IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAIL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE

 

Dated: 3^rd December 2024                           SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/79/2023

 

Between:

 

Engr. Dr. Christopher Okonkwo                                        -                        Claimant

Immediate Past President General/Adviser Senior

Staff Association of Electricity And Allied Companies

 

And

1.        Engr. Chika Benedict

(President General Senior Staff Association

of Electricity And Allied Companies (SSAEAC)   

2.     Senior Staff Association of Electricity And

Allied Companies (SSAEAC)                                                                         Defendants

3.     Comrade Nnamdi Vincent Ajibo

(General Secretary Senior Staff Association

of Electricity And Allied Companies (SSAEAC)

4.     Transmission Company of Nigeria Plc.                                                                                         

 

Representation:

M. M. Ogar, with him, Abubakar Anugbogi for the Claimant

S. M. Ahura for the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants

T. S. Shankyula, with him, I. D. Bob-Manuel for the 4^th Defendant

 

  JUDGMENT

In an Originating Summons filed by the Claimant on 24^th March 2023, the following questions were submitted by the Claimant to the Court for determination:

1.        Whether by proper interpretation of Sections 36, 39 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Rule 30(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021 as amended, the purported Tribunal set up to investigate the Claimant is constitutional as it relates to its process and procedure of its constitution, terms of reference, witch-hunt intent, vagueness of content and cover-up of complaints of Claimant, and adequacy of time for attending same by the Claimant.

2.        Whether having regards to section 14.1 of the Condition of Service of the 4^th Defendant 2020 the 1^st Defendant is competent to continue to hold the position of President General of the 2^nd Defendant (Senior Staff Association of Electricity And Allied Companies) by reason of his promotion to his current position as the Assistant General Manager of Transmission Companies of Nigeria Plc.

3.        Whether the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants have powers to sell or cause to be sold any property of the 2^nd Defendant whatsoever without consent of the Claimant being Chairman of Investment Committee/Board and approval by relevant Councils of the 2^nd Defendant.

4.        Whether the 1^st Defendant was eligible to contest and win election of 8^th June 2023 of the 2^nd Defendant to have emerged President General of the 1^st Defendant and whether the consistent violations of 2^nd Defendant's Constitution by the 1^st Defendant does not ipso facto remove him from office, especially in line with his Oath of Office.

 

The reliefs sought by the claimant upon the Court’s determination of the above questions are as follows:

1.        A Declaration that the 1^st Defendant being an Assistant General Manager of the 4^th Defendant (Transmission Company of Nigeria Plc) ceases to act as, function or perform the duties of, or hold the position of the President-General of Senior Staff Association of Electricity and Allied Companies forthwith having become a projection of Management.

2.        A Declaration that the 1^st Defendant was not eligible to contest the position of President-General of Senior Staff Association by reason of his questionably hidden financial standing of the 2^nd Defendant while he (1^st Defendant) was the Branch President of the Transmission Company of Nigeria Plc Branch having been unaccountable of the sum of N1,000,000.00(One Million Naira Only) he received.

3.        An Order that the 1^st Defendant has ceased to be the President-General of 2^nd Defendant having severally violated the Constitution 2021 as complained of by the Claimant, as also stated in his Oath of Office.

4.        An Order declaring the position of the 1^st Defendant vacant as President-General of the 2^nd Defendant by reason of his instant disqualification on account of his promotion to Assistant General Manager having become a projection of management of the Transmission company of Nigeria.

5.        An Order directing the National Executive Council and of the 2^nd Defendant to organize a Special Delegates Conference for the election of another President-General of the 2^nd Defendant forthwith.

6.        An Order invalidating the letter of invitation dated 20^th March 2023 extended to the Claimant by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants for being defective, intended to subvert his complaints on 1^st Defendant's constitutional breaches and vague having not complied with the provisions of the law and a violation of the Claimant's right to fair hearing.

7.        An Order invalidating any decision reached by the Tribunal and or National Executive Council pursuant to the decision of the said Tribunal same having been so reached in breach of Claimant's fundamental right to fair hearing.

8.        An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants their servants, agents or privies from inviting, probing, suspending, expelling and or harassing the Claimant forthwith.

9.        An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the 4^th Defendant and/or any other Power companies i.e. (electricity generation Companies, Distribution companies, Transmission Company of Nigeria Plc and any other organization of the same kind) their servants, agents or privies from recognizing, dealing with the 1^st Defendant forthwith.

 

CLAIMANT’S CASE

The Originating Summons is supported with an affidavit and a written address. The affidavit was deposed to by the claimant, and 7 documents were exhibited to the affidavit marked respectively from Exhibit AK 1 to AK 7. In the affidavit, the claimant averred that he is the immediate past President-General of the 2^nd Defendant and the Chairman Investment Committee of the 2^nd Defendant while the 1^st Defendant is the current President-General of the 2^nd Defendant, which is a Senior Staff Association under the power sector and a Union recognized under the law. The 3^rd Defendant is the General Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant while the 4^th Defendant is the employer of the 1^st Defendant. The 1^st defendant contested and won election on the 8^th April 2022 alongside other Central Executive members of the 2^nd Defendant. The 1^st Defendant is an Assistant General Manager of the 4^th defendants having been promoted from Principal Manager about 10 months away from the conduct said election. By the Condition of Service of the 4^th Defendant, once a person attains the rank of Assistant General Manager, he ceases to hold any elective position in a Union or Association, such as the 2^nd Defendant, to avoid conflict of interest and ensure confidentiality of official secrets. By virtue of the position of the 1^st Defendant, he has become a projection of Management of 4^th Defendant as contained in the Condition of Service.

 

Before the conduct of the election of 8^th April 2022, in which the 1^st Defendant was elected, the 2^nd Defendant released a Guideline approved by its National Executive Council to regulate the conduct of the election. All candidates completed Nomination Forms and deposed to affidavits verifying the accuracy of the information disclosed. The winner also swore to an Oath of Office. In the form filled, it is required that indebtedness as well as clean record of service to the association be disclosed so as to show that there is no pending financial indebtedness based on service to the association. Disciplinary records on the Association were also important such that any member with such a record is required to turn in a letter of apology with acceptance communicated.

 

Later discoveries revealed that the 1^st Defendant concealed his records that he misappropriated funds as branch President TCN (later refunded part of it) and was suspended from National Executive Council in 2019/2020 but such records were ignored and concealed by the 3^rd Defendant and team. The claimant said while he was in Lagos on 22^nd March 2023 attending to official duties, he got a call from his Clerk/Secretary in Abuja that an invitation letter was given to him by a Dispatch Rider on the same day at about 3:54 pm requiring the Claimant to appear on the 23^rd March 2023.  On reading the letter, it was discovered that it was an invitation from the 2^nd Defendant signed by Comrade John Ugwu, a member of the 2^nd defendant and the Secretary of the Tribunal set up to try him on communication on WhatsApp platform, called IPPG SSAEAC Rescue platform.  The letter also contains issues as it relates to the complaint on the intending sale of property of the 2^nd Defendant by the 1^st Defendant without approval. The letter of invitation did not give him adequate time to prepare for his defense and it goes to the root of his rights to fair hearing.

 

Members of the Tribunal that was set up are not on the letter for him to ascertain their level or degree of neutrality in the matter as required by law. It is the General Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant, which he also complained about, that set up the Tribunal and not the leadership of the 2^nd Defendant. The Tribunal that was set up was in reaction to a letter he wrote expressing dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Association is run without recourse to the law. Instead of addressing the issue he raised, the 1^st Defendant resorted to setting up the Tribunal to victimize the Claimant at the National Executive Council Meeting slated for 24^th and 25^th March 2023. This explains the short notice given to him. The 1^st and 3^rd Defendant intend to sell some property of the 2^nd Defendant to the extent of cooking up letters of authorization purportedly having emanated from the decision/resolution of the National Executive Council of the 2^nd Defendant without recourse to the Investment and Company Committee. The 2^nd Defendant constitution donates powers to the Investment Committee, which the Claimant is the Chairman, to consent to all decision on properties. The 1^st Defendant has flouted the Constitution of the 2^nd Defendant by not holding statutory meetings 4 months beyond constitutional stipulation and spending resources without relevant approvals. His complaint on infractions led to witch-hunt by the Tribunal which has been used to cover up the infractions he raised.

 

WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS

In the written address in support of the Originating Summons, learned counsel for the claimant repeated the questions in the Originating Summons as the issues for determination and proceeded to make arguments in each issue.

 

On issue 1, it was submitted that violation of rights to fair hearing renders a proceeding void no matter how beautifully made. It was submitted that the claimant has shown in paragraphs 16 to 20 of the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and in Exhibit OK 4 that he was not given fair hearing as adequate time was not given to him to defend himself. It was further submitted that failure to give adequate notice is a fundamental breach of right to fair hearing. Exhibit OK 4 was served on the Claimant on 22^nd March 2023 requiring the Claimant to appear before a Tribunal on 23^rd March 2023 leaves so much to be desired and violated the Claimant's right to fair hearing. Any decision reached by the Tribunal is therefore a nullity.

