JONATHAN PARAGUA ZAMUNA -VS- THE GOVERONR OF KADUNA STATE & 3 ORSNational Industrial Court of Nigeria- Judgment Portal

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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT KADUNA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

DATE: MONDAY 10^TH JUNE, 2024

SUIT NO: NICN/KD/13/2023

BETWEEN

JONATHAN PARAGUA ZAMUNA CLAIMANT

AND

1. THE GOVERNOR OF KADUNA STATE

2. ATTORNEY – GENERAL OF KADUNA DEFENDANTS

STATE

REPRESENTATION

D.H. Iorkunbul Esq holding the brief of Napoleon O. Idenala Esq for the Claimant

J.A. Kanyip Esq with A.A. Akawu Esq (Assistant Director Public Prosecution, Kaduna State Ministry of Justice) for the Defendants

JUDGMENT

The Claimant filed an Originating summons pursuant to Order 3 Rule 3 and Rule 17 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedures) Rules 2017 on the 30^th June 2023. The Claimant, on the 16^th of October 2023 sequel to the Order of this Court, filed an Amended Originating Summons wherein the Claimant set out a sole question herein reproduced below for the determination of this Court:

WHETHER the Defendants can unilaterally terminate the appointment of the Claimant and remove him as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna State upon allegations made against the Claimant without giving the Claimant the opportunity to be heard and to respond to any so allegations made by especially the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants contrary to S.36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As amended).

Upon the determination of the questions set out above, the Claimants pray for the following reliefs:

1. A DECLARATION that the removal from office or deposition of the Claimant on the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna State by the Defendants particularly the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants by their letter dated 18^th may, 2023, is irregular, unfair, unconstitutional, and contrary to good conscience and therefore null and void.

2. AN ORDER setting aside the removal from office or deposition of the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna State as contained in the letter of deposition dated 18^th may, 2023.

3. AN ORDER restoring the Claimant to his appointment and office as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna State with all his salaries, allowances and entitlements and benefits of the office thereof.

4. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants individually or by themselves, agents, privies, servants or anybody claiming through them from appointing or conferring upon any other person in the place of the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna State.

5. AN ORDER for General damages of #25,000,000 (Twenty-five Million Naira) for aggravated damages, embarrassment, pain and suffering.

At the plenary trial on the 20^th of March 2024, Counsel for the Claimant, Napoleon O. Idenala, Esq. identified the Amended Originating Summons filed on the 16^th of October 2023. The Summons was accompanied by a 29-paragraph affidavit deposed to by the Claimant, attached therewith are Exhibits A - E. In compliance with the Rules of this Court, the Claimant also filed a Written Address in support of the Originating Summons. Counsel also identified a 17 paragraph Further and Better Affidavit and Reply on Point of Law filed on the 19^th of March 2024 deposed to by the Claimant. Attached with the Claimant’s Further and Better Affidavit are Exhibits H – L. Counsel adopted these processes and urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought.

Counsel for the Defendants, James A. Kanyip, Esq. responding to the Amended Originating Summons, identified a 22 – paragraph Counter-Affidavit deposed to by Sani Galadima, the Deputy Director (Chieftaincy Affairs); attached wherewith are Exhibits MLGA1 – MLGA8, and Written Address filed on the 25^th of January, 2024 and adopted same and urged this Court to dismiss the claim of the Claimant.

FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE SUMMONS

The precis of the fact leading to the suit as contained in the Affidavit in support of the Amended Summons is that the Claimant was appointed as the chief of Pirigi Chiefdom (also known as Pukaruma Pirigi) in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna through the letter of appointment and by the virtue of the appointment the Claimant became a member of the Kaduna State Council of Chiefs. That from the date of being sworn into office as the Chief of Piriga, the Claimant stated that he has been administering the Chiefdom without let or hindrance and according to the terms of his appointment and he was being paid his salary every month by the Government. The Claimant further stated that over the course of his being the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom, the Claimant had a good and cordial working relationship with his communities and the Defendants. In the course of performing his official functions, he had an accident in November 2019 in Kafanchan in Kaduna State and even broke his arm. Since then, he has been receiving various medical attentions including surgeries at various hospitals in Kaduna State and Abuja FCT.

The then Governor Nasir El-Rufai who was the then occupant of the 1^st Defendant even helped the Claimant with some funds for his medicals and he is still receiving physiotherapies on a consistent basis because his National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) registration is in Kaduna. His wife of over 40 years died on the 4^th May, 2023 in Kaduna in his presence due to illness that had affected and disturbed her and his family for some time. The fact of the death and burial of his wife notwithstanding, he still was discharging the functions of his office as Chief as he also has officials to assist the Claimant whenever necessary. While still privately mourning his wife, on Friday 19^th May, 2023, he received an invitation to the Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs for Monday 22^nd May, 2023.

On the said 22^nd May, 2023 at the meeting with the Honourable Commissioner (then Hajia Umma Ahmad), she informed the Claimant that the 1^st Defendant removed the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom. That the Claimant was quite shocked by the utterances of the commissioner and he later realized that there was a letter of deposition dated 18^th May, 2023. That same day, the Claimant was to be banished to a house somewhere in Ungwan Rimi Kaduna where he is expected to stay for five (5) years. But he refused it and told them that he would rather stay in his personal house in Kaduna. And the people with the Commissioner brought a document stating that he had to sign.

The Claimant further stated that later that day he heard and read from the news media that quoting the Honourable Commissioner as saying that he was removed or deposed because of the clashes between the Gure and Kitimi Communities of Piriga Chiefdom and for his non-residence within the kingdom. The clash between the Gure and Kitimi Communities occurred on the 4^th of May, 2023, the same date that his beloved wife died and he was at the hospital with her and later with her corpse in Kaduna hospital. For the reasons stated in Exhibit D and in the media credited to the Honourable Commissioner, the Claimant was very ignorant of and was unaware of them. That he was not invited or called upon to explain himself or make any defence to all the allegations in the Exhibit D and in the media. As a Traditional Ruler, and a member of the Kaduna State Council of Chiefs, the Defendants did not avail the Claimant any opportunity of appearing before any panel, commission or body of enquiry to inform him of the allegations and his response thereof before unilaterally deposing the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom.

