work with the machine notwithstanding what I had pointed out
............................................................................. ................................................................
24. And I want the Honourable Court to declare that the sum of N25,000.00 is inadequate compensation in the circumstances of this matter.
.................
DEPONENT
Sworn at the Registry of the
High Court Port Harcourt
This ......... day of ........ 2006
Before Me
Commissioner for Oaths.
[Underlining mine for emphasis]. (See pages 9 - 11 of the record of appeal).
54. Looking at the foregoing, the learned trial Judge had reasoned that notwithstanding that below the statement are the usual characteristics of an affidavit or sworn statement e.g. "deponent", "sworn to", "before me" and "commissioner for oaths" but the statement itself does not contain any attestation that the maker is bound to make the statement truthfully and in good faith; and that there was indeed not even an attempt at swearing at all. Now, I took time to read through the authority of Lonstar Drilling Ltd. vs. Triveni Eng. Ltd. supra and wherein the deponent of the affidavit in the concluding part of its deposition used the words: "I depose to this affidavit in good faith" notwithstanding that the exact words prescribed by the Oaths Act read thus: "I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act".
55. In its findings this Court at its Benin Division ruled that much as the exact words were not used, but that the deponent complied substantially with the requirement of the Oaths Act.
56. In the instant scenario I am, with all due respect to the learned trial Judge, convinced that he fell into a grave misconception of the law when he ruled that the omission to add the words of swearing at the foot of the appellant's written statement robbed the process of the status of a statement on oath. More so where there is no particular or specified format in the law to be used in couching of a statement on oath. Even though the words of swearing are omitted at the foot of the written statement as observed by the learned trial Court, as if it were an affidavit, yet at the opening paragraph of it the deponent had noted thus: "I, Mr. Ebenezer Enyi.............. hereby make oath and state as follows......"
57. The word "oath" as defined in the Chambers 21st Century Dictionary, Revised Edition, at page 942 thereof means 1. a solemn promise to tell the truth or be loyal, etc. usually naming God as a witness...... 3. a swear-word............ having sworn to tell the truth, e.g. in a Court of law; attested by oath". Thus, the presence of the words 'make oath' albeit at the introductory part of the process, imports the impression of swearing as envisaged by the law. It is therefore immaterial that the words of swearing were not at the foot of the process. There was nothing on the record to suggest that the adverse party or even the Court at that was misled into believing that it was a process short of the written sworn statement of the appellant; more so as it was clearly stated at the bottom of it that it was sworn to at the Registry of the High Court, Port Harcourt. In compliance with Section 6 of the Oaths Act, supra, the date of the swearing and the Commissioner for Oaths before whom it was sworn were duly stated and both the Commissioner and the deponent signed accordingly.
58. The failure to insert words of swearing at the end of the written statement of the appellant, if at all that is a requirement, has not to my mind occasioned any miscarriage of justice in the instant case. After all the appellant still swore oath in Court as administered to him by the Clerk of Court and in line with Order 32 Rule 1(3) of the High Court of Rivers State (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2006, before he confirmed and adopted the written statement as his evidence-in-chief and was duly cross examined. Any such omission therefore can at best be seen as a mere irregularity in form. In this vein and as clearly spelt out in Section 4 (2) and (3) of the Oaths Act that:
4 (2) No irregularity in the form in which an oath or affirmation is administered or taken shall-
a. invalidate the performance of official duties; or
b. invalidate proceedings in any Court; or
c. render inadmissible evidence in or in respect of which an irregularity took place in any proceedings.
(3) The failure to take an oath or make an affirmation and any irregularity as to the form of oath or affirmation shall in no case be construed to affect the liability of a witness to state the truth. See also the cases of Uduma vs. Arunsi (2012) 7 NWLR Pt. 1298 P. 55 at 97-98. Para. G-A; and Anatogu vs. Iweka II (1995)8 NWLR Pt. 415, P. 547, where Uwais, JSC. (as he then was) held as follows at page 573:
59. What then is the consequence of the failure to administer oath or affirmation on a witness before a Court? The answer is given by Section 4 Subsection 3 of the Oaths Act 1963, No. 63 of 1963 which provides: "(3) The failure to take an Oath or make an affirmation shall in no case be construed to affect the liability of a witness to state the truth."