 

It was argued that the act of expressing oneself in a WhatsApp platform is not a violation of the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants' right to freedom of expression as it does not contain any statement of disparaging nature. Thus, setting up a Tribunal on an issue which does not affect anybody's right has not infringed on the rights of the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants. More so that it is the law in Nigeria that everyone has the right to associate provided that it is within the precinct of the law. Thus, the act of forming a platform in the name of "IPPG Rescue Platform" does not violate any law and it is legal. Therefore, setting up of Tribunal to probe the Association of the Claimant with others is illegal and null and void.

 

Counsel submitted further that by Rule 31(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021, only the Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant can set up a Tribunal in consultation with President General or National Executive Council. The letter of invitation given to the claimant clearly disclosed who constituted the Tribunal contrary to the provision of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution. The NEC of the 2^nd Defendant has not been held since 8^th June 2022 and did not ratify the constitution of the Tribunal. The failure of the 3^rd Defendant to set up the Tribunal but allowed it in the hands of the "leadership" of the 2^nd Defendant renders it incompetent.

 

On issue 2, counsel submitted that the Condition of Service is the bedrock of contract of service and the employment of the 1^st Defendant is regulated by it. Section 14.1 of the 4^th Defendant's Condition of Service disqualifies the 1^st Defendant from holding elective position of the 2^nd Defendant by reason of his promotion to Assistant General Manager, which made him a projection of Management of the 2^nd Defendant. By Section 14.1 of the Condition of service of the 4^th Defendant, any employee that attains the position of Assistant General Manager cannot hold elective position in a Union for fear of crisis of confidence. The 1^st Defendant who is currently an Assistant General Manager cannot hold position of President General of the 2^nd Defendant as it is an elective position.

 

On issue 3, it was submitted that by the provisions of Rule 19 of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021, the only way through which properties of the 2^nd defendant can be sold is through obtaining consent of the Claimant and his members of the Board of Investment Committee before dealing with any property as stipulated in the constitution of the 2^nd Defendant. Obtaining consent to any transaction of the 2^nd Defendant is mandatory and lack of it renders any dealing on the property illegal null and void. Thus, having not obtained consent from the Claimant and members of his Committee renders any transaction done in respect of the properties of the 2^nd Defendant by the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants null and void. Out of desperation to sell the property, Exhibit OK 6 was cooked up to seem like the National Executive Council had authorized the sale whereas the NEC of the 2^nd Defendant has not held since 8^th June 2022.

 

On issue 4, it was submitted that the 1^st Defendant has sworn an Oath, contained in Exhibit Ok 3B, that where he violates provision of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution, he is deemed to have relinquished his office. Therefore, by effect of the multiple infractions committed by the 1^st Defendant, he is deemed to have so relinquished the office. It was further submitted that Exhibit OK 2 has stipulated condition precedent for contesting election but the 1^st Defendant in connivance with the 3^rd Defendant concealed the indebtedness status of the 1^st Defendant and cleared him to contest. In view of the outstanding amount the 1^st defendant could not account for, he was not eligible to contest the election of 8^th June 2023.

 

COUNTER AFFIDAVIT OF THE 1^ST TO 3^RD DEFENDANTS.

The 1^st to 3^rd defendants filed a joint counter affidavit on 11^th April 2023 together with a written address. The Counter Affidavit was deposed to by the 3^rd defendant who is the General Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant and he exhibited documents marked respectively from Exhibit to Exhibit 5. In the counter affidavit, the 3^rd defendant averred that the claimant has ceased to be a member of the 2^nd defendant since the 24/3/2023 when the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) set up in line with the constitution of the 2^nd defendant entered a recommendation expelling him from the Association. The recommendation was affirmed by the Central Executive Council (CEC) of the 2^nd defendant. The Claimant was granted fair hearing by the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) and it substantially complied with the regulations stipulated in the constitution of the 2^nd Defendant. The 3^rd defendant said he and the 1^st defendant were not members of the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) that expelled the Claimant, neither did they in any way participate or influence its decisions. The Claimant has the right to appeal the decision of the Disciplinary Committee using the internal procedure under the provisions of the constitution of the 2^nd Defendant but he failed to do so thereby failing to comply with the internal procedure to ventilate his grievance.

 

The 1^st defendant contested and won the election into the office of the President General of the 2^nd defendant on 3rd April 2022, having met all the conditions set up by the electoral body and was duly sworn into office while he, the 3^rd defendant, was appointed as the General Secretary of the 2^nd defendant. The claimant did not contest for any position in that election. All members of the 2^nd defendant, including the claimant, were at liberty to petition or protest, in line with the constitution, against any contestant who they considered wanting. But the claimant who oversaw that election did not petition on raise any issue to disqualify either the 1^st or 2^nd defendants. There is an internal mechanism by in the constitution which allows petitions against members in leadership position who ordinarily should be disqualified but the claimant did not deem it fit to follow that procedure when he was a member of the 2^nd defendant. The Claimant himself was elected into the position of President General when he was a General Manager in the 4^th defendant and maintained the two positions until the end of his tenure. Before his expulsion, the claimant was the Immediate Past President General of the 2^nd Defendant, an office which made him part of the executive but he did not disqualify himself, knowing that he is a General Manager with the 4^th defendant.

 

The grievance of the Claimant started when the 1^st and 3^rd defendants refused to aligned with him to loot the properties of the 2^nd defendant. In his anger, the Claimant refused to complete his handover to the 1^st defendant and has continued to hold unto relevant documents and properties that were in his care by virtue of his position as the President General of the 2^nd Defendant. The claimant still withheld some properties of the 2^nd defendants till date. When the 1^st defendant became the President General, the Claimant decided to break the Association by forming a faction and hosted a WhatsApp group which he titled "SSAEAC RESCUE PLATFORM", joined legitimate members of the 2^nd defendant to that social media group, and began to poison their minds and instigate them against the administration. The acts of the Claimant became unbearable and the leadership of the 2^nd defendant constituted a Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) in line with the provisions of the constitution of the 2^nd defendant. The Disciplinary Committee granted the Claimant fair hearing before reaching the decision to expel him, among other decisions. The claimant has the right to reply to his invitation and ask for adjournment or extension of time to present himself at the sitting of the Disciplinary Committee but he did not do so and he did not appeal the decision of the Committee. Also, the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) did not in any way witch-hunt the Claimant.

 

The 2^nd defendant, as an Association, is guided by its constitution and not by the dictates of the 4^th defendant. The 3^rd defendant said he was never suspended from the National Executive Council on grounds of misappropriation of funds neither did he conceal such record. He also said neither he nor the 1^stdefendant had intention of personally selling some of the properties of the 2^nd defendant. They were acting strictly upon the authorization of the National Executive Council, which is the body holding such powers under the 2^nd defendant’s constitution. The claimant’s allegation of not holding meetings 4 months beyond constitutional stipulation is false. The National Executive Council (NEC) of the 2^nd defendant, in both the conference held on the 7^th April 2022 and the 18^th June 2022, authorized the sale of some of the properties of the 2^nd defendant

 

WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF 1^ST TO 3^RD DEFENDANTS’ COUNTER AFFIDAVIT

In the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, 7 issues were formulated for determination. The issues are these:

1.        Whether by virtue of the clear provisions of Section 17(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011, the claimant's affidavit having failed to state the nationality of the deponent falls short of the requirement of the law?

2.        Whether the Claim of the Claimant which is predicated on issues of contentious facts is sustainable, having been commenced by an Originating Summons against the contemplation of the Rules of this court?

3.        Whether by virtue of the clear provisions of Section 254 (c)(l) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, same falling short of the requirements for the invocation of the jurisdiction of this honourable court?

4.        Whether the decision of the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) of the 2^nd defendant reached on the 23/3/23 is valid and sustainable?

5.        Whether the Claimant who is not a member of the 2^nd Defendant can be heard complaining against internal issues within an Association which he is not a member?

6.        Whether the 4^th defendant, not being a member of the 2^nd Defendant, can dictate the qualification of the membership of an Association it does not belong to?

7.        Whether the claimant has proved his claims on the preponderance of evidence to warrant judgment for any of his claims?

 

On issue 1, learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants submitted that the claimant failed to state his nationality in the affidavit in support of the OS which he deposed to. It was submitted that stating the Nationality of the deponent is a mandatory requirement in every affidavit used in court by virtue of Section 17(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011. Where the deponent fails to state his nationality, it renders the entire affidavit defective and the court cannot rely on it in reaching its decision. Counsel urged the court to hold that the affidavit of the Claimant is incompetent and to strike it out accordingly.

 

On issue 2, it was submitted that Order 3 Rule 2(2) of the Rules of this Court specified the nature of actions that can be commenced by Originating Summons. Counsel argued that the averments in the claimant’s affidavits reveal that the issues in this suit are beyond the interpretation of statute or documents but the issues border on the acts of the claimant which are capable of bringing disunity in an association he once was a leader. The mode adopted by the claimant denies the defendants the right to counter claim. Counsel concluded that commencing a suit with a wrong procedure renders the procedure incompetent and same must be struck out.