That he should hold the office of Chief of Piriga Chiefdom for his lifetime. That he had risen to a rank of Director in the civil service before he was appointed as Chief and therefore his constitutional right as an individual and a respected Chief has been violated.

FACTS IN OPPOSITION THE SUMMONS

The Defendants stated that the Claimant was invited by the Ministry of Local Government Affairs to attend a meeting on the 22^nd of May, 2023 at the office of the Honourable Commissioner. The Claimant was served with a letter of deposition dated 18^thof May 2023. That the Claimant was given the option to either stay in an accommodation provided for him by the State Government at Ungwan Rimi, Kaduna for five (5) years in line with the provisions of the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021, or he could stay in his residence. The Claimant opted to stay in his residence. One of the reasons for the deposition of the Claimant as contained in his letter of deposition was his failure to handle the violent clashes between the Gure and Kitimi communities over farmlands in his Chiefdom on the 5^th of May, 2023 due to his constant absence from his domain and Chiefdom. And a letter of query dated 8^th of May, 2023 and signed by the Honourable Commissioner, Ministry of Local Government Affairs was served on the Plaintiff on the same day; and the Claimant did not respond to it.

Further stated that the Claimant was entitled to hold his office as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom for a lifetime on the condition that he complied with the provisions of the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021 other directives of the 1^st Defendant or Ministry of Local Government Affairs. After the deposition of the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga, the office cannot be left vacant; and the need to fill it as soon as practically possible became imperative. The Claimant did not receive any favourable response because there was no merit in his letter of appeal.

The Claimant cannot be paid his salary because he has ceased to be the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom after his deposition. The Claimant was issued with a letter of query which he never responded to, and the Defendants followed due process as provided for under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021 before deposing the Claimant.

The Claimant was appointed as the Chief of Piriga (Pukarma Piriga) vide a letter of 19^th of February 2018 and took his Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Office on the 7^th of April 2018. By his appointment as the Chief of Piriga, the Claimant thus became a member of the Kaduna State Council of Chiefs and the Chairman Piriga Traditional Council. One of the cardinal duties and responsibilities of Emirs and Chiefs under the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021 is to assist the State Government and security agencies in the collation of intelligence and security information and transmission to the relevant authorities. To be able to discharge this duty, Emirs and Chiefs are expected to be always resident in their domains (emirates and chiefdoms); and where they must travel or stay outside their domains, the approval of their respective Local Government Council Chairmen, the Ministry of Local Government Affairs or Governor is required beforehand.

A circular to that effect dated 25^th of August 2022 with Reference No. MLG/CA/39/VOL.IV was issued to all Emirs/Emirate Councils and Chiefs/Traditional Councils through their respective Council Secretaries who are the approved recipients of mail and correspondence for the Councils Emirs/Emirate and Chiefs/Traditional Councils under their schedule of duties. The said circular was served on the Plaintiff/Piriga Traditional Council through the Council Secretary on the 25^th of August, 2022. On the 5^th of May, 2023, violent clashes erupted between Gure and Kitimi communities in Piriga Chiefdom which led to the death of two (2) people with others sustaining various degrees of injuries, burning down of thirty-five (35) houses, and the destruction of other property and this incident took place when the Claimant was not in his domain and Chiefdom.

A letter of query dated 8^th of May 2023 with Reference No. MLG/CA/31/V0LIV was issued to the Claimant informing him of his absence in his domain and Chiefdom when the incident occurred and his failure to report it to his Local Government Council (that is Lere Local Government Council), the Ministry of Local Government Affairs or security operatives for timely intervention. Consequently, the said letter requested him to explain within 48 hours why disciplinary action which included his deposition should not be taken against him. Upon the failure of the Claimant to respond to the said letter within the stipulated time, the Honourable Commissioner, Ministry of Local Government Affairs wrote a mail dated 11^th of May, 2023 with Reference No. MLG/CA/31/VOL.IV to the 1^st Defendant recommending the deposition of the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga after detailing what transpired and the processes followed.

The 1^st Defendant minuted on the said letter approving the recommendation. The approval of the 1^st Defendant was conveyed to the Honourable Commissioner vide a mail dated 15^th May, 2023 with Reference No. GH/KD/S/78 from the Principal Private Secretary to the 1^st Defendant. Based on the approval of the 1^st Defendant as aforesaid, the Honourable Commissioner issued a letter of deposition dated 18^th May, 2023 with Reference No. MLG/CA/31/V0L.I which was served on the Claimant on the 22^nd of May, 2022. The Claimant was given the option to either stay in an accommodation provided for him by the State Government at Ungwan Rimi, Kaduna for five (5) years in line with the provisions of the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021, or he could stay in his residence. The Claimant opted to stay in his residence, and he signed an undertaking dated 22^nd of May, 2023 to that effect.

Before the occurrence of the events that led to the deposition of the Claimant, the Honourable Commissioner had verbally warned the Claimant on several occasions on his penchant for staying outside his domain and Chiefdom thereby rendering himself inaccessible to his people, the Local Government Council Chairman and security agencies in the Local Government Area; and on his poor management of the communal conflict between Gure and Kitimi communities in his Chiefdom. The Claimant wrote a letter of appeal dated 24^th of May 2023 to the 1^st Defendant (then Governor Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai) pleading for reconsideration and rescinding of the decision to depose him. The 1^st Defendant minuted on the said letter and directed the Honourable Commissioner to keep it for consideration of the incoming Governor. The directive of the 1^st Defendant was conveyed to the Honourable Commission vide a mail dated 26^th of May 2023 with Reference No. GH/KD/S/78 from the Principal Private Secretary to the 1^st Defendant.