60. In the case of Solola vs. The State (2005) All FWLR Pt. 269 P. 1751 at 1770; the apex Court took the position that:
By Section 4(3) of the Oaths Act the failure to administer oath on a witness before giving evidence is a mere irregularity which does not affect the decision arrived at on that evidence unless it has been shown to occasion a miscarriage of justice. Given the foregoing superior authorities, I am at pain picking flaw or hole in the regularity of the appellant's Written Statement on Oath as a process which ultimately culminated in his evidence-in-chief. Just as failure to administer oath on a witness would not vitiate the proceedings so also would the omission of the words of swearing at the foot of the written statement of the appellant not rob the process of its status as a written statement on oath.
61. As I earlier noted the omission at the worst stance is a mere irregularity which touches on the form as opposed to the substance of the process. In effect issue 1 (one) which is whether the defect in the appellant's deposition rendered the entire suit incompetent is answered in the negative (NO). The said issue is accordingly resolved in favour of the appellant and against the respondent." Per JOMBO-OFO ,J.C.A in ENYI v. PRODECO INT'L LTD (2018) LPELR-44690(CA) (Pp. 4-14 paras. F)” the Court of Appeal had held that the omission of the oath clause at the base of the witness statement on oath was a mere irregularity. The claimant urge the court be swayed or along with this such reasoning in the instant case.
The defendant however relying on a later Court of Appeal case OYEKANMI & ANOR v. MTN (2020) LPELR-50168(CA) (Pp. 50-59 paras. E) considered a written statement on oath from a lower court where the High Court Judge had thrown out the Appellants case on the basis of a witness statement on oath that were bereft of the oath clause words. Once more I have reproduced copiously from the OYEKANMI & ANOR v. MTN Law report, where the Court of Appeal had this to say, "A written statement on oath is the evidence on which a party relies in Court to establish his case or his answers to opponent's case as required by Order 32 Rule 2(1) and 3(1) of the Rules of the lower Court. It is equally unlike pleading which are written statements (and not evidence) generally of facts relied upon by a party in proof of his case. See: B.V. Magnusson V. Koiki & Ors (1993) LPELR-1818 (SC). Order 3 Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules of the lower Court prescribes that a written statement must be on oath and not an affidavit. See: Leo Melos Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd & Anor V. Union Homes Savings and Loans Ltd (2010) LPELR- 4431 (CA).
Respondent's Counsel submitted that, the entire arguments of the Appellants, in this issue as they relate to the competence and validity of a written statement on oath filed in the Registry of this Court on the 5th June, 2012, and the additional written statement on oath captioned written statement on oath of Appellants' witness in support of the Reply to statement of Defence filed on 8th October, 2013 misconceived, misapplied and most certainly is not the law. He referred the Court to GE INT'L Operations Ltd. v. Q-oil & Gas Services (2015) NWLR (pt 1440) 244 where the Court held thus:"When an out of Court statement in writing is made on oath, it becomes a testimony without the oath, the deposition or written declarations on a piece of paper is a mere piece of paper. The oath makes written declarations or disposition on a piece of paper an affidavit." See also: Oraekwe v. Chukwuka (2010) LPELR 9128, Maraya Plastics Ltd v. Inland Bank (2007) 7 NWLR (pt 765) 109; Ishaq v. INEC (2008) LPELR 4334.
In paragraph 35 of the written statement on oath of the Respondent, filed on the 5th day of June, 2012 and paragraph 30 of the additional written statement on oath in support of the Reply to the statement of defence, filed on the 8th day of October, 2013, Appellants as witness stated thus:-
"That I swear to this affidavit in truth and in good faith and" the above depositions in the alleged written statement are not in full compliance with the provisions of the Oaths Act as to qualify as written statement on oath as prescribed by Order 3 Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules of the lower Court. The said Order 3 Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules of Ekiti State High Court Rules mandatorily directs a claimant to file written Statement on oath of the witnesses among other documents along with his originating process. The word SHALL as embodied in the said Order has been interpreted in many judicial authorities to mean a compulsion. See: Onochie V. Odogwu (2006) 6 NWLR (pt 975) 65 (SC). It therefore follows that a valid oath must be in the form prescribed by Section 13 of the Oaths Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The form prescribed by Section 13 is in the 1st Schedule to the Act which provide as follows:
"I do solemnly and sincerely declare..."
Any Written statement, therefore, which does not bear the First Schedule to Section 13 of the Oaths Act, cannot be said to be a Written Statement on Oath.
See: Obed Orlando Ibe & Anor. v. Nkiru Ugochukwu & 41 Ors. (2010) All NWLR (Pt. 504) 1590 @ 1592/1593.