 

On issue 3, it was submitted that by the provisions of section 254(C)(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the internal squabbling in an association or trade union does not invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Counsel submitted that it was held in DANIEL vs. FADUGBA (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 582) 482 that an intra union dispute does not amount to a trade dispute. He submitted further that this suit is not a trade dispute and as such the Trade Disputes Act has specified the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court excluding intra union dispute from the list of the actions which can be entertained by this court at first instance. Counsel urged this court to strike out this suit, being an intra-union dispute.

 

On issue 4, Counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants submitted that none of the provisions of sections 36, 39 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution was infringed by the 1st to 3^rd Defendants against the Claimant to warrant this suit against them. The Disciplinary committee (Tribunal) which reached to decision to expel the claimant was constituted in compliance with Rule 4 of the Constitution of the 2^nd Defendant. The offences of poaching or raiding of association members and defamatory statements capable of undermining the association's decency or to weaken the association are specified in Rules 2 and 11 of the constitution of the 2^nd Defendant.

 

The 1^st and 3^rd defendants were not members of the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) that was set up to hear the complaints against the Claimant. The Disciplinary Committee gave the Claimant fair hearing and reached its decision. The claimant was invited to the hearing of the Disciplinary committee but he failed to attend and he has not shown in his affidavit that he asked for extension of time or even appealed the final decision of the Committee. Counsel relied on EZECHUKWU vs. ONWUKA (2016) 44 WRN 1 SC where it was held that a party who had the opportunity to be heard but rejected same cannot thereafter complain of not being given fair hearing. Counsel also referred to some provisions in Rule 3 of the constitution of the 2^nd defendant and concluded that the Claimant's right to appeal the decision of the Disciplinary Committee still subsists and he cannot engage this court in an academic exercise. Counsel urged this court to hold that the decision of the Disciplinary Committee entered against the claimant on 23/3/23 is valid and sustainable.

 

On issue 5, it was argued that in view of the expulsion of the Claimant by the Disciplinary Committee, the Claimant is no longer a member of the 2^nd defendant at the time he filed this suit and he cannot complain about happenings within an association which he is no longer a member.

 

On issue 6, it was argued that the provision of section 14.1 of the 4^th Defendant's condition of service 2020, which provides that the members who have attained the level of Assistant General Manager of the 4^th Defendant shall not be eligible to hold leadership positions in the 2^nd defendant, cannot be enforced by this Court because, the 2^nd defendant is a trade union with a constitution of its own which guides its operations. The 4^th defendant is not a member of the 2^nd defendant and therefore cannot dictate terms of operation of the internal affairs of the 2^nd Defendant. In any event, it is the 4^th defendant who can complain or take out disciplinary action for any breach of the condition of service by the 1^st Defendant. It is not the duty of the claimant to enforce the 4^th defendant's condition of service. It was also argued that there are internal procedures for the removal of the 1^st and 3^rd defendants if they are found wanting or disqualified in any manner. The claimant did not follow any of such internal procedures.

 

On issue 7, learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants submitted that a careful perusal of the facts and documents presented by the claimant will show that the claimant failed to substantiate his allegations.

 

FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF THE CLAIMANT

On 19^th May 2023, the claimant filed a further affidavit in response to the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants. It was deposed to by the claimant and he exhibited documents marked Exhibits FA 1 to FA 8. He said he was the Immediate Past President General of the 2^nd Defendant and that recommendation on Exhibit 0K 4 was given on 23/03/2023. Therefore, he could not cease to be a member by mere recommendation of the Tribunal. Till now, he does not have a copy of the expulsion letter and could not appeal. It was the threatened breach of his fundamental right that made him approached the court. He was not given fair hearing and did not have adequate time and facilities to defend himself. The Tribunal was set up on the 15^th March 2023 but they could not invite him until 22^nd March 2023, which was less than a day to the hearing and when he was out on assignment. A mere recommendation of the Tribunal cannot dismember him from the 2^nd Defendant but the ratification of the National Executive Council of the 2^nd Defendant. The NEC scheduled on 25^th April 2023 did not take place as can be seen from Exhibit 5A. The 1^st and 3^rd Defendants were the persons accused in Exhibit F.A 2 and they set up a Tribunal and presided over ratifying bodies (Central Executive Council and National Executive Council respectively) on the Tribunal's recommendation. These made them judges in their own case. No provision in the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021 that gives a person under trial before a Tribunal an avenue/right to appeal Tribunal's decisions, especially after the NEC ratification since the supreme National Delegates Conference of the 2^nd Defendant holds every three years, the last being in April 2022.

 

There is no internal procedure which he failed to pursue. The 1^st Defendant was not elected on the 3^rd April 2022 but on 8^th April 2022. The 3^rd Defendant was the head of screening committee and custodian of information regarding all contestants and concealed same regarding the 1^st Defendant, hence no room to petition until much later after the election when facts of the concealment and collusion come out. The Claimant did not contest any position but earned the statutory position as Chairman, Investment Committee pursuant to Rule 19 (b & c) of the Constitution of the 2^nd Defendant. The Condition of Service of the 4^th Defendant did not forbid holding of General Manager position alongside President General of the 2^nd Defendant until 2020 while the Claimant had been a General Manager since 2013 and the operating Condition of Service at that time was Pre-2016 and 2016 Conditions of Service respectively. His last promotion was in May 2013 while his election was 8^th April, 2016 and re-election on 6^th April, 2019. This was not in conflict with Condition of Service 2016. The elevation of the 1^st Defendant happened after his election on 8^th April 2022 which is a basis for his disqualification in line with Chapter 14.1 of the 4^th Defendant’s Conditions of Service 2020. He did not host any WhatsApp group with any ill intention but out of quest for expression of opinion because the 1^st and 3^rd defendants had expelled him from all communication channels, WhatsApp Platforms and online meeting. Thus, he set up a platform to counter the lies and explain himself. There is no document in his possession as he has handed them over. The Tribunal was set up to ostracize him from the 2^nd Defendant and cover-up the infractions by the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants. Leaders of the 2^nd Defendant who are staff of 4^th Defendant are bound by both the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021 and 4^th Defendant's Condition of Service 2020. It was not written in the invitation letter that extension or adjournment could be granted. Since the inauguration of the 1^st and 3^rd defendants on 8^th April 2022 and after the 1^st NEC meeting on 18^th June 2022, no other NEC meeting took place except the one scheduled for 25^th March 2023. Thus, Exhibit OK 6B of the Originating Summons was falsified by the Defendants. The real Minutes of Meeting of the 18^th June 2022 did not include any resolution for sale of any property.

 

CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FURTHER AFFIDAVIT In the reply on points of law filed by the claimant, his counsel responded to each of the issues canvassed in the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants. The submissions of the learned counsel for the claimant are as follows:

 

On issue 1, it was submitted that Section 17 of the Evidence Act does not contain any provision on affidavit and as such, the arguments of counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants should be disregarded.  It was argued further that even if the nationality of the Claimant is not contained in the affidavit in support of the OS, it is a defect as to form and not substance that will render the affidavit invalid. Counsel cited Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 to submit that defective affidavit may be permitted to be used provided that it is sworn to before a person duly authorized to do so. Since the affidavit of the Claimant was duly sworn to before a Commissioner for Oath, counsel urged this court to rely on the affidavit of the Claimant and discountenance with the submission of learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants. Again, counsel submitted that the nationality of the claimant has been stated in the further affidavit filed by the claimant and that has cured the omission of his nationality in the affidavit in support of Originating Summons.

 

On issue 2, it was submitted that where issues in Originating Summons are not material to the live issues, same matter can be determined on the strength of the said Originating Summons. Counsel relied on NELSON-MOORE & ANOR vs. MEDICINE PLUS LTD & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24089(CA). He argued further that even if there are contentious issues in the instant case, they are just peripheral to the live issues as the non-contentious issues are the breach of fair hearing and disqualification. All other issues, if contentious, are not material to the live issues. Counsel submitted that there are no substantially contentious issues in this Originating Summons and the subject matter of the suit is the interpretation of 2^nd Defendant Constitution, 4^th Defendant's Constitution and the Tribunal's recommendation. Therefore, there is no better mode that to commence the suit than Originating Summons.

 

On issue 3, it was submitted that the case of EZE & ORS vs. UDEH & ORS (2017) LPELR-42716(CA) has resolved the issue of the court which has jurisdiction to hear inter and intra union matters. Counsel for the claimant went further to set out in extenso the relevant portion of the decision in the case and submitted that the decision in EZE & ORS vs. UDEH & ORS is later in time than the case of DANIEL vs. FADUGBA cited in the address of the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants.