By letter dated 1^st of June 2023, the Claimant wrote another appeal to the 1^st Defendant (now Senator Uba Sani), through the Ministry of Local Government Affairs making the same plead as contained in his earlier letter of 24^th of May, 2023. Vide a letter dated 25^th of July 2023 with Reference No. MLC/CA/31/VOLI, Ministry of Local Government Affairs wrote to the Claimant informing him of the approval of the 1^st Defendant upholding the decision to depose him as the Chief of Piriga.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Counsel for the Claimant nominated a sole issue for the determination of this suit to wit:

WHETHER the purported termination of the Claimant's appointment by way of deposition as Chief of Piriga Chiefdom for the reasons adduced by the Defendants without according to the Claimant fair hearing and without due regard to the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria can stand in the eyes of the law.

Counsel for the Defendants submitted a sole issue for determination to wit:

Whether the Defendants followed due process and gave the Plaintiff the opportunity to be heard before his deposition as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom

LEGAL ARGUMENT OF THE CLAIMANT

Counsel for the Claimant submitted that by the contents of Exhibits 'A' 'B'C D' 'E and 'F and the contents of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons there existed a contract of employment between the Claimant and the Kaduna State Government represented by the Defendants who upon his application, interviewed him, selected and appointed him as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna State. And the Claimant has been occupying that position since the day he was appointed on 19^th of February 2018. Going through Exhibit 'D' i.e. the letter of Deposition of the Claimant will show that the Defendant says that it was deposing the Claimant for reasons contained in Exhibit D. The allegations are the weighty allegations used by the Defendants especially the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to allegedly depose the Claimant. The other reasons trending in the media attributed to the Commissioner of the 2^nd Defendant as the reasons for the deposition of the Claimant.

The Claimant has vehemently averred and contended that he was never given any opportunity to respond to, answer or respond to any of the said allegations before he was deposed or his employment terminated. Submitted that for the Governor (1^st Defendant herein) based on the recommendation of the Ministry of Local Government Affairs (its servant/agent herein) based on the allegations made against the Claimant, the Governor who is the accepting authority must have to be satisfied that the Claimant was given fair hearing cited ALH. MUHAMMAADU ILIYASU BASHAR V. ALHAJI MUSTAPHA HARUNA JOKOLO & ORS (2016) LPELR-40241(CA), REAR ADMIRAL FRANCIS ECHIE AGBITI V. THE NIGERIAN NAVY (2011) LPELR-2944(SC) and S.36 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

From the affidavit in support of this application, the Claimant averred and showed that he did do anything wrong to warrant the purported deposition/termination of his employment as Chief, neither was he queried nor accorded fair hearing before his purported deposition based on the allegations made before Exhibit 'D' was issued to him. Cited the case of ONUEGBU V. OKAFOR (2003) LPELR-12403(CA).

LEGAL ARGUMENT OF THE DEFENDANT

The Claimant was appointed as the Chief of Piriga vide a letter of 19^th February, 2018 and took his Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Office on the 7^th of April, 2018. It is also not in dispute that he was deposed on the 22^nd of May, 2023 vide a letter dated 18h May, 2023. What is in dispute is whether his deposition followed due process and he was given the opportunity to be heard before the said deposition. The question arising from the sole issue for determination which now begs for answer is: did the Defendants follow due process and gave the Claimant the opportunity to be heard before his deposition? The starting point is to first determine the nature of the appointment of the Claimant. On this, it is not in dispute that the Claimant was appointed by the 1^st Defendant vide Exhibit 'A' attached to the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons; and his appointment was made pursuant to section 1 of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law, Cap 25, Laws of Kaduna State, 1991 (now repealed by Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021, section 10 (1) thereof).

The process for the deposition of the Claimant is provided for under section 11 (1) of the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021. That the appointment and deposition of the Claimant both have statutory flavour. In the case of Mr. Eniwomake Richard Ovivie & Others v. Delta Steel Company Limited (2023) LPELR-60460 (SC), the Supreme Court, per His Lordship, Ogunwumiju, JSC at pp. 24-26, paras. B-C held that an employment enjoys statutory flavour when the contract of service is governed by statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provision. Where the conditions for appointment or the determination of a contract of service are governed by the pre-conditions of an enabling statute, so that a valid determination or appointment is predicated on satisfying such statutory provisions, such contract is one with a statutory flavour. The contract is determinable not by the parties, but only by statutory preconditions governing its determination.

From the provisions in section 11 (1) of the Law, the 1^st Defendant can depose the Plaintiff based on the recommendation of the Ministry of Local Government Affairs if he is satisfied that the deposition is in the public interest, order, or good governance of the State. Based on the depositions in of the Counter-Affidavit, the processes followed by the Ministry of Local Government that led to the deposition of the Plaintiff were clearly stated.

Submitted that the Ministry followed due process and gave the Claimant the opportunity to be heard through Exhibit MLGA 2. It was his failure to respond to it within the 48 hours given to him that made the Ministry to write Exhibit MLGA 3 to the 1^st Defendant recommending his deposition which was approved; consequently, Exhibit MLGA 4 was served on him. This process is in line with the provisions of section 36 (2) (a) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and section 11 (1) of the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law, 2021.

Submitted further that the Ministry had drawn his attention on the need to always stay in his domain and Chiefdom; and verbally warned the Claimant on several occasions on his penchant for staying outside his domain and Chiefdom. All these were build-up facts and processes that led to his deposition.

COURT’S DECISION

I have carefully gone through the facts leading to this suit and the defence thereof, I am without a scintilla of doubt that this suit bothers on the deposition of the Claimant who is a traditional chief of Pirigi Chiefdom (also known as Pukaruma Pirigi) in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna, putting it differently the termination of the appointment of the Claimant as a traditional chief of Pirigi Chiefdom. Curiously, given the facts of this suit, I am pressed to query if this Court has jurisdiction over the deposition of the Claimant from the traditional stool of Pirigi Chiefdom even though the parties are silent about the propriety of bringing this suit before the National Industrial Court instead of the High Court which has unlimited jurisdiction subject to the provisions of Section 251 and 254C of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is fundamental to know that parties cannot on their accord confer jurisdiction on the court. Jurisdiction is the threshold of judicial power and judicialism, and by extension extrinsic to the adjudication. It is the backbone of any adjudication. Parties cannot by connivance, acquiescence, or collusion confer jurisdiction on a court. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, parties in the litigation cannot confer jurisdiction on the court. As a matter of law, lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by one or both parties. It is a hard matter of law clearly beyond the compromise of the parties. This is because parties cannot conspire to vest jurisdiction in a court where there is none. Any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction would be an exercise in futility, for such proceedings are null and void. It is for this reason that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of proceedings, even for the first time on appeal: see the case of A.-G., RIVERS STATE V. A.-G., FED (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1652) 53.