Section 13 of the Oaths Act provides as follows:
"It shall be lawful for any Commissioner for Oaths, Notary Public or any other person authorized by the Act to administer oaths, to take and receive the declaration of any person voluntarily making the same before him, in the form set out in the 1st Schedule which is as follows, I (name supplied) do solemnly and sincerely declare, that I make this solemn declaration contentiously believing same or the contents to be true."
In putting the legitimacy of oath in any Written Statement to rest, the Enugu Division of the Court of Appeal said in Chikwelu Chris Obumneke v. Okeke Sylvester & Anor (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 605) 1945 @ 1947 as follows:
"Thus, every oath to be legitimate must comply with the provisions of the Oaths Act, Cap. 333, Laws of the Federation and the 1st Schedule thereto. Where there is no statement in an oath stating that it is made solemnly, conscientiously believing the contents to be true and correct and by virtue of the Oaths Act, it is not an oath or Affidavit properly so called."
From the signature and stamp of the Commissioner for Oaths referred to above, it would be seen that the grouse expressed by the Appellants' Counsel against rejection of both written declarations/depositions border on both their form and substance.
As stated earlier in the course of this judgment, any written statement which does not comply with the 1st schedule to Section 13 of the Oaths Act, cannot be said to be a written statement on oath. It is this vital aspect of the oath that is missing in the written statement of the Appellants' witness CW1, in the present appeal. Non compliance with the provisions of the Oaths Act, is a fundamental breach of the Oaths Act. The consequence is that the entire statement of the Appellants' witness CW1 is left bare. The Rules of Court are not made for fun, they are made to be obeyed.
See: Hart v. Hart (1990) 1 NWLR (pt 126) 276, Tom Ikimi v. Godwin Omamnli (1995) 3 NWLR (pt 383), Ibrahim v. Col Cletus Emein & Ors (1996) 2 NWLR (pt 430) 322, Tehat A.O. Sule v. Nigeria Cocoa Board (1985) All NLR 257, Odu v. Jolaoso (2002) 37 WRN 115.
It is on the basis of the above that I agree with the learned trial judge to jettison the evidence of CW1. The Rules of Court in that aspect must be obeyed and it is not a kind of breach that can be referred to as a technicality, as Appellants' counsel would like us to believe.
Learned Counsel for the appellants, made a long list of facts or presumed facts to back the complaint that the trial Court did not properly evaluate the evidence, before allotting probative value to them. He complained that appellants pleaded in paragraphs 11- 14 of the Amended Statement of claim of the Appellants' dated 7th September, 2016:-
"11. Shortly thereafter the defendant's agents tested the transmission mast which generated a great vibration and emission of fumes. The claimants' building was shaken to its foundation, whilst the fumes forced the claimants out of their building and took refuge in the house of a neighbor.
12. Claimants further aver that the defendant started full operation of the transmission mast as a result of which the nuisance caused by the operation became unbearable for them.
13. Claimants eventually vacated the residential building and relocated to the house of one Mrs. Florence Rotimi. They live there up till this moment as continuous inhalement of the emission from the transmission mast could cause damage to the claimants' health as well as the members of their family living with them.
14. The installation of the transmission mast to the claimants' residential building is an eyesore and a potential health hazard." The paragraphs above form the fulcrum of the Appellants' case, before the lower Court.
The appellants in paragraphs 29-30 pleaded the measures taken by the Respondent.
The Respondent in its statement of defence paragraphs 24-26 pleaded measures they had undertaken viz a viz the complainant of the Appellants.
Appellants' counsel premised his contention, on the paragraphs referred to above, in contending that the respondent admitted creating discomfort or nuisance to the Appellants. He argued that the trial judge jettisoned, the evidence of CW1, on the basis of non compliance with oaths law. Whereas the evidence of the CW2, and CW3, recounted were never tested, challenged or discredited under cross examination by the respondent, or its counsel under a favorable condition. But the trial judge picked on the evidence of CW2, and CW3, emanating from cross examination relating only to events of a single day.
The complaint of Appellants' counsel is that the evaluation given to the evidence of CW2, and CW3, by the trial judge amounted to looking for facts to destroy the evidence in support of the Appellants' case.
The learned trial judge began evaluating the evidence before the Court, by first determining the competence of the defendants' final written address, based on issues outside those formulated at the pre-trial conference without the leave of Court. In his exercise of evaluating evidence before the Court, learned trial judge examined the statement of defence. In his further evaluation of evidence, he looked at the written deposition by the CW1, dated 18/10/16, which he found revealed that it had no oaths clause. This was obviously missing in the written deposition with the implication that the written deposition fell short of the standard required under Section 13 of the Oaths Act.