 

On issue 4, it was argued that the claimant was not given reasonable time to defend himself before the Tribunal. He relied on R. ARIORI & ORS. vs. MURAIMO ELEMO & ORS. (1983) 1 SCNLR 1; (1983) 1 SC 13 AT 24 where the Supreme Court defined the phrase "fair hearing within a reasonable time" in this sentence:

"Fair hearing, therefore, must mean a trial conducted according to all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties to the cause. Reasonable time must mean the period of time which, in the search for justice, does not wear out the parties and their witnesses and which is required to ensure that justice is not only done but appears to reasonable persons to be done."

                                                       

Counsel then argued that the time given to the Claimant was less than a day and no reasonable time. He also submitted that no such provision as Rule 3 exists in the Constitution of the 2^nd Defendant which provide "The Rule on membership rights clearly gives any member who is disciplined the right to appeal the decision." It was submitted further that the Tribunal did not conduct it proceedings according to all rules. According to counsel, access to court is sacrosanct even where certain law or regulation forbids same. Any regulation that forbids access to court must give way to the provision of the Constitution relying on FIDELITY BANK PLC vs. MONYE & ORS (2012) LPELR-7819(SC). Counsel concluded that to insist that the Claimant must appeal the decision of the Tribunal before coming to court is tantamount to denying the Claimant access to court.

 

On issue 6, it was submitted that the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants have not denied in their counter affidavit that the 1^st Defendant is an Assistant General Manager of the 4^th Defendant. The 1^st Defendant's position as the President General of the 2^nd Defendant is contingent on his employment and Condition of Service of the 4^th Defendant contrary to the argument of the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants that the 4^th Defendant is not a member of the 2^nd Defendant and therefore cannot dictate the terms of operation of the internal affairs of the 2^nd Defendant.

 

On issue 7, learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, having failed to place any sufficient material in defence of the suit, they cannot assert any fact of proving their case on the preponderance of evidence.

 

COUNTER AFFIDAVIT AND NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 4^TH DEFENDANT.

The 4^th defendant filed a counter affidavit and written address on 20^th April 2023. Ogwuche Nathaniel, a Litigation Secretary in the law office of counsel for the 4^th Defendant, deposed to the counter affidavit. I have read the counter affidavit and I find no useful fact stated in it which responds to the averments of the claimant, other than to say that the claimant has no cause of action against the 4^th Defendant.

 

In addition to the counter affidavit, the 4^th defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on the same day wherein it sought an order striking out its name from the suit. The Notice of Preliminary Objection is supported with an affidavit and a written address. In opposing the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the claimant filed a counter affidavit and written address on 17^th July 2023. I have read these processes. It is observed that the content of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 4^th defendant to the Originating Summons is the same as the submissions contained in the written address in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection. Similarly, the content of the further affidavit and reply on points of law filed by the claimant in response to the counter affidavit of the 4^th defendant to the Originating Summons is the same content of the counter affidavit and written address of the claimant in opposition to the Notice of Preliminary Objection. It is clear to me that the same issue upon which the 4^th defendant opposes the Originating Summons is the same issue constituted in its Notice of Preliminary Objection. It is therefore proper that I examine the contentions of the parties in contained in these processes when the Notice of Preliminary Objection is being considered.

 

DECISION ON OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE 1^ST TO 3^RD DEFENDANTS

I have examined all the processes filed in this suit. I ought to start, ordinarily, by determining the NPO of the 4^th defendant but I have seen that the 1^st to 3^rd defendants have also raised issues which touch on the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this suit in the written address in support of their counter affidavit to the Originating Summons.  In issues 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the written address of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in support of their counter affidavit to the Originating Summons, they raised these objections to the competence of the suit and the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suit:

1.        That Whether by virtue of the clear provisions of Section 17(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011, the claimant's affidavit having failed to state the nationality of the deponent falls short of the requirement of the law.

2.        Whether the Claim of the Claimant which is predicated on issues of contentious facts is sustainable, having been commenced by an Originating Summons against the contemplation of the Rules of this court.

3.        Whether by virtue of the clear provisions of Section 254 (c)(l) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, same falling short of the requirements for the invocation of the jurisdiction of this honourable court.

4.        Whether the Claimant who is not a member of the 2^nd Defendant can be heard complaining against internal issues within an Association which he is not a member.

 

The Notice of Preliminary Objection of the 4^th defendants is simply as to whether there is a cause of action against it. The question whether the claimant disclosed a cause of action against the 4^th defendant is not a jurisdictional matter or an issue which affects the competence of the suit. In other words, the Notice of Preliminary Objection, even as so styled, is not one that must be necessarily considered with priority. The issues of jurisdiction and competence of the suit raised by the 1^st to 3^rd defendants are fundamental jurisdictional issues which ought to be considered and determined before delving into the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the 4^th defendant.

 

I have earlier set out the arguments made by the learned Counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants on issues 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the written address of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in support of their counter affidavit to the Originating Summons and the reply of the Counsel for the claimant to each of the issues or the grounds of objection. I will not repeat the arguments again. I will proceed right away to determine each of the grounds of objection in this order-

 

GROUND 1:

The summary of the objection of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in issue 3 of the address filed to oppose the Originating Summons is that the subject matter of the suit is an intra-union dispute and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such dispute in the first instance. While the learned Counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants has rightly observed that the case of the claimant is an intra-union dispute and not a trade dispute, counsel however seems to have improperly construed and applied the provisions of section 254C[1] of the CFRN 1999 to his arguments. The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court has been expanded in section 254C [1] of the 1999 Constitution [as amended]. The Court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction to entertain civil causes and matters involving or arising from the following subject matters, among others: trade unions, Trade Unions Act, interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as it relates to trade unionism, determination of any question as to the interpretation and application of trade union constitution or the constitution of an association of employers or any association relating to employment. See generally section 254C[1](a), (b), (d) and (j) of the 1999 Constitution [as amended].

 

These provisions of the Constitution clearly confer jurisdiction on the NICN to entertain matters involving trade unions, whether inter or intra union, and disputes arising from trade union constitution or the constitution of associations. The case of the claimant involves a dispute with the 2^nd defendant where he was a member and part of his complaints in this suit involves the construction of some provisions of the Constitution of the 2^nd defendant. In my view, this suit falls within the subject matters which the court is granted original jurisdiction. Let me also point that the decision of this court delivered on 24/7/2001 in Suit No. NIC/5A/2021 between MARITIME WORKERS UNION OF NIGERIA vs. NIGERIA LABOUR CONGRESS, which learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants relied upon was decided before the enactment of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act in 2010. Therefore, that decision is no longer of any authority in view of the provisions of section 254C[1](a), (b), (d) and (j) of the 1999 Constitution [as amended]. In sum, it is my view, and I so hold, that inter or intra union disputes fall into the original jurisdiction of the NICN. Accordingly, this court has the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit of the claimant. Issue 3 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants is resolved against the 1^st to 3^rd defendants.

 

GROUND 2:

The contention of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in issue 5 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants is that the claimant lacks locus standi to complain against internal issues within the 2^nd defendant Association because he is no longer a member of the 2^nd defendant, having been expelled. Either deliberately or by inadvertence, counsel for the claimant did not respond to issue 5 of the written address of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants. That notwithstanding, it is observed that one of the complaints of the claimant in this case is about propriety and validity of the procedure resulting to his expulsion from the 2^nd defendant and parties have joined issues on that area of his case. It should be noted that the claimant is challenging actions taken by the 1^st to 3^rd defendants and affecting him as a member of the 2^nd defendant. As far as his complaints include actions taken against him as a member, he has locus to complain and sue about those actions.

 

Again, on his complaint about general issues in the association which are not personal to him, the claimant is permitted to also challenge such actions based on his right as a member of the Association. This is where the issue of the subsistence of his membership of the 2^nd defendant arises for determination, which is the determination of the validity of his expulsion from the 2^nd defendant. Thus, the locus of the claimant to complain about internal issues in the 2^nd defendant cannot be determined at this point until it is first determined that his expulsion was lawfully done. In the result, whether or not the claimant is no longer a member of the 2^nd defendant at the time he filed this suit, by the effect of expulsion, will be determined in the Originating Summons. At this point however, I will resolve issue 5 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants against the 1^st to 3^rd defendants.

 

GROUND 3:

It was contended by learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, in issue 2 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, that this suit is incompetent because it was commenced by a wrong originating process. According to counsel, the suit is beyond the interpretation of statute or documents but involves contentious issues which cannot be instituted by Originating Summons under Order 3 Rule 2(2) of the Rules of this Court.

 

Going by the provisions of Order 3 Rules 3 and 17 [1] of the NICN Rules 2017, civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters relating to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations. Also, where a suit raises substantial dispute of facts or likely to involve substantial dispute of facts, it cannot be commenced by way of originating summons but by Complaint.

 

I have examined the issues submitted by the claimant in the originating summons for determination, the reliefs sought and the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the originating summons. The claimant has complained of some actions of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants affecting him as a person and his membership of the 2^nd defendants which were allegedly done in violation of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the constitution of the 2^nd defendant and the condition of service of the 4^th defendant. For that reason, the claimant wants this court to interpret the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the constitution of the 2^nd defendant and the condition of service of the 4^th defendant to determine the propriety of those acts of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants and for the court to make pronouncements as to the rights and status of the parties, consequent upon the interpretation of the Constitution and the other documents. In my view, the claimant’s case is principally to interpret provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the constitution of the 2^nd defendant and the condition of service of the 4^th defendant as they affect his complaints in the suit. Therefore, I hold that this suit is suitable for determination vide originating summons.

 

Issue 2 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants is resolved against the 1^st to 3^rd defendants.

 

GROUND 4

The argument of the learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in issue 1 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit to the Originating Summons is that the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons is incompetent and should be struck out because the claimant, who deposed to it, did not state his nationality in the affidavit as required by Section 17(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 2011.

 

I have examined the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. It was made by the claimant who stated in the introductory paragraph of the affidavit that he is “male, adult, Christian of Katampe Extension, F.C.T. Abuja.” Although the claimant did not state his nationality, he gave his address in Nigeria and his surname is unmistakably a local Nigerian name. Also, his averments disclose that his membership of the 2^nd defendant is by virtue of his employment in the 4^th defendant, a Nigerian agency.  The fact that the claimant did not specifically mention his nationality in the affidavit did not in any way mislead this court or the defendants as to the nationality of the claimant.

 

In any event, by the marginal note to section 117 of the Evidence Act, the matters required to be stated in an affidavit in that section are matters as to the form of an affidavit. A defect in the form of an affidavit does not ipso facto invalidate the affidavit. Section 113 of the Evidence Act provides that the court may permit an affidavit to be used, notwithstanding that it is defective in form according to the Act, if the Court is satisfied that it has been sworn before a person duly authorized. Thus, where an affidavit is duly sworn before the Commissioner for oaths, any defect in the form of the affidavit can be overlooked. In this instance, the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons was duly sworn before the Commission for oaths on 24/3/2023. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the nationality of the claimant was not stated in the affidavit, I will allow it to be used in these proceedings. I also resolve issue 1 of the written address in support of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants against them.

 

DECISION ON THE NPO OF THE 4^TH DEFENDANT

Having determined all the issues of objection arising from the written address of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in support of their counter affidavit to the Originating Summons, I will now consider the Notice of Preliminary Objection (NPO) of the 4^th defendant.

 

The grounds of the 4^th defendant’s NPO are that:

i.                    The suit does not disclose any cause of action or reasonable cause of action against the 4^th defendant.

ii.                 Relief 7 of the Originating Summons, which is the only relief having to do with the 4^th defendant is nebulous, incompetent, defective and without basis.

iii.               The suit is a gross abuse of court process as against the 4^th defendant.

 

The NPO was supported with an affidavit deposed to by Oguche Nathaniel, Litigation Secretary in the law firm of counsel for the 4^th defendant. A written address was also filed in support of the NPO wherein learned counsel for the 4^th defendant submitted 3 issues for determination, to wit:

1.        Whether the claim of the Claimant as presently constituted discloses any cause or probable cause of action as against the 4^th Defendant.

2.        Whether the suit of the Claimant constitutes an abuse of court process as against the 4^th Defendant.

3.        Whether the 4^th Defendant is entitled to an order of this Court striking out its name from the suit for non-disclosure of any cause of action against the 4^th Defendant.

 

In opposing the NPO, the claimant filed a counter affidavit on 17^th July 2023. It was deposed to by the claimant. Filed along with the counter affidavit is a written address wherein the claimant adopted the 3 issues submitted for determination in the NPO by the 4^th defendant. The 4^th defendant filed a reply on points of law on 28^th June 2024. I have considered the facts deposed in the parties’ affidavits and I have also considered the submissions contained in the written addresses filed in respect of the NPO.

 

The contention of the 4^th defendant, from the totality of the grounds of the NPO, the affidavit in support and the arguments in the written address, is that the suit of the claimant did not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the 4^th defendant and that the 4^th defendant was improperly joined by the Claimant in this suit. I have examined the originating summons, the affidavit and the further affidavit filed by the claimant thereto. None of the questions for the determination in the Originating Summons affected the 4^th defendant. The 4^th defendant is not a member of the 2^nd defendant and the claimant has not shown that the 4^th defendant directs the 2^nd defendant. In addition, the claimant did not make any allegation of wrongdoing or infraction of his rights or obligations against the 4^th Defendant. The claimant did not also say that the 4^th defendant acted in breach of any provision of the 2^nd defendant‘s constitution which affected the claimant. Not to go too far, the claimant has not shown why the 4^th defendant is a party in this case. I have seen relief 7 sought by the claimant. The order sought therein is directed to the 4^th defendant but there is no fact placed before the court in his affidavits which would warrant the court to make the order against the 4^th defendant. There is no basis whatsoever for seeking the relief against the 4^th Defendant.

 

I completely agree with the 4^th defendant that the claimant did not disclose any cause of action against the 4^th Defendant. The 4^th defendant is therefore not a proper party in this suit and it is accordingly struck out from the suit.

 

DECISION ON THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

The claimant submitted 4 questions for determination in the Originating Summons. The 4 questions constitute the issues this court shall determine in this suit.

 

QUESTION 1.

Whether by the proper interpretation of Sections 36, 39 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Rule 30(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021 as amended, the purported Tribunal set up to investigate the Claimant is constitutional as it relates to its process and procedure of its constitution, terms of reference, witch-hunt intent, vagueness of content and cover-up of complaints of Claimant, and adequacy of time for attending same by the Claimant.

 

In question 1 of the Originating Summons, the claimant wants the court to construe the provisions of Sections 36, 39 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution and Rule 30(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021 to determine the validity of the constitution and the procedure of the Tribunal set up to investigate him. The starting point will be to examine the provisions which the claimant wants this court to construe.

 

The claimant sought the interpretation of the general provisions of sections 36 of the 1999 Constitution. He did not specify the particular provision of the section which relates to his case. But upon considering his averments in the affidavits and the submissions in the written address in support of the Originating Summons, it is clear to me that he founded his case on his right to fair hearing under the provision of subsection 6[b] which guaranteed his right to be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. On the other hand, section 39 of the 1999 Constitution guarantees the freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference. Section 40 provides that every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests.          

 

The claimant has also called on this court to construe Rule 30(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021 but I cannot find the said constitution among the processes filed by the claimant. In paragraph 25 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the claimant said thus: “A copy of the portion of the 2^nd defendant’s constitution is attached and marked as exhibit OK 7.” The said exhibit OK 7 is pages 2, 3, 64 and 65 of the 2^nd defendant’s constitution. That is all the claimant exhibited and it does not contain Rule 30(4) of the 2^nd defendant's Constitution. In Originating Summons proceedings, it is mandatory for the claimant who seeks the interpretation of any document or instrument to accompany the Originating Summons with copies of the instrument or the document sought to be construed, other than documents which the court can take judicial notice of. See Order 3 Rule 17 NICN Rules 2017. It is therefore reprehensible for a party, who wants the court to interpret contents or provisions of a particular document, to fail to produce the document in its entirety before the court. In this case, the claimant failed to exhibit the 2^nd defendant's Constitution which he wants this court to interpret to determine the questions in the Originating Summons. The failure ought to affect the aspect of his case relating to the document but I have observed that the 1^st to 3^rd defendants have exhibited the complete copy of the 2^nd defendant's Constitution. It is Exhibit 5 of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants. Since the law is trite that the court is entitled to examine documents and processes in its record when determining a matter, I will examine the said constitution exhibited by the 1^st to 3^rd defendants in determining the questions in the Originating Summons relating to it.

 

I have seen Rule 30 of the 2^nd defendant's Constitution. It has no sub rules. It is a standalone Rule and its provision is not related to the case of the claimant. From the submissions in issue 1 of the written address in support of the Originating Summons, reference was made to Rule 31(4) of the 2^nd defendant's Constitution. It seems to me that the relevant provision of the 2^nd defendant's Constitution which the claimant intended to found his complaints in question 1 of the Originating Summons is Rule 31(4) of the 2^nd defendant's Constitution. The Rule provides for disciplinary procedure and the setting up of Tribunal.

 

In his affidavit evidence, the claimant said the 2^nd Defendant is a trade union and the claimant was the immediate past President-General of the 2^nd Defendant and the current Chairman of the Investment Committee of the 2^nd Defendant. While he was in Lagos on 22^nd March 2023 on official assignment, his Clerk/Secretary in his office in Abuja called to inform him that an invitation letter was delivered to him at about 3:54 pm of that day requiring the Claimant to appear on the 23^rd March 2023 before the 2^nd defendants Tribunal set up to try him on some alleged infractions. The claimant said the letter of invitation did not give him adequate time to prepare for his defense and it affected his rights to fair hearing. He also said members of the Tribunal were not stated on the letter for him to ascertain their level or degree of neutrality in the matter and that it is the General Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant, which he also complained about, that set up the Tribunal and not the leadership of the 2^nd Defendant. In the written address in support of the Originating Summons, learned counsel for the claimant submitted that Exhibit OK 4 was served on the Claimant on 22^nd March 2023 requiring the Claimant to appear before a Tribunal on 23rd March 2023. As a result, the claimant was not given fair hearing as adequate time was not given to him to defend himself and this amount to breach of his right to fair hearing. It was further submitted that by Rule 31(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021, only the Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant can set up a Tribunal in consultation with President General or National Executive Council but in this case, the letter of invitation discloses that the Tribunal was not constituted in accordance to the provision of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution.

 

In the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, the 3^rd defendant averred following some allegations against the claimant, the leadership of the 2^nd defendant constituted a Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) in line with the provisions of the constitution of the 2^nd defendant to try the claimant and the tribunal entered a recommendation expelling the claimant from the Association. The Disciplinary Committee gave the Claimant fair hearing before reaching the decision to expel him. The claimant has the right to reply to his invitation and ask for adjournment or extension of time to present himself at the sitting of the Disciplinary Committee but he did not do so. In the written address of counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, it was submitted that none of the provisions of sections 36, 39 and 40 of the 1999 Constitution was infringed by the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants against the Claimant and that Disciplinary Committee gave the Claimant fair hearing before it reached its decision. The claimant was invited to the hearing of the Disciplinary committee but he failed to attend and he has not shown in his affidavit that he asked for extension of time or even appealed the final decision of the Committee. Counsel relied on EZECHUKWU vs. ONWUKA (2016) 44 WRN 1 SC where it was held that a party who had the opportunity to be heard but rejected same cannot thereafter complain of not being given fair hearing.

 

From the affidavit evidence of the parties, these facts are apparent. The claimant was a member of the 2^nd defendant union and in March 2023, a Disciplinary Committee, also called Tribunal, was set up to try the claimant. The claimant was given an invitation letter to appear before the Tribunal on 23^rd March 2023. The Tribunal sat on that day but the claimant did not appear. The Tribunal took a decision and recommended the expulsion of the claimant from the union. The claimant was accordingly expelled from the 2^nd defendant.

 

From the facts deposed by the claimant in his affidavit and further affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, as well as the submissions on issue 1 of the written address in support of the Originating Summons, the contention of the claimant under question 1 of the Originating Summons is that he was not given fair hearing by the Tribunal before the decision was taken against him. The reason he alleged denial of fair hearing is that he was not given adequate time to prepare to defend himself before the Tribunal. According to the claimant, the notice was served on him on 22^nd March 2023 at about 3.54pm at his office in Abuja when he was away in Lagos and the notice required him to appear before the Tribunal the following day. The said invitation letter is Exhibit OK 4. It is dated 20^th March 2023. It reads thus:

 

 

Dr. Chris Okonkwo

Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN)

14 Zambezi Crescent

Maitama Abuja

 

Dear Sir,

 

TRIBUNAL INVITATION:

 

Please be informed that sequel to your recent publications and actions on various social media platforms, a tribunal was set up by the Leadership of SSAEAC from the provisions of our constitution on page 82 rule 31 item[[4] second paragraph]] to make findings and recommendations for CEC/NEC considerations.

 

Also note that the tribunal terms of Reference (TOR) are as follows:

1.     To look into the constitution to ascertain if you followed the proper procedure in ventilating your grievances in line with the provisions of our Constitution 2021 as amended.

2.     To investigate and confirm an allegation of creation of a parallel online Secretariat/Whatsapp platform tagged IPPG SSAEAC RESCUE PLATFORM where you referred to the present leadership as outgoing team.

3.     To look into your handing over process to the incumbent PG with a view to know if the constitutional provisions relating to handing over was adhered to looking at rule 26 of our Constitution 2021 as amended.

 

In view of the above Sir, the tribunal humbly invites you to meet with them to hear from you in accordance with the provisions of our Constitution 2021 as amended.

 

Date: Thursday 23^rd March, 2023

Venue: Greenminds Hotel Utako Abuja

Time: 3pm prompt

 

Please note that the above date is the last sitting day of the tribunal as the tribunal used the last two sittings to make their findings.

 

Yours in struggle,

 

Comrade John Ugwu

Tribunal Secretary.

 

The 1^st to 3^rd defendants exhibited a similar letter to their counter affidavit as Exhibit 2. By Exhibit 2, the 1^st to 3^rd defendants have confirmed the content of the invitation letter given to the claimant. From the content of the invitation letter, the claimant was invited to appear before the Tribunal on 23^rd March 2023 at 3pm. The venue was Greenminds Hotel, Utako, Abuja. The claimant said he was served the letter on 22^nd March 2023 at his office in Abuja at about 3.54 pm but he was in Lagos at the time. The 1^st to 3^rd defendants did not controvert these facts in their counter affidavit. They are therefore deemed to have admitted the fact that the claimant was served the invitation letter on 22^nd March 2023 at his office in Abuja at about 3.54pm and that the claimant was in Lagos on the day the invitation letter was served.

 

The claimant was to appear before the Tribunal on 23^rd March 2023, which was about 24 hours after the claimant was served the letter of invitation. According to the claimant, as a result of the short notice, he could not appear before the Tribunal on that day. I have seen the report of the Tribunal, which the 1^st to 3^rd defendants exhibited to their counter affidavit and marked Exhibit 1. It is dated 23^rd March 2023. Of particular relevance is the content of paragraph E of the report, which reads as follows:

E. BREAKDOWN OF TRIBUNAL ACTIVITIES:

1.        Collection of nomination letters of members on Monday 13^th and 14^th March 2023.

2.        Inauguration and commencement of tribunal sittings on the 15^th of March at the National Secretariat Ijora, Lagos.

3.        Second sitting still at the National Secretariat Ijora, Lagos on Friday 17^th March 2023.

4.        Official invitation of (IPPG) Comrade Chris Okonkwo through hard copy medium to enable IPPG meet with the tribunal members at Green Minds Hotel Utako on the 20^th of March 2022.

5.        Tribunal final sitting at Green Minds Hotel Abuja on the 23^rd of March 2023, where the tribunal members expected the appearance of IPPG to state his own side of the story and defend himself of the allegation leveled against him in conformity with the principles of fair hearing as provided in our constitution. But the (IPPG) ignored the tribunal invitation and refused to make appearance and this was the last sitting of the tribunal.

 

From the report, the Tribunal was set up to investigate the claimant and it was inaugurated on 15^th March 2023, which was the same day it commenced sitting. The last sitting of the Tribunal was on 23^rd March 2023. The letter given to the claimant to invite him to appear before the Tribunal is dated 20^th March 2023 and it was meant to invite the claimant to the Tribunal’s proceedings of 23^rd March 2023, which was also the last proceeding of the Tribunal. The report reveals that the claimant did not appear before the Tribunal on that day and the Tribunal proceeded to conduct the business of the day, made its findings and recommended the expulsion of the claimant from the 2^nd defendant. In view of the circumstances surrounding the invitation of the claimant and the proceedings of the Tribunal, can the claimant be said to have been given fair hearing by the Tribunal before it reached its decision expelling the claimant from the union?

 

From the terms of reference of the Tribunal, it was set up specifically to investigate the claimant on the allegations made against him as contained in the terms of reference in exhibit OK 4. Again, the 1^st to 3^rd defendants Exhibit 1, the report of the Tribunal, discloses that the Tribunal started sitting since on 15^th March 2023 but it did not invite the claimant to appear before it until its last proceeding of 23^rd March 2023, and to make matters worse, the claimant was not served the invitation letter until a day to the last sitting of the Tribunal. In fact, the invitation letter emphatically stated in its last paragraph that the sitting of 23^rd March 2023 was the last sitting of the Tribunal, thereby foreclosing any extension of the proceedings to enable the claimant to appear and be heard in defence of the allegations against him. I have said it earlier that the fact that the invitation letter was delivered to the claimant’s office in Abuja on 22^nd March 2023 while he was away in Lagos on official duty is not in dispute. It means that the parties agree that the claimant was constrained by distance to make the appearance before the Tribunal on 23^rd March 2023. Therefore, claimant’s non appearance before the tribunal on 23^rd March 2023 was on good cause.

 

Learned counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants relied on the authority of EZECHUKWU vs. ONWUKA (supra) to contend that a party who had the opportunity to be heard but rejected same cannot be heard to complain of not being given fair hearing. This authority is not apposite to the circumstances of this case. It is clear to me from the facts of this matter that the claimant did not reject the opportunity to be heard as he was not even given opportunity of being heard. The 2^nd defendant’s Tribunal served the claimant invitation letter too late and at a time the claimant was not available to attend the proceedings. In addition, the claimant’s invitation by the Tribunal was the very first one extended to him by the Tribunal since it commenced investigation into the allegations made against the claimant. The Invitation was also served very late to the date of the proceeding. When the claimant did not appear for his first invitation, the Tribunal ought to have given him another opportunity to appear before going ahead to take its decision. The claimant can only be guilty of failure to appear when he was given more than one opportunity to appear before the tribunal and he failed to appear.