For this reason, it is legally expedient to raise the issue of jurisdiction on whether the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has jurisdictional garb to entertain this suit concerning the deposition of the Claimant from being the traditional chief of Pirigi Chiefdom. Before expounding the jurisdiction of this Court, I am not oblivion of the position of law which requires that where a Court raise an issue suo motu, the Court shall beckon the parties to address the Court on the issue raised. The Court of Appeal in the case of ORJI V. AMARA (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1531) 21 sternly warns that no court of law has the jurisdiction to raise an issue and resolve it suo motu without hearing the parties. In the Nigerian adversary system of adjudication, courts should be reluctant or loath to raise issues suo motu. This is because litigation is not theirs but that of the parties. If a court raises an issue suo motu, it has removed itself from its exalted position to flirt with the parties and in the course gets itself soiled in the litigation. Although a court has the jurisdiction to raise an issue suo motu, it does not have the jurisdiction to resolve the issue suo motu. The court must allow the parties to react to the issue by way of address. On no account should a court of law raise an issue suo motu and resolve it suo motu. A court is not a Father Christmas and its jurisdiction is limited to the issues presented to it. The court cannot generally make pronouncements that affect the parties before it without allowing the parties to address it thereon.

Notwithstanding the profound warning of the appellate courts in a plethora of judicial authorities which enjoin the courts to be hesitant to raise issues suo motu and resolve it suo motu, authorities plenteous which state the instances where the Court can raise issues suo motu and resolve it suo motu without hearing from the parties. The Supreme Court in the case of AKINGBULUGBE V. NIROWI (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1895) 339 where the Supreme Court held that:

It has become accepted that a court can raise an issue suo motu and decide same without calling for the address of parties in the following instances:

a. When the issue relates to the court’s own jurisdiction;

b. When both parties are not aware or ignored a statute which may have a bearing on the case. This is because every court is expected to take judicial notice of statutes by virtue of section 122(2)(a) and of the Evidence Act, 2011;

c. When on the face of the record, serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings are evident.

See also ANGADI V. P.D.P. & ORS (2018)15 NWLR (PT. 1641) 1; PERSONS, NAMES UNKNOWN V. SAHRIS INT’L LTD (2019) 13 NWLR (PT. 1689) 203; and OMONIYIV. ALABI (2015) 6 NWLR (PT. 1456) 572.

In the case of OGAR & ORS V. IGBE & ORS (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt.1678) 534 articulated as follows:

There is this misconception that in ALL cases where the court, at any stage, finds that an action is manifestly incompetent either as regards competence, jurisdiction or by operation of a statute it cannot on its own initiative or suo motu put an end to it without hearing the parties. English Courts, holding on to the principle that lithe (sic) consent of the parties cannot give a court jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess, II (sic) have held that a court is not only entitled, but bound, to put an end to proceedings if at any stage and by any means it becomes manifest that they are incompetent; and that it can do so on its own initiative, even though the parties have consented to such void action ...

In Effiom v. Cross River State Independent Electoral Commission, Tabai, JSC, relying on Tukurv. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 and tacitly accepting this principle, states that in some special circumstances the court can raise an issue of law or jurisdiction suo motu and without hearing the parties, decide on it. He however qualifies it; holding that the principle that the court ought not to raise an issue suo motu and decide upon it without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on it applies mainly to issues of fact. In any case, the appellant who complains that the court below raised an issue suo motu and decided upon it without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on it, must go further to show that the failure to hear him on the point occasioned some miscarriage of justice.

(underlined mine for emphasis)

Thus, the jurisdiction of the court is a creation of the statute; that is the issue which the Court raises suo motu here is a matter of law, though the Court will utilize the provision of the Constitution which creates this Court viz-a-viz the facts already placed before this Court to determine the jurisdiction of this Court. This is a jurisdictional issue which bothers on law; therefore, it is needless to call the parties to address the Court on the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court after all the Court is expected to have all laws at its fingertips.

Given the above exposition of the law, it is the finding of this Court that the Court can legally raise the issue of jurisdiction suo motu and decide it suo motu without the address of the parties after all the jurisdiction is an issue of law.

Reverting to the issue of the jurisdiction of this Court to hear this suit, the foundation of the jurisdiction of this Court is the provision of Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as Amended). Section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution provides thus:

254C—(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters—

(a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.

Gleaning from the provision of Section 254C1(a), it is without hesitation that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to or connected with employment and matters incidental to employment or connected with employment. The exclusiveness jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court received judicial confirmation in the case of COCA-COLA (NIGERIA) LTD. V. AKINSANYA (2013) 18 NWLR (pt. 1386) 255 the Court of Appeal held as follows:

The Supreme Court again in the National Union of Electric Employees v. B.P.E. (2010) 2 - 3 SC (Pt. II) 27; (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 538 reiterated on the extent of jurisdiction of National Industrial Court as follows:

“The implication of conferring exclusive jurisdiction in trade disputes on the National Industrial Court is to exclude the wide powers of the State High Court thus causing the conflict between Decree No. 47 and section 272 of the 1999 Constitution ……. void being inconsistent with section 272 of the 1999 Constitution.”

Undoubtedly, the coming in of the Third Alteration Act provided a radical departure from the position of the Supreme Court in the authorities cited above. The Act has widened the hitherto narrow and specialized jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court to new areas like the issuing of injunctions and exclusive jurisdiction over employment matters in all strata of labour market. Without doubt therefore the phrase employment mentioned in the Third Alteration Act embraces the mode of private employment of the respondent with the appellants and is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. The courts from the apex court and the Court of Appeal quickly adapted to the new amendment. All the recent decisions have held that section 254C(1)(a) of the Third Alteration Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the National Industrial Court over labour matters including private employment or employment in the private sector of the economy.