I am of the view, that the learned trial judge rightly held that the written deposition adopted by the CW1, dated 18/10/16, revealed that the deposition had no oaths clause. It has been settled by a long line of decisions, that where in a written deposition there is no Oaths Clause in flagrant violation of Section 13 of the Oaths Act. Applying the above position of the law to this appeal, the implication of this, is that the two written depositions of the CW1, are incompetent before the Court, and are therefore correctly discountenanced by the learned trial judge. Only a competent written deposition could be adopted pursuant to Order 32 Rule 2(3) of the High Court of Ekiti State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2011. Section 215(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, provides that witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief. Evidence in chief is the root on which cross-examination as a stem rests…..” wherein the Appellants pleaded that shortly after the Respondent's agents tested the transmission mast which generated a great vibration and emission of fumes. The Appellants building was shaken to its foundation whilst the fumes forced the Appellants out of their building and they took refuge in their neighbor's building.
It is indisputable from the holding of the lower Court that the learned trial judge correctly accessed and evaluated the pleadings, and evidence adduced before the Court, in determining to dismiss the Appellants' case." Per AKINBAMI ,J.C.A in OYEKANMI & ANOR v. MTN (2020) LPELR-50168(CA) (Pp. 50-59 paras. E)
"This Court has consistently held that a witness Statement on Oath is……..not evidence. It only becomes evidence after the witness is sworn in Court and adopts his statement. At this stage at best it becomes evidence in Chief. It is therefore subjected to Cross-Examination after which it becomes evidence to be used by the Court. If the opponent fails to Cross-Examine the witness, it is taken as the true situation of facts contained therein."
62. In the circumstances of this case and considering the provisions of Order 3, I am inclined to rely on the pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in OYEKANMI & ANOR v. MTN (2020) LPELR-50168(CA). I find for the Defendants that the claimant witness statement on oath falls short of the requirement of a written statement on oath and it fails to anchor the claimants case, this means that the claimant has nothing before this court in furtherance of his Claims. The judgement of this court is therefore that the claimants case is hereby struck out.
Now in the event that I am wrong and bearing in mind that trial Court are expected to resolve all issues, here is how I would have proceeded in resolving the remaining issues.
2 Whether the Claimant has placed cogent, credible and reliable materials before this Honourable Court to entitle him to grant of declaratory reliefs sought before this Honorable Court. From the Defendant
63. The claimants reliefs are as follows
a. A DECLARATION setting aside the constitution, composition, and findings of the Disciplinary Committee which tried the Claimant upon which his letter of dismissal was founded for lack of competence to try a criminal allegation of rape or sexual assault.
b. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant by a letter dated June 27, 2019, did not follow due process of law and procedure.
c. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the first Defendant by a letter dated June 27, 2019 is null, void and of no effect, having being in breach of the right to fair hearing as guaranteed by the 1999 constitution.
d. A DECLARATION that the employment of the Claimant with the first Defendant is showered with statutory flavour, and regulated by law.
e. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is still in the employment of the first Defendant.
f. AN ORDER re-instating the Claimant back to his employment and in his position prior to the purported dismissal.
g. AN ORDER directing payment of the Claimant unpaid salaries and other benefits including promotion from June 27, 2019 till his re-instatement as follows:
i. Salary at the rate of N134.141.09 (One hundred thirty-four thousand, one hundred forty-one naira, nine kobo) (Net salary) per month from July 2019 till reinstatement.
ii. Earned allowances from years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 till judgement and reinstatement.
iii. Payment to the Claimant by the Defendant, of a sum N150,000,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) as damages for the suffering, trauma, injury and other inconveniences suffered by the Claimant as a result of his purported and wrongful dismissal by the first Defendant.
iv. N500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as the cost of this proceeding.