 

The 1^st to 3^rd defendants contended that the claimant has the right to ask for adjournment or extension of time to present himself at the sitting of the tribunal but he did not do so. I do not think the failure of the claimant to request for adjournment or extension of time when he could not appear before the tribunal on 23^rd March 2023 was enough justification for the Tribunal to have proceeded on that day to take a decision against the claimant. In view of the short notice of the allegations and the invitation given to the claimant, the Tribunal ought to have differed its sitting of 23^rd March 2023 suo motu when the claimant did not appear and allow the claimant another opportunity to appear. It should even be noted that the claimant was invited only once to appear before a tribunal investigating him and he was invited to the very last proceeding of the Tribunal.

 

Notwithstanding the short notice of the allegations and time given to the claimant, the tribunal did not deem it fit to give him another date to appear. It foreclosed the claimant, considered the allegations against the claimant and indicted him. The Tribunal proceeded to recommend punishments against the claimant, including expulsion from the union. What the Tribunal did in its proceedings of 23^rd March 2023 is completely against the rule of fair hearing. The claimant was not given adequate time and facility to prepare to defend himself on the allegations made against him. By the provisions of Section 36[1] of the 1999 Constitution, every person is entitled to a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations by a court or other tribunal. One of the requirements of fair hearing is that any person standing trial for any wrongdoing is entitled to be given adequate time and facilities to prepare to defend himself. See section 36[6]b) of the 1999 Constitution. In AROBlEKE vs. N.E.L.M.C. (2017) LPELR-43461(SC) at 36-37, it was held by the Supreme Court that:

"To satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be affected directly by disciplinary proceedings must be given adequate notice of the allegations against him to enable him make representation in his own defence.”

 

I find that the claimant was not given fair hearing by the Tribunal in the determination of the allegations made against the claimant. As a result, the decision of the Tribunal was reached in breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing. Where a person is not given opportunity to be heard in the determination of his rights and obligations by a court or tribunal, it renders the proceedings and any decision reached in the proceedings null and void and decision reached thereby is bound to be set aside. See OBOMHENSE vs. ERHAHON [1993] 7 NWLR [Pt. 303] 22; ELIAS vs. ECO BANK NIG. PLC [2019] 4 NWLR [Pt. 1663] 381; LA WARI FURNITURE AND BATHS LTD vs. F.R.N [2019] 9 NWLR [Pt. 1677] 262.

 

The claimant also challenged the composition of the Tribunal. He contended that by Rule 31(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution 2021, it is the Secretary of the 2^nd Defendant that can set up a Tribunal in consultation with President General or National Executive Council but in this case, the letter of invitation disclosed that the Tribunal was set up by the “leadership” in violation of Rule 31 (4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution. Rule 31(4) of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution provide, inter alia, thus:

“Setting up of the Tribunal shall be by the General Secretary in consultation with the President General or NEC.”

 

This provision is clear and simple. The 2^nd Defendant's Constitution gave the power to set up Disciplinary Tribunal to the General Secretary, who in setting up the Tribunal, is required to do so in consultation with the President General or NEC. There is no dispute in this case that the Tribunal was set up by the “leadership”. In the first paragraph of the invitation letter, the claimant was informed that “a tribunal was set up by the Leadership of SSAEAC”. Also, in paragraph 23 of the counter affidavit of the 1^st to 3^rd defendants, it was confirmed that the Disciplinary Committee (Tribunal) was constituted by the leadership of the 2^nd defendant. There is nowhere in the 2^nd defendant’s Constitution the General Secretary is referred to as the leadership nor is the word “leadership” defined in the constitution to mean the General Secretary. The implication is that the “leadership” who set up the Tribunal is not the General Secretary who is constitutionally empowered to set up the Tribunal.

 

I find that the Tribunal set up to investigate the claimant was not constituted or set up in accordance with the provisions of the 2^nd defendant’s constitution. Consequently, the constitution of the Tribunal, the invitation to the claimant, its proceedings, findings and recommendations are null and void. The result of the foregoing findings is that issue 1 is resolved in the negative and in favour of the claimant.

 

QUESTION 2.

Whether having regards to section 14.1 of the Condition of Service of the 4^th Defendant 2020 the 1^st Defendant is competent to continue to hold the position of President General of the 2^nd Defendant (Senior Staff Association of Electricity And Allied Companies) by reason of his promotion to his current position as the Assistant General Manager of Transmission Company of Nigeria Plc.

 

In the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the claimant deposed that the 1^st defendant is an employee of the 4^th defendant and also the current President-General of the 2^nd Defendant, having been so elected in the election of the 2^nd defendant conducted on 8^th April 2022. The position of the 1^st Defendant in the 4^th defendant is an Assistant General Manager and he was promoted to that position about 10 months before the conduct of the election.

 

Exhibit OK 1 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons is said to be the condition of service of the 4^th defendant. However, what the claimant did is to exhibit only 3 pages of the condition of service. The pages are the cover page and pages 115 and 116 of the document. Page 115 contains the provisions of section 14.1 of the condition of service upon which the claimant founded question 2 of the Originating Summons. Without mincing words, the pieces of the 4^th defendant’s condition of service exhibited to the affidavit on support of the Originating Summons is the doing of counsel for the claimant who filed the processes. This is bad practice. The habit of exhibiting only the needed pages of a document and thereby preventing the court from having the opportunity to consider the document as a whole is quite reprehensible and unacceptable. What was exhibited as exhibit 1 is not the complete copy of the 4^th defendant’s condition of service. The claimant failed to produce before the court the entire document embodying the condition of service of the 4^th defendant and without the condition of service, the document with which to determine question 2 of the Originating Summons is not before the court. I cannot also examine the pieces of document exhibited by the claimant and referred to as the 4^th defendant’s condition of service. Therefore, it will be in order at this point to resolve question 2 of the Originating Summons against the claimant as he failed to produce the document he wanted the court to construe in determining that question.

 

I have said earlier that one of the pages of the pieces of exhibit OK 1 contains the provisions of section 14.1 of the 4^th defendant’s condition of service on which the claimant founded question 2 of the Originating Summons. Assuming I am wrong in the position I took above in discountenancing exhibit OK 1, I have decided to examine the exhibited pieces of the condition of service, nonetheless, in order to determine question 2 of the Originating Summons on its merits.

 

The relevant portion of the provisions of Section 14.1 of the 4^th defendant’s condition of service is as follows:

“Employees from the rank of AGM and above, being projection of management shall not hold elective office in any of the unions. This is in order to avoid conflict of interest and ensure confidentiality of official secrets.”

 

In the written address in support of the Originating Summons, it was submitted that by the above provision of the 4^th Defendant's Condition of Service, by reason of the 1^st defendant’s promotion to Assistant General Manager, which made him a projection of Management of the 4^th Defendant, the 1^st defendant is disqualified from holding elective position in the 2^nd Defendant. It was submitted further that the 1^st Defendant, as an Assistant General Manager of the 4^th defendant, cannot hold the position of President General of the 2^nd Defendant. In response, counsel for the 1^st to 3^rd defendants submitted that the provision of section 14.1 of the 4^th Defendant's condition of service cannot be enforced by this Court because the 2^nd defendant is a trade union regulated by its own constitution and since the 4^th defendant is not a member of the 2^nd defendant, it cannot dictate the terms which regulate the internal affairs of the 2^nd Defendant. It was further argued that it is the 4^th defendant who can complain or take out disciplinary action for any breach of the condition of service by the 1^st Defendant.

 

The provisions contained in the condition of service of the 4^th defendant constitute the terms and conditions of the contract of employment between the 4^th defendant and its employees, including the 1^st defendant. Such terms and conditions binds the 1^st defendant and the 4^th defendant such and any breach of the terms of the condition of service by the 1^st defendant entitles the 4^th defendant to take disciplinary action against the 1^st defendant for the breach. Therefore, the allegation that the 1^st defendant, being an Assistant General Manager of the 4^th defendant also holds elective position of President General of the 2^nd Defendant is an allegation of breach of the condition of service of the 4^th defendant. It is the 4^th defendant that is entitled to complain about the violation of the terms of its employment and to take disciplinary action against the 1^st defendant, if necessary. The 4^th defendant seems not to have bothered. It is the claimant, who is not the employer of the 1^st defendant and not a party to contract of employment between the 4^th defendant’s and the 1^st defendant, that is complaining. More so, the claimant is not affected in any way by the 1^st defendant’s breach of section 14.1 of the 4^th defendant’s condition of service. Thus, it is not the responsibility of the claimant to complain that the 1^st defendant violated terms of the 4^th defendant’s condition of service. The claimant’s complaint in this issue projects him as someone swallowing panadol, even in overdose, for someone else’s headache. 

 

Again, the fact that the 1^st defendant holds the position of Assistant General Manager in the 4^th defendant is not a factor that disqualified him from contesting for the office of President General or holding the office of President General of the 2^nd defendant. Membership of the 2^nd defendant and qualification of its members to contest for any elective position is regulated by the constitution of the 2^nd defendant and not by the condition of service of the 4^th defendant. Once the constitution of the 2^nd defendant has set conditions for qualification to contest election and an interested member of the 2^nd defendant meets those conditions, he is eligible to contest and be elected. The terms of that member’s condition of service with his employer, unless expressly incorporated into the constitution of the union, cannot be used as criteria to disqualify the member. Therefore, the fact that the 4^th defendant’s condition of service provide that a member of management shall not hold elective position in any union does not disqualify or prevent the 1^st defendant from being elected or holding office as President General of the 2^nd defendant. The election may render the 1^st defendant liable to be sanctioned by his employer but not by the 2^nd defendant who is not regulated by the condition of service of the 4^th defendant. Therefore, the 1^st defendant, having been duly elected by the union members, is competent to continue to hold the position of President General of the 2^nd Defendant and he cannot be removed from the position for any reason outside the constitution of the union.

 

Taking either of the views I have expressed on this issue, issue 2 is resolved in the affirmative and against the claimant.

 

QUESTION 3.

Whether the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants have powers to sell or cause to be sold any property of the 2^nd Defendant whatsoever without the consent of the Claimant being Chairman of Investment Committee/Board and approval by relevant Councils of the 2^nd Defendant.

 

The claimant averred that the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants intend to sell some properties of the 2^nd Defendant without recourse to the Investment and Company Committee. In the written address in support of the Originating Summons, counsel for the claimant submitted that by the provisions of Rule 19 of the 2^nd Defendant's Constitution, the only way the properties of the 2^nd defendant can be sold is through obtaining consent of the Claimant and members of the Board of Investment Committee. It was further submitted that failure to obtain the consent of the Claimant and members of the Board of Investment Committee renders any dealing on the property illegal null and void. On their part, the 1^st to 3^rd defendants averred that the move to sell properties of the 2^nd defendant was authorized by the National Executive Council, which is the body having such powers under the 2^nd defendant’s constitution. The 1^st to 3^rd defendants relied on the NEC meetings of 7^th April 2022 and the 18^th June 2022 where authorization for the sale of some of the properties of the 2^nd defendant was given.

 

The provision of RULE 19 of the 2^nd defendant’s constitution is as follows:

The Association shall incorporate a holding company or form Management Committee/Board to manage its properties, real estate and other long term investments. The holding company or Management Board shall comprise of-

i.                   Ex Officio

ii.                National Treasurer,

iii.             The Three (3) National Trustees

iv.              Women Leader

v.                 General Secretary

All decisions concerning the properties and investments shall be with the consent of the Board.

 

This provision is clear and unambiguous. Any decision to be taken concerning the properties and investments of the 2^nd defendant shall be with the consent of the Board constituted in the Rule to manage the properties and investments of the 2^nd defendant. In other words, no decision can be taken by the 2^nd defendant on its properties or investments under the management of the Board without the consent of the Board. Let me emphasis that the consent required is that of the Board as a body and not that of an individual holding position in the Board. This clarification is necessary in view of the context of question 3 where the claimant asked whether any property of the 2^nd Defendant can be sold without his consent, being the Chairman of Investment Committee/Board. The consent required in Rule 19 of the 2^nd defendant’s constitution to validate any decision on the property of the 2^nd defendant is that of the Management Board and not the consent of the Chairman of the Management Board.

 

The 1^st to 3^rd defendants confirmed in their counter affidavit that some properties of the 2^nd defendant were to be sold and the sale was authorized by the National Executive Council of the 2^nd defendant. The 1^st to 3^rd defendants did not mention anywhere in the counter affidavit that the proposed sale of the properties of the 2^nd defendant received the consent of the 2^nd defendant’s Management Board. The 1^st to 3^rd defendants however said that the sale of the properties was authorized by NEC and that the NEC is the body having such powers under the 2^nd defendant’s constitution. In my view, the power of NEC to authorize sale of the 2^nd defendant’s properties does not exclude the provision of Rule 19 of the Constitution which required the consent of the Management Board for the sale of any property of the 2^nd defendant. The NEC may authorize sale of the property but Rule 19 of the 2^nd defendant’s constitution provides that such decision shall be with the consent of the Management Board.

 

In view of foregoing, I resolve issue 3 in favour of the claimant to the extent only that no decision can be taken concerning the properties of the 2^nd defendant without the consent of the Management Board.

 

QUESTION 4

Whether the 1^st Defendant was eligible to contest and win election of 8^th June 2023 of the 2^nd Defendant to have emerged President General of the 1^st Defendant and whether the consistent violations of 2^nd Defendant's Constitution by the 1^st  Defendant does not ipso facto remove him from office, especially in line with his Oath of Office.

 

The claimant has raised two issues in question 4 of the Originating Summons. He contended first that the 1^st defendant was not eligible to contest the election of 8^th June 2023 because of his concealed indebtedness status. Secondly, that the 1^st Defendant is deemed to have relinquished the office of President General because of multiple violations of 2^nd Defendant's Constitution. I have carefully considered the facts deposed by the parties in respect of this issue and the submissions of the respective counsels on the issue.

 

In paragraph 15 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the claimant averred that it was discovered that the 1^st Defendant concealed his records that he misappropriated funds as branch President TCN and he was suspended from the National Executive Council in 2019/2020. He also said such records of the 1^st defendant were ignored and concealed by the 3^rd Defendant and his team. It is because of this alleged concealed indebtedness of the 1^st defendant the claimant contended in question 4 of the Originating Summons that the 1^st defendant was not eligible to contest the election of 8^th June 2023. The claimant however did not mention any election held on 8^th June 2023 or to be held on 8^th June 2023 in either of his affidavits in support of the Originating Summons. It is observed this suit was filed on 24^th March 2023. Therefore, the said election of 8^th June 2023 mentioned in question 4 of the Originating Summons has not been held before this suit was filed and nothing was said about any proposed election to be held on 8^th June 2023 in the affidavits of the claimant. The only election which the claimant mentioned in his affidavit is the one conducted on 8^th April 2022 in which the 1^st defendant was elected President General of the 2^nd defendant.

 

The claimant’s allegation that the 1^st Defendant misappropriated funds as branch President TCN and that the 1^st and 3^rd defendants concealed records of the misappropriation are criminal allegations the claimant has made in this suit. In order to sway this court to hold that the 1^st defendant was not eligible to contest the election as a result of the criminal acts, the claimant is expected to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. It is the law that where an allegation of crime is made in a civil proceeding, the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See ABIBO vs. TAMUMO [1999] 4 NWLR [Pt. 599] 334 at 340; AGBAJE vs. FASHOLA (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082) 90 at 147. I have examined the affidavits filed by the claimant and the documents exhibited thereto but I find that he failed to substantiate the allegation of misappropriation and concealment of record which he made against the 1^st and 3^rd defendants. He also failed to prove that the 1^st defendant was suspended from NEC for misappropriation.

 

Similarly, the claimant had contended that the 1^st Defendant committed multiple violations of 2^nd Defendant's Constitution and should be deemed to have relinquished the office of President General of the 2^nd defendant but I cannot find satisfactory proof of the violations of 2^nd Defendant's Constitution by the 1^st Defendant or infractions allegedly committed by the 1^st defendant. The claimant’s averments in his affidavit are mostly speculative and bereft of cogent proof.

 

Even if the claimant was able to prove his allegations, I still wonder if the court is the proper forum for the claimant to seek the 1^st defendant’s disqualification from contesting election in the 2^nd defendant or to make the 1^st defendant relinquish the office of President General of the 2^nd defendant. These matters are the internal affairs of the union to which the court cannot interfere. It is within the rights of the union to decide who qualifies to contest its elections and when a person holding an elective office is liable to be removed from the office. The claimant’s belief that the 1^st defendant is not qualified to contest election in the 2^nd defendant or that he is liable to relinquish the office of President General of the 2^nd defendant are matters the claimant should submit to the union to investigate and conclude under the provisions of its constitution. The level of the court’s interference in such matters is limited to complaints arising from breach of procedure or the provisions of the union constitution affecting the rights of members of the union.

 

For these reasons, issue 4 is determined against the claimant.

 

Having resolved all the questions submitted by the claimant for determination in the Originating Summons, I will now turn to the reliefs sought by the claimant in the Originating Summons. The result of the conclusions reached on each of the questions is that the claimant succeeds in reliefs 6 and 7 only. All the other reliefs, which are reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9, have not been proved and they are accordingly dismissed. For the reliefs 6 and 7 which succeed, the court orders as follows:

1.  The constitution of the Tribunal, the letter of invitation dated 20^th March 2023 issued to the claimant by the Tribunal, the proceedings of the Tribunal and the decisions and recommendations of the Tribunal contained in its report dated 23^rd March 2023 are hereby set aside for being invalid, null and void.

2.  No order as to cost.

 

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe

Judge