This then takes us to, what employment is. Though the definitional meaning of the word ‘employment’ has become a difficult task in the academic arena, it is because of the elastic nature of employment that Sam Erugo noted in Introduction to Nigerian Labour Law: Contract of Employment and Labour Practice, (the 2^nd Edition) at page 20 – 21 that the word ‘employment’ could mean a number of varied relationships cognizable in law and flowing from the effect of a person being employed. However, though the words ‘employment’ and ‘employed’ are frequently used, the two appear not to have any precise legal meaning. Ordinarily, anyone who works for someone else can be said and understood to be employed by that other. But the matter is not that simple. It may happen that the notion of employment spreads across many relationships often erroneously regarded as mutually exclusive. This may entail varying and varied relations in works, trades, or occupations that terms like servants, employees, agents, apprentices, independent contractors, partners, bailees, and others can be used to describe the persons so employed even when the result of such may be different in each case.

This difficulty in having an all-encompassing legal meaning of the word ‘employment’ is made simpler by the Court of Appeal in COCA-COLA (NIGERIA) LTD. V. AKINSANYA (supra) where the Court held thus:

The word ‘employment’ is not defined in the Third Alteration Act. Its ordinary or literal meaning, however, is “work, especially when it is done to earn money” (see Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (7th Edition) 479). Further, the word ‘labour’ grammatically and literally means ‘work’ and the word ‘labourers’ extracted from the word ‘labour’ means people who work or are available for work in a country or company (see Oxford Dictionary (supra) on page 823). The key word in the definition of ‘employment’ is thus ‘work’ which means to do something that involves physical and mental effort, especially as part of a job; while the word ‘job’ means work for which one receives regular payment (see Oxford Dictionary (supra) 1696(work) and 799 (job) respectively).

Further to the above, the Employment Relationship, International Labour Conference, 95^th Session, Report V(1), Fifth Item on the Agenda. Geneva: International Labour Office succinctly stated that:

The employment relationship is a legal notion widely used to refer to the relationship between a person called an employee (frequently referred to as a worker) and an employer for whom the employee performs work under certain conditions in return for remuneration. It is through the employment relationship, however defined, that reciprocal rights and obligations are created between the employee and the employer. The employment relationship has been, and continues to be, the main vehicle through which workers gain access to the rights and benefits associated with employment in the areas of labour law and social security. It is the key point of reference for determining the nature and extent of employers' rights and obligations towards their workers...new forms of relationship which do not always fit within the parameters of the employment relationship...led to a growing number of workers whose employment status is unclear and who are consequently outside the scope of the protection normally associated with an employment relationship.

From the foregoing, there are four major constituents which are sine qua non for the ascertainment of an employment relationship or contract which can be gleaned from COCA-COLA (NIGERIA) LTD. V. AKINSANYA (supra) and ILC to wit: employer, employee (worker), and certain terms and conditions in return for remuneration. The Court of Appeal in REG. TRUSTEES, U.T.C. (NIG.) PLC V. PETERS (2022) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1862) 297 held that the employer-employee relationship is the association between a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another who in turn has the right to control the person's physical conduct in the course of that service. See also the case of REG. TRUSTEES, CAC V. DADA (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1548) 61.

Interestingly, the Apex Court of Nigeria in its effort gave the yardsticks for the ascertainment of the contract of employment in the case of SHENA SECURITY CO. LTD. V. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD. AND ANOR. (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118)77 where it was held on the meaning of contract of employment/service thus:

1. If payments are made by way of “wages” or “salaries” this is indicative that the contract is one of service. If it is a contract for service, the independent contractor gets his payment by way of “fees”. In alike manner, where payment is by way of commission only or on the completion of the job, that indicates that the contract is for service.

2. Where the employer supplies the tools and other capital equipment there is a strong likelihood that the contract is that of employment or of service. But where the person engaged has to invest and provide capital for the work to progress, that indicates that it is a contract for service.

3. In a contract of service/employment, it is inconsistent for an employer to delegate his duties under the contract. Thus, where a contract allows a person to delegate his duties thereunder, it becomes a contract for services.

4. Where the hours of work are not fixed it is not a contract of employment/of service. See: Milway (Southern) Ltd. v. Willshire (1978) 1 RLR 322.

5. It is not fatal to the existence of a contract of employment/of service that the work is not carried out on the employer’s premises. However, a contract which allows the work to be carried on outside the employer’s premises is more likely to be a contract for service.

6. Where an office accommodation and a secretary are provided by the employer, it is a contract of service/of employment.

Notedly, from the metrics quoted above, it is germane to mention that there is a difference between a contract of service and a contract for service. While the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has exclusive jurisdiction over the contract of employment or service pursuant to Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution. A contract for service is outside the radius of the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.

In the case of THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THREE-WHEELER BENEFICIARIES OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, LAGOS STATE V. ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA (unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2013), the ruling of which was delivered on 10^th May 2017, the National Industrial Court held thus:

This Court does not have jurisdiction over every workplace issue. For instance, as against contracts of service, this Court does not assume jurisdiction over contracts for service, and yet contracts for service are workplace issues strictly so-called. See Mr. Henry Adoh v. EMC Communications Infrastructure Limited [2015] 55 NLLR (Pt. 189) 546 NIC, Ozafe Nigeria Limited v. Access Bank of Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/179/2014 the ruling of which was delivered on 16^th March 2016 and Engr. Jude Ononiwu (Trading under the name of Judeson Chemical and Engineering Co. Ltd) v. National Directorate of Employment & Another unreported Appeal No. CA/OW/32/2015 the ruling of which was delivered on 22^nd May 2015.