64. Reliefs a-e are Declaratory reliefs, the position of the law as per such reliefs has been well established in IKEANA & ORS V. OHAKWE & ORS (2005) LPELR – 54697 (CA). "It is settled that where a party seeks declaratory reliefs, he must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, if any. In essence, a declaratory relief must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court notwithstanding the default of defence or any admission in the defendants' pleading. The onus therefore is on the claimant to establish his case on a preponderance of evidence. See DUMEZ (NIG) LTD V NWAKHOBA (2008)18 NWLR (pt. 119) 361, OKOYE V NWANKWO (2014)15 NWLR (prt.1429) 93 and SANUSI V AMEYOGUN (1992)4 NWLR (prt.237) 527." Per MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, JCA (Pp. 12 - 12 Paras C - F).Also in OLAYIWOLA V. MINISTER, FCT & ORS (2021) LPELR – 53044 (CA)."The law is unequivocal that in a case seeking declaratory relief, the Claimant must succeed on the strength of its case and not the weakness of the Defence." Per MONICA BOLNA'AN DONGBAN-MENSEM, JCA (Pp. 40 - 40 Paras A - B). See GLO V. FATMAX GLOBAL VENTURES LTD (2020) LPELR – 50500 (CA)."It is trite that a person who seeks declaratory reliefs from a Court or Tribunal must prove it to the hilt. He must rely on the strength of his own case. Failure of Defendant Defence to the claim for declaratory reliefs cannot operate in favour of the claimant. The claimant or plaintiffs must produce cogent and convincing evidence to support his claim otherwise the relief sought would be dismissed. See EDWARD NKWEGU OKEREKE VS NWEZE DAVID OMAHI & ORS (2016) 11 NWLR (PART 1524) 438 AT 489 B - G per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said. - "It has been settled by a long list of authorities of this Court that: Where a party seeks declaratory reliefs, the burden is on him to establish his claim. He must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence (if any). Such reliefs will not be granted even on the admission of the defendant. See: Emenike v. P.D.P (2012) LPELR - SC 443/2011 p. 27, O-G, (2012) 12 WLR (Pt. 1315) 556: Dumez Ltd v. Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205,297 - 298 F - A, Ucha v. Elechi (2012 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 330." Per PETER OLABISI IGE, JCA (Pp. 31 - 32 Paras F - E).
65. The claimants reliefs are as follows
h. A DECLARATION setting aside the constitution, composition, and findings of the Disciplinary Committee which tried the Claimant upon which his letter of dismissal was founded for lack of competence to try a criminal allegation of rape or sexual assault.
66. With regard to lack of competence I had already resolved that the question of recourse criminal trials in domestic tribunals earlier in this Judgement.
i. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the Defendant by a letter dated June 27, 2019, did not follow due process of law and procedure.
j. A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the service of the first Defendant by a letter dated June 27, 2019 is null, void and of no effect, having being in breach of the right to fair hearing as guaranteed by the 1999 constitution.
k. A DECLARATION that the employment of the Claimant with the first Defendant is showered with statutory flavour, and regulated by law.
l. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is still in the employment of the first Defendant.
m. AN ORDER re-instating the Claimant back to his employment and in his position prior to the purported dismissal.
n. AN ORDER directing payment of the Claimant unpaid salaries and other benefits including promotion from June 27, 2019 till his re-instatement as follows:
i. Salary at the rate of N134.141.09 (One hundred thirty-four thousand, one hundred forty-one naira, nine kobo) (Net salary) per month from July 2019 till reinstatement.
ii. Earned allowances from years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 till judgement and reinstatement.
iii. Payment to the Claimant by the Defendant, of a sum N150,000,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) as damages for the suffering, trauma, injury and other inconveniences suffered by the Claimant as a result of his purported and wrongful dismissal by the first Defendant.
iv. N500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as the cost of this proceeding.
67. The Defendant had argued that failure of the claimant to produce minutes of the Disciplinary Committee meeting is fatal to the grant of the claimants reliefs. The position of the law is as was stated in ALIU V. COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, EKIADOLOR (2014) LPELR-24453(CA) (Pp. 34 paras. A) where the Court Appeal restated that "It is however the law that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongly terminated, he has the onus to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and to prove in what manner the said terms had been breached by the employer. See KATTO V. CENTRAL BANK (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607)390." Per EKPE ,J.C.A
68. Section 254 C gives this court exclusive jurisdiction in respect of”
i) …….
ii) appeals from the decisions or recommendations of any administrative body or commission of enquiry, arising from or connected with employment, labour, trade unions or industrial relations; and
iii) …….
Which is tantamount to a judicial review. I find that the report of the Disciplinary Committee is a sina qua non (an indispensable and essential action, condition, or ingredient.) for the court to make a determination of whether the rules of natural justice equity and good conscience: the twin pillars of (audi alteram patem and Nemo juris in causa sua) were observed;. Without these minutes, the Court is unable to substantiate the question of lack of fair hearing. With the exception of relied d. for A DECLARATION that the employment of the Claimant with the first Defendant is showered with statutory flavour, and regulated by law all other reliefs fail. Reliefs a, b, c, e, f, g having not been substantiated to the satisfaction of this Court all fail.
69. The Claimants case fails and is hereby struck out.
70. This is the Court’s judgment and it is hereby entered.
………………………………
HON. JUSTICE E. N. AGBAKOBA
JUDGE, COURT 3