In the case of LAWRENCE IGWEGBE V. STANDARD ALLIANCE LIFE ASSURANCE LIMITED (unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/465/2013), the judgment of which was delivered on 11^th of July 2017, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria had to determine on the facts before it, if the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant was one of an employment relationship (contract of service) or one in which the claimant was an independent contractor (contract for service). The court held that the fact that the Claimant was on commission and not on salary was very suggestive that the relationship was one of a contract for service. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in SHENA SECURITY CO. LTD (supra) and held that salary is a component part of the employment relationship strictly speaking (contract of service).

Lest I forgot, it is essential to mention here without much ado that in order to determine whether a cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of a court as provided for in the Constitution or the statute that created it, regard will be had to the originating processes only. Where the action is commenced by a writ of Summons, the processes to be examined are the writ of Summons and statement of claim. Where the action is commenced by originating Summons, it is only the originating Summons and the affidavit in support that would be considered: see the case of AONDOAKAA V. OBOT (2022) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1824) 523 and ODUAH V. OKADIGBO (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1660) 433.

Relating the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria over the contract of employment to the fact of this suit, premised on the facts and exhibits before this Court, is the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants herein is employer-employee relationship?

The Claimant stated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 10 and 24 of the Affidavit in support of the Amended Originating Summons that the Claimant was appointed as the Chief of Pirigi Chiefdom (also known as Pukaruma Pirigi) in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna through the letter of appointment and by the virtue of the appointment the Claimant became a member of the Kaduna State Council of Chiefs. That from the date of being sworn into office as the Chief of Piriga, the Claimant stated that he has been administering the Chiefdom without let or hindrance and according to the terms of his appointment and he was being paid his salary every month by the Government. On the said 22^nd May, 2023 at the meeting with the Honourable Commissioner (then Hajia Umma Ahmad), she informed the Claimant that the 1^st Defendant removed the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom. That the Claimant was quite shocked by the utterances of the commissioner and he later realized that there was a letter of deposition dated 18^th of May 2023. And the Claimant has been stopped from earning salary since the purported termination or deposition as a chief.

A clinical study of the facts set out above as contained in the affidavit in support of the Amended Originating Summons would unmistakenly delineate the index of the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants by virtue of Exhibit A and C. In that, the Claimant was appointed, or preferably in labour law practice, employed by the 1^st Defendant as the Chief of Pirigi Chiefdom in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna through Exhibit A. After the appointment, the Claimant started receiving monthly salaries from the Defendants and when the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant became sour, the Defendants deposed the Claimant through Exhibit C.

Let me take the voyage of this case to the root or source of the chieftaincy title of Pirigi Chiefdom. The traditional title of Pirigi like other traditional institutions/emirates in Nigeria existed before the convention or democratic system of government. The post-colonial era and constitutional democratic system of government ushered in what is known as the three arms of government under the provision of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) which now subjugate the traditional chiefdom/emirates to the constitutional democratic system of government. However, due to the closeness or affinity of the traditional chiefs/emirs with their people and for whatever reasons, some chiefs are classified, recognized and graded, in the instant suit, the chiefdom of Piriga is graded as 3^rd Class and their appointments and depositions are subjected to the laws enacted by the State House of Assembly.

Now provision of Section 5(2)(a)(b) of the Constitution provides thus:

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of a State–

(a)shall be vested in the Governor of that State and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by a House of Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through the Deputy Governor or Commissioners of the Government of that State or officers in the public service of the State; and

(underlined mine for emphasis)

(b) shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all Laws made by the House of Assembly of that State and to all matters with respect to which the House of Assembly has for the time being power to make laws.

It is important to note that Section 5(2)(a) of the Constitution provides that the executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor of that State (the 1^st Defendant in this case) and, subject to the 1999 Constitution as Amended and other provisions of any law made by the House of Assembly of the State, be exercised by the Governor either directly or through the Deputy Governor or Commissioners of the Government of the State or officers in the Public Service of the State. So, who are the officers in the public service of the state? Section 318(1) of the Constitution provides that:

"public service of a State" means the service of the State in any capacity in respect of the Government of the State and includes service as-

(a) Clerk or other staff of the House of Assembly;

(b) member of staff of the High Court, the Sharia Court of Appeal, the Customary Court of Appeal or other courts established for a State by this Constitution or by a Law of a House of Assembly;

(c) member or staff of any commission or authority established for the State by this Constitution or by a Law of a House of Assembly;

(d) staff of any local government council;

(e) staff of any statutory corporation established by a Law of a House of Assembly;

(f) staff of any educational institution established or financed principally by a government of a State; and

(g) staff of any company or enterprise in which the government of a State or its agency holds controlling shares or interest—

Gleaning from Exhibit A which states that:

Mr. Jonathan Paraguwa Zamuna

My Brother. Your Highness, Sir

APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF PIRIGA (PUKARMA PIRIGA)

In pursuance of the powers conferred on me under section 1 of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law CAP. 25, laws of Kaduna State 1991, I Nasir Ahmad el-Rufai, hereby appoint you Mr. Jonathan Phraguwa Zamuna as 3^rd Class Chief of Piriga Traditional Council.

2. By this appointment, you are hereby accorded all the rights and privileges pertaining to the office, including membership of the Kaduna State Council of Chiefs. Your appointment to this office places on you enormous responsibilities, one of which is the obligation to give your people good leadership and to treat all with justice and equity. I must reiterate your role as a father to all and peace-maker amongst not only the people of your Chiefdom, but the entire state to which your loyalty should be total.

3. I wish you God's guidance and blessing in the discharge of your onerous task as Chief of Piriga and look forward to your formal installation and presentation of Staff Office.

4. Once more, congratulations.

signed

Nasir Ahmad el-Rufai

Governor

The appointment of the Claimant and his eventual deposition were made under the provisions of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law CAP. 25, laws of Kaduna State 1991 and the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law No. 21 of 2021 which now indicate that the chiefdom of Piriga being a 3^rd Class Chiefdom is an established authority and has the status of an authority established for the State by the Laws of the Kaduna State House of Assembly (that is, the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law of Kaduna State 1991 and the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law No. 21 of 2021). This reminds me of the words of Kahn-Freund in his book Labour and the Law, London: Stevens and Sons pages 1 and 8 where he expressed the view that the contract of employment creates a relationship between one who has power and another who has no power and that “in its inception, it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination” and that the aim of labour law is to use the law to control the employment relationship.

Therefore, the essence of the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law of Kaduna State 1991 and the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law No. 21 of 2021 is to recognize the institution of traditional rulers as part and parcel of the public service of Kaduna State and to protect and command the obedience and submission of these chiefs to the State Government who appoints them.

Thus, given the provision of Sections 5(2)(a) and 318(1) of the Constitution, the chiefdom of Piriga is public service of the Kaduna State, the Claimant as at the time the Claimant occupied the chiefdom of Piriga is a public officer in the public service of Kaduna State. The appointment of the Claimant as chief of Piriga Chiefdom was to act as the eye of the State Governor in Piriga Chiefdom or the intermediary between the Defendants and the people of Piriga Chiefdom. Applying the yardsticks for the ascertainment of the contract of employment enumerated above in the case of SHENA SECURITY CO. LTD. V. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD. AND ANOR. (supra), the payment of the monthly salary to the Claimant upon his appointment as the chief of Piriga Chiefdom or as an officer in the public service of Kaduna State who received salaries from the coffer of the State Government of Kaduna State brings the termination of his appointment to the realm of the jurisdiction of this Court.

Again, one of the reasons the Defendants deposed the Claimant from being the chief of Piriga Chiefdom is that it is alleged that the Claimant ‘has been residing and operating from Kaduna town for quite some time in violation of the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law No. 21 of 2021 which requires paramount rulers to reside within their communities…’ This indicates that the Claimant being a chief of Piriga Chiefdom cannot operate outside his domain where the Claimant ruled. That is the Defendants control where the paramount rulers reside through the instrument of the law.

Premised on the foregoing, it is the finding of the Court that Exhibit A created the employer-employee relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants, the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law of Kaduna State 1991 and the Kaduna State Traditional Institution Law No. 21 of 2021 recognize the Chiefdom of Piriga as the public service of Kaduna State, the Defendants pay the monthly salaries of the occupant (the Claimant) of the Chiefdom and control where the occupant of the chiefdom reside through the instrument of law, for these reasons, the appointment of the Claimant as chief of Piriga Chiefdom by the Defendant has created a contract of employment or service pursuant to Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution in which only the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has exclusive jurisdiction thereof. Therefore, this Court has the power to assume jurisdiction over this suit. I so hold.

In respect of the substantive suit, the Claimant activates the jurisdiction of this Court to interpret Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As amended) in relation to the deposition of his rulership of Piriga Chiefdom. It is pivotal to mention here that it is not the business of this Court to consider the weight of the allegation against the Claimant, but the Court is bothered about whether the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing before the administrative decision of the Defendant which removed the Claimant from occupying the stool of Piriga Chiefdom. Because a fair hearing is the cornerstone of valid administrative decisions. The provision of section 36(2) of the 1999 Constitution was inserted into the Constitution to curb the excesses of draconian legislation or to stem the tide of arbitrariness inherent in non-observance of the rules of fair hearing and non-intervention of courts in ministerial or executive or administrative decisions. It is also to give persons who might be subject to executive absolutism, a leeway to make representations before being condemned. The rule of natural justice and fair hearing which are encapsulated in the latin maxims "audi alteram partem" and "nemo judex in causa sua" are further given constitutional flavour under the provision: see the case of UNILORIN V. ADESINA (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 331.

Now, the deserving question to ask here is, did the Defendants afford the Claimant a fair hearing before the administrative decision of the Defendant which removed the Claimant from occupying the stool of Piriga Chiefdom? To answer this question, there is a need to have a crucible reading of the affidavits filed by the parties.

The Claimant stated that on the said 22^nd of May 2023 at the meeting with the Honourable Commissioner (then Hajia Umma Ahmad), she informed the Claimant that the 1^st Defendant removed the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga Chiefdom. That the Claimant was quite shocked by the utterances of the commissioner and he later realized that there was a letter of deposition dated 18^th May, 2023. The Claimant was not invited or called upon him to explain himself or make any defence to all the allegation contained in Exhibit D and the media. That as a traditional ruler, and member of the Kaduna State Council of Chiefs, the Defendants did not avail him the opportunity of appearing before any panel, commission or body of enquiry to inform him of the allegations.

Responding to the Affidavit in support of the Amended Originating Summons, the Defendants stated that a circular to that effect dated 25^th of August 2022 with Reference No. MLG/CA/39/VOL.IV was issued to all Emirs/Emirate Councils and Chiefs/Traditional Councils through their respective Council Secretaries who are the approved recipients of mail and correspondence for the Councils Emirs/Emirate and Chiefs/Traditional Councils under their schedule of duties. The said circular was served on the Plaintiff/Piriga Traditional Council through the Council Secretary on the 25^th of August, 2022. On the 5^th of May, 2023, violent clashes erupted between Gure and Kitimi communities in Piriga Chiefdom which led to the death of two (2) people with others sustaining various degrees of injuries, burning down of thirty-five (35) houses, and the destruction of other property and this incident took place when the Claimant was not in his domain and Chiefdom.

The Claimant in paragraph 8 of his Better and Further Affidavit stated that he was not personally served with any query dated the 8^th of May 2023 as he was away in Kaduna mourning the death of his wife, preparing for the burial and receiving condolences from the public including the 1^st Defendant and his officers over the death of his wife which occurred on the 4^th of May 2023. Further stated that Exhibit MLGA 2(query) was never received by the Claimant, neither was it brought to his attention.

Given the facts set out here which revolve around whether the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing before the administrative decision of the Defendant which removed the Claimant from occupying the stool of Piriga Chiefdom, I need to state that affidavit before this Court like pleadings are read holistically in order to discern the gist of a case of a party; they are not construed in fragments. In dealing with pleadings, a court must read all the paragraphs together to get a flowing story of the parties and not a few paragraphs in isolation. It is the totality of the pleadings, whether it is the statement of claim or the statement of defence, that states the case of the party and it will be an injustice to invoke only a few paragraphs to come to a conclusion: see the case of STERLING BANK PLC V. FALOLA (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1453) 405.

The Claimant asserted that the Claimant was not served with any query to answer any allegation against him. The Defendants in paragraph 19(g)(h) of their Counter-Affidavit stated that a letter of query (Exhibit MLGA2) dated 8^th of May 2023 with Reference No. MLG/CA/31/V0LIV was issued to the Claimant informing him of his absence in his domain and Chiefdom when the incident occurred and his failure to report it to his Local Government Council (that is Lere Local Government Council), the Ministry of Local Government Affairs or security operatives for timely intervention. Consequently, the said letter requested him to explain within 48 hours why disciplinary action which included his deposition should not be taken against him. Upon the failure of the Claimant to respond to the said letter within the stipulated time, the Honourable Commissioner, Ministry of Local Government Affairs wrote a mail dated 11^th of May, 2023 with Reference No. MLG/CA/31/VOL.IV to the 1^st Defendant recommending the deposition of the Claimant as the Chief of Piriga after detailing what transpired and the processes followed. However, the Claimant countered the Defendants and stated that he was not personally served with any query dated the 8^th of May 2023 as he was away in Kaduna mourning the death of his wife, preparing for the burial and receiving condolences from the public including the 1^st Defendant and his officers over the death of his wife which occurred on the 4^th of May 2023.

Exhibit MLAG2 is the certified true copy of the Query, the official stamp of Piriga Traditional Council appears on the face of Exhibit MLAG2 which indicates that the Query was served on the 8^th of May 2023. The question that ruminates my mind here is this, did the service of Exhibit MLAG 2 on the secretary of the Piriga Traditional Council amount to service on the Claimant? The Defendants stated in paragraph 19(e) of their Counter-Affidavit that:

a circular to that effect dated 25^th of August 2022 with Reference No. MLG/CA/39/VOL.IV was issued to all Emirs/Emirate Councils and Chiefs/Traditional Councils through their respective Council Secretaries who are the approved recipients of mail and correspondence for the Councils Emirs/Emirate and Chiefs/Traditional Councils under their schedule of duties.

(underlined mine for emphasis)

It is not in doubt that the Claimant was bereaved losing his wife on the 4^th of May 2023, it is also clear from the gamut of evidence before this Court that Exhibit MLGA 2 was issued and served at the secretary of the Piriga Traditional Council on the 8^th of May, 2023 and it is also not in dispute that the Claimant was not within his domain when Exhibit MLGA 2 was received by the secretary of the Piriga Traditional Council on the 8^th of May 2023. The salient question that unsettles the mind of the Court is, was Exhibit MLGA 2 communicated to the Claimant. The Claimant in paragraph 8 of his Better and Further Affidavit stated that he was not personally served with any query dated the 8^th of May, 2023 as he was away in Kaduna mourning the death of his wife, preparing for the burial and receiving condolences from the public including the 1^st Defendant and his officers over the death of his wife which occurred on the 4^th of May 2023. Further stated that Exhibit MLGA 2(query) was never received by the Claimant, neither was it brought to his attention. Without gainsaying, the assertion of the Claimant in paragraph 8 of his Further and Better Affidavit has created doubt in the mind of the Court to conclude that the service of Exhibit MLGA 2 that was received at the secretary of the Piriga Traditional Council on the 8^th of May 2023 metamorphosed to the service on the Claimant because there is nothing before this Court that Exhibit MLGA 2 was communicated to the Claimant who was out of the chiefdom at the time Exhibit MLGA 2 was received by the secretary of the Piriga Traditional Council. The Defendant should have filed a further and better affidavit to respond to paragraph 8 of the Claimant’s Better and Further Affidavit. The significance of a further and better affidavit cannot be played down in any proceeding. A further and better affidavit provides additional information not available in a main affidavit, and/or in reply to a counter-affidavit: see the case of MARAYA PLASTICS LTD. V. INLAND BANK (NIG.) PLC. (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 765) 109. Normally, a further and better affidavit performs two main functions, namely: it provides additional information not available in the first or main affidavit; and it provides a reply to a counter affidavit: see also the case of SENTINEL ASS. CO. LTD. V. S.G.B.N. LTD. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 495

In the case of A.-G., ONDO STATE V. A.-G., EKITI STATE (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 743) 706 where the Supreme Court held that:

I shall mention too that the plaintiff did not find it necessary to file a further and or better affidavit in respect of anything deposed to by the defendant in its counter affidavit and or further counter-affidavit. The proper and only conclusion therefore is that the defendant's story remained unchallenged and uncontraverted.

Flowing from the preceding, there is no pinch of evidence before this Court to hold that the Claimant was aware of Exhibit MLGA 2. It will amount to a denial of fair hearing if this Court should validate the Defendants' decision which deposed Claimant. A fair hearing is the foundation stone of justice, which has been transplanted into the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The constitutional provision of fair hearing and the common law principle of audi alteram partem cannot only be satisfied when a disciplinary body is constituted and the person heard on oral evidence. The requirements of the law of fair hearing can be satisfied if the person is given an opportunity to defend himself in response to a query. In such a situation, it does not matter whether the person refuses or fails to respond to the query. The important consideration is that the employer allowed the employee to defend himself against the allegations preferred against him: see the case of ARINZE V. FIRST BANK (NIG.) LTD. (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 639) 78.

It is therefore the finding of the Court that the service of Exhibit MLAG2 at the secretary of the Piriga Traditional Council without evidence of the transmission of the same to the Claimant even when the Claimant was not within the chiefdom cannot be a sufficient service on the Claimant. The Claimant was not given a fair hearing before stripping him off the traditional title of Piriga chiefdom. Consequently, the claim of the Claimant succeeds and it is hereby ordered as follows:

5. AN ORDER for General damages of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira) for aggravated damages, embarrassment, pain and suffering.

6. All the terms of this judgment are to be complied with within 30 days from the date of this Judgment without prejudice to the right of Appeal by any aggrieved party.

Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

PRESIDING JUDGE

KADUNA DIVISION

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA