IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ENUGU
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE O.O. AROWOSEGBE
DATE: TUESDAY NOVEMBER 28, 2023
SUIT NO: NICN/EN/18/2018
BETWEEN:
MRS. CYNTHIA OYINYECHI ODIMMA………………………………CLAIMANT
AND
1. FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY COMMISSION
2. MRS. PAULINE UZOAMAKA NJOKU DEFENDANTS
APPEARANCES:
1. G.O. NWOKEIWU – FOR THE CLAIMANT.
2. N.B. CHIKANI – FOR THE 1ST DEFENDANT.
3. CHIJIOKE O. CHIKEZIE – FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
COMPLAINT commenced this suit May 4, 2018. The Statement of Facts [SF] sets out the following reliefs at para 56 thereof:
a. A DECLARATION of this Honourable Court that the 1st Defendant, not being a court of competent jurisdiction, lacks the power to determine what amounts to lawful debt.
b. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court declaring null and void the purported finding by the 1st Defendant that the Claimant owes the 2nd Defendant lawful debt.
c. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court declaring null and void the purported Reduction in the rank of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant from Route Commander (RC) to Deputy Route Commander (DRC).
d. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the 1st Defendant to forthwith restore the Claimant to her rank of Route Commander (RC) effective 14/1/2018 with all promotions, salaries, emoluments and other perquisites of office due to her.
e. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the 1st Defendant to forthwith return to the Claimant any money deducted from her salary or salaries for the purpose of paying the purported debt owed the 2nd Defendant and matter connected thereto.
f. A PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st Defendant, her agents, servants, privies, workers or any person acting for or on her behalf from deducting any money from the Claimant’s salary or salaries for the purpose of paying the purported debt owed the 2nd Defendant and matters connected thereto.
g. A PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st Defendant, her agents, servants, privies, workers or any person acting for or on her behalf from harassing, intimidating, victimizing and/or terminating the Claimant’s employment in respect of the purported debt owed 2nd Defendant and matters connected thereto.
h. AN ORDER directing the 2nd Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N? as general damages for the unlawful and unjustified interference with the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant.
i. AN ORDER directing the 1st Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N? as general damages.
The 2nd defendant filed Second Defendant’s Statement of Defence [SDSD] May 28, 2018 while the 1st defendant filed Statement of Defence [FDSD] June 13, 2019. The claimant filed Reply to both defendants’ SD June 24, 2019. Thus, pleadings were completely joined. Let me go to summary of the pleadings.
SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
A: Claimant’s Grievances
The claimant pleaded that; she is an employee of the 1st defendant, having been employed February 2007. She pleaded that; her employment is permanent and pensionable. She pleaded that, at the time of the confirmation of her appointment, she was unmarried. She pleaded that, her initial documents from the 1st defendant had errors with respect to her name, which the 1st defendant refused to correct but that; her last promotion letters bear the correct name. She pleaded too that, her employment is subject to FRSC Reviewed Condition of Service, 2007 [Staff Manual]. She pleaded that, her husband rented an apartment from the 2nd defendant but that, she signed the tenancy, based on the agreement of the landlady and her husband because, her husband travelled out at the time of execution but that, all receipts were issued in her husband’s name. She pleaded that, her husband was asked to vacate the premises because, the landlady wanted to renovate and was subsequently, served notice to quit and notice of intention to apply to recover possession, which were served on her husband, through the Chief Magistrate’s Court.
She pleaded that, the landlady subsequently brought an action against her husband at the Chief Magistrate’s Court to recover possession and that, the suit was struck out March 30, 2017 and that, thereafter, the landlady started troubling her, to vacate the premises with her husband and pay up the accrued rents and that, she referred the landlady to her husband with whom the landlady had the contract. She pleaded that; the 2nd defendant [the landlady] boasted that, she would use her connections to have her dismissed. She pleaded that, she advised her husband, who vacated the premises in June 2017, but that, the landlady wrote a petition against her to the 1st defendant on 26th June 2017 wherein, the landlady said she rented a house from her and that, she owed her N400,000. She pleaded that, the 1st defendant directed her to pay up the rent before the 31st August 2017 and that, she responded by forwarding the contract documents to the 1st defendant to show that, she had no tenancy with the 2nd defendant but, only acted as agent to her husband. She pleaded that; the 1st defendant insisted, despite this that, she paid up the rents and vacate the premises by 31st August 2017 or face disciplinary actions.
She pleaded that; the 1st defendant commenced disciplinary proceedings against her on 4th October 2017 and served her with a charge sheet. She pleaded that she was denied free and fair trial in the FDP, as she was not allowed legal representation whereas, the 1st defendant had legal representation. She pleaded further that, she was harassed and intimidated and that, she was not immediately communicated the FDP’s decision but later on 7th February 2018, wherein the letter of January 2, 2018 demoted her for failure to pay a lawful debt and, indicated that the debt would be deducted from her salaries. She further pleaded that, the 1st defendant, upon realising its error in saying, the claimant owed a lawful debt thereafter directed the 2nd defendant to pursue the recovery of her debt in court, pursuant to which the 2nd defendant has instituted a suit against the claimant and her husband at the Chief Magistrate’s Court on the same debt for which she was already found liable and punished. She pleaded that, the actions of the defendants have subjected her to ridicules and psychological trauma, as she had been forced to dress in lower rank attire and to be addressed with lower rank and that, her husband absconded because of this too.
The claimant pleaded the issuance of pre-action notice whereupon she later filed this suit and claimed the reliefs earlier itemised above. That being the end of the SF, I move to summary of the 1st defendant’s FDSD.
B: 1st Defendant’s Statement of Defence [FDSD]
The 1st defendant counterpleaded para 9 that, the claimant is subject to the Staff Manual and the applicable circulars. The 1st defendant counterpleaded paras 12, 32 & 51 that the claimant did not submit application and obtain approval to marry, contrary to the Staff Manual. The 1st defendant counterpleaded paras 13, 14 & 15 that, the claimant had no power of attorney to execute the contract on behalf of the said husband and that, all the monies paid were paid by the claimant, making the claim of non-existent husband fraudulent and at best, making the claimant agent to unknown principal. In reaction to paras 34-41, the 1st defendant counterpleaded that, the claimant was only investigated administratively in accordance with the Staff Manual, which found that, the claimant executed the contract on behalf of an unknown principal and personally paid all the rents and stayed in the apartment but later refused to pay the next rent when it fell due and thereby dented the 1st defendant’s corporate image.
The 1st defendant further counterpleaded that, the claimant was given the opportunity to fish out the alleged husband or pay personally and, she failed, upon which the Staff Manual was accordingly applied. The 1st defendant equally counterpleaded that, the claimant failed to explore the internal dispute resolution mechanism before rushing to court and that, up till the time the suit was filed, the outstanding debt was not paid. The 1st defendant counterpleaded that, the claimant is not entitled to all the reliefs claimed and that; cost should be awarded against her. The 1st defendant thereafter proceeded to its Counter-Claim [CC].
Under the CC, the 1st defendant pleaded that; the Court should order the claimant to pay up the arrears of rent to clear the 1st defendant’s corporate name. That ended the 1st defendant’s defence and, the CC. I move to the 2nd defendant’s defence.
C: 2nd Defendant’s Statement of Defence [SDSD]
In reaction to paras 12-14 of the SF, the 2nd defendant counterpleaded that, the claimant and her husband lived in the rented apartment and that, the claimant and her husband are one person, while the claimant paid the first rent in her husband’s name and the others in her name. The 2nd defendant also counterpleaded that, the claimant and her husband still owed the sum of N633,330.27 on which the 2nd defendant has filed a suit at the Chief Magistrate’s Court, and in response to paras 15-19, counterpleaded that, the suit was only struck out. The 2nd defendant counterpleaded that, she wrote the petition against the claimant to her employer in order to seek its assistance to persuade the claimant to pay her. The 2nd defendant counterpleaded para 42 that, the claimant promised to pay several times and failed. The 2nd defendant equally counterpleaded paras 47 & 53 that, her counsel advised her, in all the steps she took and that, the claimant is the architect of her problems and that, fraudulent conducts caused her any trauma she suffered.
Finally, the 2nd defendant prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. That being the end of summary of the 2nd defendant’s defence, I move to summary of the claimant’s reply to both the 1st & 2nd defendants’ statement of defences [SDs].
D: Summary of Reply to the Two Statements of Defences [RSDs]
The claimant replied that, she applied and got approval to get married in 2008 and married customarily in 2009 and statutorily in 2012 and applied for change of name in 2014, which was granted March 18, 2014. The claimant also replied that, the 1st defendant refused to document the investigations of the FDP and that; the FDP did not find that the claimant signed the contract as agent of unknown principal. That is all that is worthy of summary as reply pleadings, as all others were repetitious of issues that had been joined on the SF and SDs. That being the end of summary of the pleadings, I move to summary of the proceedings.
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The matter came up first before me November 14, 2018 and again March 26, 2019 when it was adjourned for hearing. On 24th June 2019, the 1st defendant’s learned counsel regularised their defence processes. On 28th October 2019, the Court granted the claimant’s motion to file Further Written Statement on Oath [FWSO] filed 18/10/2019. Court awarded cost of N3,000 against the claimant on this date too.
The case was opened with the claimant testifying as CW1 on 23rd March 2021 and the Court ordered the claimant to re-swear her defective WSO and adjourned the case. On 26th July 2021, the claimant regularised her Re-sworn WSO [RWSO] and, the trial continued with CW1 in chief and she adopted the RWSO and two other WSOs. CW1 thereafter tendered Exhibits C1-C22. Thereafter, the case was adjourned for continuation. It came up on 2nd February 2022 and CW1 was reminded of her previous oath. The learned counsel for the 1st defendant cross-examined the CW1. Under Cross-Examination [XX] CW1 admitted that, disciplinary panel was set up and that, she submitted herself to the panel. She said, the provost accompanied her to the panel but that, she objected to the membership composition of the panel. She said, she objected to the legal officer of the 1st defendant and demanded for her own lawyer because, she saw a lawyer representing them. She said the reduction in rank had been confirmed and that, she was served with the letter in January 2018.
She said, since then, she had been wearing the reduced rank but that; she did not appeal the verdict. She said she never received query and could not remember being issued with a warning letter. Three queries and warning letters were shown to the CW1 but objection against them were sustained and, they were accordingly marked rejected. The XX of the CW1 by the 1st defendant was thereafter brought to an end without re-examination while the case was adjourned for continuation. It came up next March 15, 2022 and the 2nd defendant cross-examined the CW1. The CW1 answered that, she got married in December 31, 2010 and that; they packed in, in 2013 and packed out from the 2nd defendant’s apartment in June 2017, when the office wrote her to pack out. To the question: whether from 2013 to 2017 June, she packed in with the husband and packed out with him, she answered “No sir.” She said she did not know when her husband left the apartment but that; she did not owe arrears of rent.
Further under XX by the 2nd defendant, the CW1 answered that, the case in which the 2nd defendant claimed arrears of rent was between her and her husband and that, she only signed the agreement for her husband, who was not around when it was to be executed and, under his direct instruction, to the knowledge of the landlady. She said the magistrate’s court’s case filed by the 2nd defendant had no bearing on this suit. She said, it was not true that she filed this case to ask the Court to declare that, it was her husband that was supposed to pay the arrears and not her because, the 2nd defendant sued her husband in the case and not her.
She said further that, after judgment was delivered, the landlady turned round and began to threaten her that, she would ensure she was dismissed and that, she wrote petitions against her and her office set up a panel on the issue. She admitted that, the petition indicated that she was owing N400,000. She said it was not true that her employer found her culpable and ordered her to pay the arrears because, before the panel was set up, her employer had already addressed her as a defaulter. The XX was brought to an end after few other irrelevant questions without re-examination. Thereafter, the learned claimant’s counsel closed the claimant’s case, while the case was adjourned for defence.
The case came up for continuation next May 24, 2022 and DW1 for the 1st defendant opened the 1st defendant’s defence. DW1 introduced himself and his position in the 1st defendant. DW1 adopted the WSO made 13/06/2019 and ended his testimony without tendering any document. The case thereafter proceeded to XX by the claimant’s learned counsel. Under XX, DW1 admitted that, the reason the 2nd defendant concluded that, the claimant was the one that contracted the tenancy relationship was because, she never applied to the 1st defendant to get married. DW1 added that, before a female staff could marry, she must have spent two years and must apply to get marry, with the details of the spouse. DW1 said he did not bother to confirm from their employer, if the claimant obtained permission to get married before he reached the conclusion because, he knew the nature of the case. He said this is because, he did not want the case to go beyond his office, which was why he did everything possible to settle the matter amicably between the landlady and the claimant and that, he gave up when his efforts did not yield result and advised that, the case be taken to the headquarters, where it was decided.
He said it was not true that he failed to reach out to the husband because, he had concluded that the lady was not married but that, all efforts he made to get across to the husband, through the claimant, failed because, she said her husband was not in Nigeria. He agreed that, he did not profile the claimant’s because; he did not receive a directive from the headquarters. He replied that, he could not say the directive to profile did not come because, there was no application to get married and that, this was because, the claimant said she was married, which made it unnecessary to inquire whether she was profiled or not. He maintained that, he did not lie in para 7 of his WSO that the husband was not profiled because there was no application to get married. DW1 said the document [Exhibit XXD1A] tendered to show that, he continually referred to the claimant as defaulter, did not emanate from him and that; they had no imprimatur from him.
DW1 denied that, he testified at the panel that tried the claimant and that; he was never in the panel. DW1 maintained that; Exhibit C19 was an afterthought, having been dated 2018, which was after the commencement of this case in 2017 and that; it was therefore, fake. DW1 also said, he did not know anything about whether it was because, no letter of authority to sign the contract was tendered by the claimant that made him to say the husband did not authorise her to sign and maintained that, all he knew was that, it was the claimant that signed the contract on behalf of the husband, whom she said was abroad. DW1 said he was not aware of any judgment in respect of the tenancy and was not aware that; the 2nd defendant sued the claimant’s husband. But when shown Exhibit C9 and his depositions in paras 12 & 13 of his WSO, he admitted he knew there was a case on the matter but he did not know when the judgment came out. He said he believed the story of the landlady about the claimant owing her rents because, the claimant did not deny it.
DW1 also admitted that, in accordance with the Staff Manual, a staff could only be punished, if he owed a lawful debt but that, he could not remember that, the 2nd defendant showed him any document where a court declared that, the claimant owed the 2nd defendant. At this stage, the XX was brought to an end without re-examination and, the case was adjourned for continuation. It came up next 29th June 2022 for XX by the 2nd defendant.
Under XX by the learned counsel to the 2nd defendant, the DW1 answered that, the case of indebtedness was established against the claimant in the office in Enugu because, the claimant had agreed before the case was brought to him in office that, she would be paying N50,000 monthly to the 2nd defendant but that, while the claimant never denied the debt, she maintained that, it was the husband that would pay. DW1 stated that, there was no evidence that the claimant married. DW1 agreed that, it was because, the claimant disagreed with the verdict of the headquarters that she rushed to this Court. The XX by the learned counsel to the 2nd defendant was brought to an end and, the learned counsel to the 1st defendant attempted to re-examine the DW1 but the Court, on objection, disallowed the re-examination on the ground that, it was another evidence-in-chief and the learned counsel to the 1st defendant brought the re-examination to an end and closed the 1st defendant’s case. The case was thereafter adjourned for continuation of defence.
It came up on 18th April 2023 and the 1st counsel tendered the Staff Manual from the Bar without objection and it was marked Exhibit Bar 1. Thereafter, DW2 for the 2nd defendant was fielded for the 2nd defendant’s evidence-in-chief. The 2nd defendant personally testified for herself as DW2. She adopted the WSO made 28th May 2018 and tendered Exhibit D1 and was thereafter submitted for XX. Under XX by the claimant’s learned counsel, DW2 said, the claimant was her tenant because; she signed the agreement but added the husband in the agreement. She denied that, the agreement [Exhibit C4] provided that, it was between her and the claimant’s husband and queried, whether there was any evidence authorising the claimant to act as agent. When shown Exhibit C5, the receipts she issued in the husband’s name, she now said, she issued it because, the claimant told her, her husband was in the USA and that, she would use it to collect her money back.
DW2 admitted, she authored the issuance of Exhibits C6 & C7 and said, she sued the husband in the Magistrate’s Court but that, the husband never appeared in the Court while the claimant represented him throughout and gave evidence at p. 5 of the Exhibit C9 but the case was struck out because, she failed to submit the power of attorney. She said she did not know that the husband was her tenant. She admitted that, the judgment in issue was Exhibit C9 and stated that, at p. 5 thereof, the claimant pleaded that, she be allowed to stay. She said it was not true that, after the judgment, she decided to punish the claimant for daring to testify in the suit. The 2nd defendant said she did not file another suit against the claimant but that, when she failed to pay as promised at her immediate office, she was directed to the Zonal Office, Enugu and, she still failed to pay, she was given the headquarters address and she was eventually asked from Abuja to come to the Zonal Office, Enugu where the case was heard in the presence of the claimant.
She said the claimant refused to react to her story, as she said she had an appointment in the hospital, but that they called relatives of the husband on phone and, they said the claimant was no longer their wife because, she fought with their mother. She said further that, up till date, the claimant had not paid the arrears and that; the case at the Magistrate’s Court was still there while the Multi-Door Court House could not resolve it too. She said, she did not think the ADR took place while this case was pending. She said they all went to the Multi-Door Court House as directed by the Magistrate’s Court and that; she was surprised when she was served with this suit. She admitted that Exhibit C16 was filed at the Magistrate’s Court at her instruction.
The 2nd defendant admitted she told the panel that the claimant was the only tenant she knew because, she never saw the man and that; she sued the man and yet, did not see him. She said the claimant told her that, he was in the USA. She maintained that, she did not know the claimant’s husband and that; anybody can represent anybody. She said, it was the claimant alone who brought the keys of the apartment to her around 7.30pm 16th December 2017 and that, since she lived in far away place, she would not know if both of them packed out at the same time. She said only the claimant and her brother signed the contract without any relation of the husband. On the question that, she lied in her WSO that claimant and the husband were her tenants, she said, she had earlier said when the claimant was taking the house, she said her husband was in the USA. To the question whether she lied in para 9 of her WSO, when she said, she approached the claimant and her husband several times, she said she only believed the claimant when she said she had husband and that, it was at the Multi-Door Court House she learnt the man had bolted away.
She said her understanding of vacation of the premises was when she received the keys from the woman to whom she handed the keys to personally. She denied that her reason of writing petition against the claimant to her office was to get her punished but that, she had worked in a reputable firm and that; no staff of the First Bank of Nigeria [FBN] would agree to go to the police station because of rent on which she had been to the Multi-Door Court House. The XX by the claimant’s learned counsel came to an end at this point without re-examination. The 1st defendant’s counsel also declined to cross-examine the 2nd defendant. Thereafter, the learned 2nd defendant’s counsel closed the 2nd defendant’s case, while the case was thereafter adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses [FWAs].
On 12th October 2023, the learned counsel to the 2nd defendant, CHIJIOKE CHIKEZIE, adopted the 2nd defendant’s FWA and urged the Court to dismiss the case. The erudite counsel to the 2nd defendant did not file Reply on Points of Law [RPL]. The erudite 1st defendant’s counsel, N.B. CHIKANI, thereafter adopted the 1st defendant’s FWA and the RPL, and also urged the Court to dismiss the case. The erudite claimant’s counsel, G.O. NWOKEIWU, equally adopted the claimant’s FWA and urged the Court to find in the claimant’s favour. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 30th November 2023 for judgment. As the judgment became ready before the date, the new date was ordered communicated to the learned counsel to the parties.
However, before I delivered the judgment today the 28th November 2023, I drew the attention of the learned counsel to the parties to the fact that, the copy the learned claimant’s counsel substituted for Exhibit C10, was incomplete and drew their attention to the copy frontloaded and gave them the one in issue to see and assess the situation. The two learned opposing counsel applied that the Court accepted another copy in replacement of the incomplete copy. The application was granted and the new copy was re-marked Exhibit C10 in replacement of the incomplete one, which was marked with the order for its substitution.
Having got to this juncture, the next thing is to summarise the FWAs.
SUMMARY OF THE THEORIES OF THE CASE
A: 1st Defendant’s Theory of the Case
Erudite ESTINE OKOLO franked the 1st defendant’s theory of the case, as contained in the FWA. The erudite counsel formulated four issues:
1. Whether the claimant has complied with all the conditions precedent provided by the FRSC Regulations on Discipline and other relevant documents before initiating this action and claim for damages. [sic]
2. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction when the claimant has not complied with the requirements provided for in the regulations before initiating the action. [sic]
3. Whether FRSC, a paramilitary organization, is empowered to punish its erring staff on a matter which has the propensity to affecting the image of the Corps.
4. Whether the Claimant by virtue of endorsing the tenancy agreement is not an agent of disclosed principal and that by virtue of marriage, she is not one and the same with the so called husband and having admitted to have lived and stayed in the said property, she is not liable to pay the arrears of rent.
Arguing issue 1, the learned counsel argued that, the claimant did not issue pre-action notice aside other preconditions she failed to fulfill before filing this action. Erudite counsel argued that, the claimant failed to apply for a review of the Federal Road Safety Disciplinary Panel’s [FDP] decision and, for clemency as contained in Schedule 3, pp. 33 & 53 of the Staff Manual and, is therefore estopped from bringing this action. The learned counsel argued that, this must come before the issuance of pre-action notice. The learned counsel quoted the rule as stating that, the appeal must be filed within two weeks of the FDP’s decision and that, the decision of the Commission or the Corps Marshal shall be final. Thus ended arguments on issue 1 and, the learned counsel moved to issue 2.
Under issue 2, which is on the question, if the Court could assume jurisdiction where the claimant failed to comply with the conditions precedent, the erudite counsel cited First Bank of Nigeria v. Abubakar (2008) 12 SC (Pt. 111) 109 at 135 and Madukolum v. Nkemdilim (1962) ANLR 484 and submitted that, the Court thereby lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He argued that; the condition stated in S. 5(e) of the Staff Manual is clear and urged the Court to make the appropriate order. That ended arguments on issue 2 and, the erudite counsel moved to issue 3.
Under issue 3, which is as to: whether the Corps have the vires to punish an erring staff, for owing a lawful debt, the erudite counsel argued that, the claimant is subject to the specialised regulations of the Corps and that, a situation where a staff fails to pay debt, is antithetical to the image of the Corps and cited Zenabor v. Bayero University Kano (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1169) 96 CA and urged the Court to decide issue in its favour and moved to issue 4.
Under issue 4, which deals with the questions whether the claimant is not an agent of a disclosed principal when she personally executed the contract and, whether she was not personally bound by reason of being one with the husband by dint of marriage, the erudite counsel argued that, the facts that: the claimant did not produce any evidence of authorisation to sign the contract, she collected the keys of the apartment at inception and submitted them at the end and, the admission that, she personally lived there with members of her own family for four years and, the further admission before the FDP that, the 2nd defendant was her landlady, proved the learned counsel’s theory of the case and, as such the claimant was liable to pay the rent, as an agent of disclosed principal. The learned counsel argued too that, in line with the Marriage Act, husband and wife are one person, and thus, the claimant was liable for the arrears of rent and therefore earned the punishment of reduction in rank. On the basis of the foregoing, the learned counsel urged the Court to dismiss the case. That ends the FWA of the 1st defendant. I move to summary of the 2nd defendant’s FWA.
B: 2nd Defendant’s Theory of the Case
Erudite O.C. CHIKEZIE franked the 2nd defendant’s theory of the case. The erudite counsel submitted two issues for the consideration of this Court thus:
1. Whether the Letter of Protest dated 26/6/2017 marked as Exhibit C10 can by any strength of imagination be said to amount to unlawful and unjustified interference with the claimant’s employment with the 1st defendant as to render the 2nd defendant liable in damages?
2. Whether the claimant has made out any case against the 2nd defendant as to entitle her to the reliefs being sought in paragraph 56(h) of the statement of fact. [sic]
Arguing issue 1, the erudite counsel argued that, the 2nd defendant stated in para 9 of her SDSD that, she wrote the letter to bring to the notice of the 1st defendant the problems she had with the claimant, who is a staff of the 1st defendant, to recoup her arrears of rent, and submitted that, the letter was thereby justified. The learned counsel submitted that, it is not in dispute that the claimant: was a tenant of the 2nd defendant, who packed out without paying the arrears of rent, and insisted the arrears of rent be paid by her husband that, the claimant executed the contract that, she was not married to the husband at the time of the contract that, the FDP invited the claimant to settle the matter and, advised her to pay and, she refused and insisted that, the money be paid by the unknown husband. The learned counsel submitted that, these conducts justified the petition to her boss.
The learned counsel argued that, under XX, the 2nd defendant gave evidence of how the claimant failed to fulfill her numerous promises to pay the arrears of rent installmentally and that, they have not been paid till now. The learned counsel argued that, this showed the 2nd defendant wanted the case resolved amicably and that, failure in this respect resulted in the suit at the Magistrate’s Court. On the ground of the foregoing, the learned counsel urged the Court to hold that, the petition in Exhibit C10 was justified and moved to issue 2.
Under issue 2, which is, as to whether the claimant made out a case against the 2nd defendant, the learned counsel submitted that, he who asserts must prove and cited S. 132 of the Evidence Act. The learned counsel argued that, the claimant has not been able to show that the 2nd defendant unjustifiably interfered with her employment, as the case before the Court showed that, there was an issue of unpaid arrears of rent by the claimant and that, Exhibit C10 only sought the intervention of the 1st defendant in this regard. On the basis of the foregoing, the learned counsel urged the Court to dismiss the case. That ends the 2nd defendant’s FWA, which is the last in the defendants’ FWAs. The next thing is, summary of the claimant’s FWA.
C: Claimant’s Theory of the Case
Erudite G.O. NWOKEIWU franked the claimant’s theory of the case and submitted six issues for the Court to consider:
1. Whether the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court to entertain this suit was properly activated?
2. Whether the FDP complied with the rules of natural justice and fair hearing in the conduct of its proceedings leading to their recommendation of disciplinary measures against the claimant?
3. Whether in view of the facts and circumstances of this case, the FDP was right to have concluded that the claimant owed the 2nd defendant lawful debt?
4. Whether the 2nd defendant unjustly interfered with the claimant’s employment with the 1st defendant and thereby caused the claimant to suffer damages?
5. Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the extant suit?
6. Whether the 1st defendant is entitled to the reliefs sought in her counter claim?
Arguing issue 1, the learned counsel submitted that, the facts of cases and the reliefs sought, determine courts’ jurisdictions and cited Egbele v. The Postmaster General (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 576) 575 at 581. Learned counsel submitted that, Schedule 3 of Exhibit C11 [Staff Manual] does not make it mandatory that aggrieved employee must lodge appeal as condition precedent to filing suits in court. Learned counsel argued further that, in the assumption that the provision mandates appeal, the 1st defendant blocked the claimant from exercising her right of appeal against the FDP’s recommendation. Learned counsel argued that, evidence is on record that the claimant testified that she was not furnished with the FDP’s decision immediately, but on the 7th February 2018 when she was served with Exhibit C15, which was dated 2nd January 2018. References were made to paras 44 of the SF and 43 of the RWSO and the fact that, the pleadings and the evidence were not challenged; and hence, the claimant was not able to assess the situation to determine whether or not to appeal, until the right was permanently foreclosed.
The erudite counsel argued that, the 1st defendant cannot usurp the jurisdictions of courts to adjudicate matters and cited Adeogun & Ors v. Fashogbon & Ors (2008) LPELR-131 (SC). There ended the arguments on issue 1 with the exhortation to dismiss the jurisdictional objections. The learned counsel thereafter moved to issue 2.
Under issue 2, which is whether the FDP breached the rules of natural justice and fair hearing, the learned counsel was of the opinion that, with regard to exercise of right of discipline in employment laced with statutory flavours, the procedures stipulated must be adhered to strictly to lawfully exercise the power of discipline and cited New Nigeria Newspapers Ltd v. Atoyebi (2013) LPELR-21489 (CA) and ESUT & Anor v. Ude (2014) LPELR-23013 (CA) on when an employment is said to enjoy statutory flavour. Erudite counsel cited the introduction to Exhibit C11, which cited S. 5 of the RSCEA and, SS. 18(1) of the RSCEA and 318(1) of the Constitution that, they combined to show; the employment in issue has statutory flavours. Erudite counsel cited Zenith Plastics Industries Ltd v. Samotech Ltd (2018) LPELR-44056 (SC) on the requirements of the rules of natural justice and fair hearing. The learned counsel argued that, the claimant was harassed and intimidated by the FDP members throughout the proceedings and referred to paras 43 of the SF and 40 & 42 of the RWSO.
The erudite counsel further said, even before the sitting of the FPD, the members had prejudged the matter because, they openly told the claimant that, she should pay the alleged debt owed by her husband. Learned counsel cited paras 10 of the Reply and 10 of the RWSO. Erudite counsel argued that, the persistent references to the claimant at the FDP as defaulter, is significant proof of violation of S. 36(5) of the Constitution and Exhibit C11 [RSCEA], which he said, tagged any offender ‘alleged defaulter’ instead ‘defaulter’, which the members of the FDP persistently called the claimant before she was heard. The learned counsel argued that, the refusal of the 1st defendant to record the proceedings of the FDP also violates paras (9) & (10) of Schedule 1 of the RSCEA, which is pursuant to S. 53 of the RSCEA. The erudite counsel argued that, the record frontloaded [Exhibit XXD1A] did not contain the accurate records of what transpired.
The learned counsel argued that, administrative bodies acting quasi-judicially are bound by the principles of fair hearing and cited Judicial Service Commission of Cross River State & Anor v. Young (2013) LPELR-20592 (SC) and submitted that, the FDP’s breach of fair hearing makes its proceedings null and, urged the Court to so find. The learned counsel thereafter moved to issue 3.
Under issue 3, which is objection against the finding of the FDP that the claimant was indebted to the 2nd defendant, the learned counsel submitted that, the fact that the 1st defendant was not presented with any court’s judgment with a verdict that the claimant was indebted to the 2nd defendant is fatal to the finding. Erudite counsel argued, the claimant denied that she owed the 2nd defendant any debt and that; it was her husband that had tenancy agreement with the 2nd defendant and cited the tenancy [Exhibit C4] and argued that, the claimant merely signed for her husband. The erudite counsel also cited the receipts [Exhibit C5], the notices [Exhibit C6 & C7] and the Magistrate’s Court’s judgment [Exhibit C9] to argue that, the tenancy was with the claimant’s husband and that, they were all presented before the FDP, yet, it wrongly concluded that, the claimant was tenant of the 2nd defendant and her debtor. The learned counsel cited paras 6-10 of the 1st defendant’s FDSD, as containing the warped reasons for the conclusion of the FDP.
The learned counsel argued too that, the allegation that the claimant did not obtain approval for marriage was totally disproved and referred to paras 2-4 of ? and 2-4 of the AWSO both filed 24/6/209 [sic] and Exhibits C18A-C18B, C19 & C20. The erudite counsel argued too that, the assertion that, all the rents paid were paid by the claimant was unproved, as all the receipts [Exhibit C5] for payment were issued in the name of the husband. The learned counsel submitted that, the claimant was just an agent of a disclosed principal and, could not be liable, as long as she acted within the scope of the authority donated to her and cited Fairline Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd & Anor v. Trust Adjusters Nig. Ltd (2012) LPELR-20860 (CA), submitting that, the contract [Exhibit C4] clearly identified the claimant’s husband and the 2nd defendant as parties to the contract, which was why the 2nd defendant filed a suit against the husband. The learned counsel argued that, it was only after the failure of the suit [Exhibit C9] that the 2nd defendant petitioned against the claimant. Learned counsel also referred to Exhibits C6 & C7. On the basis of the foregoing, the learned counsel concluded that, there was no basis for the FDP’s finding that the claimant owed the 2nd defendant arrears of rent; and urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the claimant. Erudite counsel moved to issue 4.
Under issue 4, on the accusation that the 2nd defendant unjustly interfered with the claimant’s employment, the erudite claimant’s counsel argued that, the 2nd defendant is liable because, she ought to have foreseen the consequences of her petition against the claimant, which led to her demotion, more so when she knew the claimant was not her tenant and owed her no arrears of rent. Learned counsel cited Abusonmwan v. Mercantile Bank Ltd No. 2 (1987) LPELR-61 (SC). The erudite counsel argued that, the behaviour of the 2nd defendant was perverse, malicious and intentional. The erudite counsel referred to Exhibits C4, C6-C7, C9 & C16 and submitted that, malice on the part of the 2nd defendant was inferred from the fact that, she knew the court was the venue for her claim because, she went to the court after she had achieved her aim of interfering with the claimant’s employment for no just cause.
In further proof of the malice, the erudite counsel argued that, the 2nd defendant was inconsistent in the case he pursued, as at one hand, she pleaded that, the claimant and her husband were her joint tenants but changed course later to say, they were one and the same, and still yet under XX said that, only the claimant was her tenant. Erudite counsel referred to para 5 of the FDSD. Erudite counsel cited Patrick Goddy Ekwuno & Ors v. Bosah Ekwuno (2011) LPELR-9180 (CA) on the effect of serious contradictions in evidence and urged the Court to hold that, the 2nd defendant unjustly accused the claimant and caused the punishment she received from her employer. There ended arguments on issue 4. The learned counsel thereafter moved to issue 5.
Issue 5 raised the question of the claimant’s entitlement to damages, as a result of the injuries suffered by dint of the 2nd defendant conducts. The learned counsel referred to the equitable principle of ubi jus ibi remedium and submitted that, the injury having been established, the claimant must be compensated and cited Sharafa v. Stanbic IBTC Bank (2019) LPELR-47407 (CA). That ended arguments on issue 5. The learned counsel thereafter moved to issue 6.
Under issue 6, which questioned whether the 1st defendant is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the CC, the erudite claimant’s counsel argued that, CC, being separate independent action must be proved and, cited Jeric Nigeria Ltd v. UBN (2000) LPELR-1607 (SC) and for that reason, must have another set of pleadings and cited Ladunni & Anor v. Wema Bank Ltd & Anor (2010) LPELR-4418 (CA). The erudite counsel argued that, the 1st defendant merely stated the reliefs claimed in the CC and did nothing more, which renders the CC baseless. The learned counsel also argued that, the 1st defendant was seeking to enforce a contract in which it was not a party and cited Reichie v. Nigeria Bank for Commerce and Industry (2016) LPELR-40051 (SC) on privity of contract and submitted that, the CC is liable to be dismissed, as the 1st defendant is an interloper. The erudite counsel ended by urging the Court to resolve the issue in the claimant’s favour and ended the FWA by urging the Court to grant all the reliefs claimed by the claimant. I move to summary of the 1st defendant’s Reply on Points of Law [RPL] to the claimant’s FWA.
D: The 1st Defendant’s RPL
Erudite ESTINE OKOLO also franked the 1st defendant’s RPL. The learned counsel replied that, the cases cited by the claimant’s learned counsel in paras 31-33 of the claimant’s FWA were totally irrelevant, as they were cited off marks, as the issue was not that, the NIC lacked jurisdiction but that, the conditions precedent to its activation were not met. The learned counsel referred to Exhibit 15? to argue that, the FDP’s decision was communicated orally to the claimant before the letter she received on 7th February 2018 and submitted that, the claimant’s right of appeal was never foreclosed as argued. The learned counsel argued that, the procedure is that, the claimant applied for the record of the FDP before it is made available to her and that, the claimant never applied for it, as she had made up her mind not to challenge the decision.
The learned counsel argued that, there was no way the rules of fair hearing could be breached because; there was a lawyer in attendance to ensure compliance with due process. The learned counsel argued that, the use of the word defaulter is a paramilitary term and did not signify that the defaulter is guilty. The learned counsel replied to para 3.27 of the claimant’s FWA that, the proceedings of the FDP are documented verbatim. Thus, the summary of the RPL ends on the summary of all that I considered to be proper RPL. That being the end of summary of the FWAs, I proceed to my decision. But before then, I wish to state that, I have carefully imbibed the facts of the case at my fingertips. I have also carefully taken note of the authorities cited and consulted some of them to refresh my memory. I have also taken note of the demeanours of the witnesses. I state too that, I am aware that, I did not summarise the Written Statements on Oath [WSOs] of the witnesses simply because, I considered that unnecessary because, they were carbon copies of the pleadings, which I have earlier painstakingly summarised.
I also need to make some focal preliminary comments on some defects of general nature that I observed in the FWAs of the learned counsel to the parties and other issues. I observed that, the learned claimant’s counsel, in virtually all the authorities cited [case laws], did not put the exact pages and paras that contained the rationes decidendi he wished the Court to apply. That is laziness. It is after a court has found the exact rationes decidendi cited useful that, it proceeds to read the full reports to see the full context and not that, a court would begin to engage in a voyage of discovery to unearth the relevant portions of all the cases cited. I also observed the learned 1st defendant’s counsel was in the habit of citing statutes without pinning down the exact sections of the statutes that contained what he attributed to the statutes! For example, he cited the Marriage Act and did not tell the Court, which sections of the Marriage Act he had in mind. That is laziness too.
The third issue I wish to clear preliminarily is in relation to Exhibit C22. I observed at p. 15 of the Record of Proceedings that 17 documents were listed as admitted without objection and, which were accordingly ordered to be marked Exhibits C1-C17. But I observed that, no document was actually marked Exhibit C17 and that the document that was supposed to be marked Exhibit C17, was marked as Exhibit C22. This is the pre-action notice. So, there is no document marked Exhibit C17. The 4th issue is that relating to paras (h)&(i) of the reliefs sought by the claimant, the exact Naira amounts, which I left vacant. This is I did because; they were Tippexed and altered with different figures than originally typed therein. And being that there is no evidence led to show who did the alteration, I did not record them. On this note, I must warn counsel that, it is the highest negligence to Tippex or cancel amounts claimed at the point of filing and substitute them with other figures, instead of taking the pleadings back to correct the errors by properly typing them like the other parts of the pleadings.
The sums claimed are about the most important aspects of cases, which ought not to be left to speculations. Whether I will make further decision on this would depend on the fate of the case. I leave it at that now. Having made these preliminary remarks, I now proceed to give my decision, with cogent reasons to justify it.
COURT’S DECISION AND THE RATIONES DECIDENDI
The parties, through their learned counsel, formulated various issues for the Court’s determination. I found that they are prolix and that, they could be condensed into just three issues:
1. Is there a failure to comply with the conditions precedent to institute this action?
2. Has the 1st defendant jurisdiction to discipline the claimant on accusation of being indebted in Mesne Profit to the 2nd defendant?
3. Is the 1st defendant entitled to the relief claimed in the CC?
I will take the three issues seriatim. I begin with issue 1, which is threshold. This is the pertinent provision of para 4 of Schedule 3 of the Staff Manual at p. 52 thereof: “The decision of the Commission or the Corps Marshal and the Chief Executive on the appeal shall be final.” And S. 36(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that, a law enabling the making of administrative decisions that affect the rights of others in Nigeria must ensure it: “contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive.” Can these two provisions from the Staff Manual and the Constitution co-exist? I think the answer is no. In as much as the Constitution says no provision shall be made in any law that gives administrative authorities powers to make adverse decisions on persons that says, such decision is final and conclusive. I think the words ‘final’ and ‘conclusive’ in the phrase “final and conclusive” mean the same thing and that, the ‘conclusive’ is an emphasis on the initial ‘final’ and that, they mean that, such decisions must not have the toga of finality and conclusion on the matters. And there is no argument that, that is what happened in the present scenario. In view of the above, the provision is null and therefore, cannot create a condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court; and I so hold. I come to the other ground of the jurisdictional objection.
The prerogative of mercy in Schedule 4 at p. 53 of the Staff Manual referred to by the objector did not create a condition precedent to the exercise of rights to approach this Court, first, because, such argument is non sequitur with the provision of para 4 of Schedule 3 [supra], which says the decision of the Commission or the Corps Marshall is final on appeal to it by an officer aggrieved by the decision of the FDP. Schedule 4 did not mention FDP and as such, it is not a condition precedent to seeking redress against the decision of the FDP in courts of law. Besides, prerogative of mercy, as it naturally implies, even applies to compromising the civil decisions of courts in favour of the Corps and against its erring officers after judgments. It is a wider discretion without time limit, which the aggrieved staff can call upon the Corps to exercise in his/her favour at any time without time bar. That is why it has no time limitation. I therefore hold that, the Schedule 4 is not a condition precedent at all. In the event, the two grounds of the objection are dismissed. And in line with Makaowulu v. Ukwa West LGC (2018) LPELR-48807 (CA) 2021, D-E, the objection on pre-action notice is deemed waived, having being belatedly raised at the FWA stage. Issue 1 is therefore resolved against the 1st defendant and in favour of the claimant. I move to issue 2.
Issue 2: Has the 1st defendant jurisdiction to discipline the claimant on accusation of being indebted in Mesne Profit to the 2nd defendant? In resolving this issue, I have to determine first, if the claimant is truly indebted to the 2nd defendant. I am aware that, the learned claimant’s counsel has argued vociferously that, there is breach of fair hearing and failure to follow procedures in the trial of the claimant before the FDP. I know, this ought to be determined first, being threshold. However, as with all rules of law, there is an exception to this rule of law and, the exception is that, where there is admission, the needs for proof and for the observance of the rules of fair hearing and procedures are obviated – Dongtoe v. CSC, Plateau State (2001) LPELR–959 (SC) at 34–35, E–G:
"It is well settled that where there is an accusation of the commission of criminal offences, the burden of proof to be established by the accuser before a criminal tribunal established by law is that the commission of the offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that an administrative body cannot usurp the constitutional function of the courts by making a finding of guilt in such cases. However, where there is an admission of guilt, the question of establishing the legal burden of proof no longer arises, and no burden of proof rests on the accuser, the burden of proof having been discharged by the admission of the accused.”
In Obo v. Commissioner of Education Bendel State & Anor (2001) LPELR-2187 (SC), the plaintiff/appellant was dismissed because, he overstayed his study leave without approval and also fraudulently converted the salaries paid to his account, even though, he was on study leave without pay, and the trial court and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, which he challenged on grounds of non-compliance with the rules of fair hearing and non-compliance with the procedure for termination in the Civil Service Rules, just like in the instant case. The Supreme Court held:
“…I must say that there was no dispute that the plaintiff had grossly overstayed his study leave without pay. He himself had admitted that fact in his letter Exhibit 43. What is admitted needs not be proved (S. 134 of the Evidence Act). So failure by the 2nd defendant to have given the plaintiff a query cannot be fatal in his case.’ I agree with what the two lower courts respectively said above.” – Per Idris Legho Kutigi JSC, 8-9, F-A.
It is pertinent that, Obo’s case and Dongtoe’s case, deals squarely with statutory employment in the civil service; alleged infractions of S. 36 of the Constitution [fair hearing] and, non-compliance with the civil service rules, just like the case being made herein by the claimant. So, the facts are on all fours with this case. I make allowance for the fact that; this case does not involve allegations of crime, but allegations of purely civil misconduct. But this makes the authorities more forcibly applicable. If they could create exceptions to discipline on allegations of crimes without formal trials in courts of law, which require proofs beyond reasonable doubt, it would be illogical for anyone to argue that, they are not more applicable to pure allegations of civil misconducts, which require lesser burden of proof. The core of the ratio decidendi is that, where there is admission, the need for proof, during which the rules of fair hearing, natural justice and procedural rules become applicable, takes the back seat. This is because; the reason for all these safeguards is, to secure fair trial or fair procedure of unraveling the truth. Once there is admission, trial becomes obviated, and so, all the rules fashioned for the purpose of fair trail.
In Arinze v. FBN (2004) LPELR-551 (SC), the Supreme Court upped the breadth by holding that, where there is incontrovertible evidence against an employee, the employer can dismiss, even though, the allegations border on crimes, without waiting for formal trial in the courts of law. Though, admittedly, the case was situated in common law employment relations and not in employment clothed with statutory flavours, like this case. But the principle is nonetheless applicable across bar and more particularly, in purely civil misconducts that demand less burden of proof.
In any event, I cannot even see where the issues of unfairness or breach of procedures were involved. Merely removing the word “alleged” from the phrase “alleged defaulter” in the proceedings of the FDP and, even before the proceedings, was of no moment. This is trial before an administrative tribunal and not, before a court of law. So, the FDP is not strictly bound by the provisions of S. 36(1) of the Constitution on fair hearing. Rather, the provisions of S. 36 (2)(a) of the Constitution, which says, it is good enough if the administrative authority allows the person to be affected to state his own side of the story before the decision affecting his interests is made, bind it. It is clear the claimant was present at the proceedings of the FDP, especially when the 2nd defendant gave evidence against her and exercised her right to cross-examine on what she felt was the relevant facts of her theory of the case [defence]. S. 36(1) of the Constitution is strictly applicable only to courts of law created directly under the Constitution and not to administrative tribunals like the Civil Service Commission, the FDP, etc. It is S. 36(2)(a) of the Constitution that anchored the loose rules of natural justice, which the FDP is bound to comply with and which it actually substantially complied with in the claimant’s trial.
It is not important that a lawyer did not represent the claimant since she did not insist on getting one. She could not even have so insisted on the date of the trial if notice of the trial had long been served on her and she did not bring along a counsel. The important thing was that, she was heard before a decision was taken against her and, it is not therefore correct, to say, she was presumed guilty before she was heard. And she could not legally complain against the lawyer brought to the FDP to assist in its deliberations. Her duty in the FDP is to react to the allegations against her by telling her own side of the story and by cross-examining the other side to discredit her: no more, no less. Whether she took effective advantage of the opportunity is another matter, which is entirely her headache alone and not that of the administrative tribunal – Bassey v. CSC Cross River State & Ors (2010) LPELR-3858 (CA) 10-11, F-C. That settles the issues of breach of fair hearing and non-compliance with procedures. None was established, and the objections are hereby dismissed.
It is now left for me to check if there was admission of debt in the instant case. But before then, let me clear a pertinent preliminary issue precedent to the issue of whether the claimant admitted the debt in this instance. That is the question of whether the claimant was an agent of a disclosed principal, and for that reason, not liable for the debt of her principal. That is the main theory of the claimant’s case, as propounded by her erudite counsel. I cite the Supreme Court in B.B. Apugo & Sons Limited v. Orthopaedic Hospital Management Board (2016) LPELR-40598 (SC):
“The law is that an agent of a disclosed principal is ordinarily not personally liable on a contract he enters into on behalf of the said principal… This court further expatiated on the relationship between an agent and his principal and their respective liabilities in the case of Asafa Foods Factory Vs Alraine (Nig.) Ltd. (supra) at 373 E – H as follows: ‘It has been held that the fact that a person is an agent and is known to be so does not therefore of itself necessarily prevent his incurring personal liability. Whether he does so is to be determined by the nature and terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances. Where he contracts on behalf of a foreign principal there is a presumption that he is incurring personal liability, unless a contrary intention appears… It is not the law that if a principal is liable, his agent cannot be. The true principle of the law is that a person is liable for his engagements (as for his torts) even though he is acting for another unless he can show that by the law of agency he is to be held to have expressly or impliedly negative his personal liability.” – [P. 50-51, B-D].
“In cases of agency where the agent contracts on behalf of a foreign principal, the agent is liable for his engagements (as for his torts) even though he is acting for another, unless he can show that by the law of agency he is to be held to have expressly or impliedly negatived his personal liability...” – [P. 91, B-D].
“It is unconscionable for a party who having taken benefit under the contract to seek to avoid its obligations under the contract on the ground that the contract is void unless ex facie the contract is illegal where the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio will apply…” – [P. 91, D-E].
The cause of action is very clear. It is that, the claimant entered into tenancy with the 2nd defendant and owed N400Thousand therefrom, which she refused to pay and that, consequently the 2nd defendant petitioned the claimant’s office to help her recover the debt and, the claimant resisted it that, she had no tenancy contract with the 2nd defendant but rather, it was her husband that entered into tenancy relationship with the 2nd defendant, on behalf of whom she merely acted as agent and therefore, not bound by the contract – paras 24-27 of the SF but the 1st defendant, her employer, nonetheless found her liable and punished her, by reduction in rank and ordered the debt deducted from her salary – Exhibits C15 & XXD1A, thus, this action. The defendants joined issues separately on these, in the separate SDs that the claimant was personally liable for the contract and rightly and lawfully punished by her employer for the misconduct in failing to pay the debt.
There is admission of the claimant that, she executed the contract on behalf of her husband who was abroad – Paras 13 of the SF and 13 of the claimant’s RWSO deposed 22/06/2021. There is evidence too, that the claimant lived in the house throughout the duration till she packed out [P. 10 Exhibit XXD1A]. There is evidence also that, the claimant was the one who initiated and negotiated the tenancy with the 2nd defendant and not the alleged husband – P. 4 of the RDP’s Report [Exhibit XXD1A] and P. 2 of Exhibit C9. There is evidence at the trial in the Magistrate’s Court that, the alleged husband could not be served the court’s processes and that, services were effected through pasting on the gate of the apartment in issue – P. 4 of Exhibit C9. There is no evidence that the 2nd defendant ever had any dealings with the alleged husband or ever met with him. There is evidence that, the claimant is the one who tendered the receipts of all the payments made in respect of the tenancy. How could she have access to the receipts while the alleged real defendant was not available? This singularly proved one thing that, the claimant was the tenant and not the alleged husband. When all the surrounding circumstances are viewed dispassionately, the only logical and irresistible conclusion to reach is that, the claimant was the tenant and not the alleged husband. The claimant was just trying to play smart and make the law an ass.
To hold otherwise is to allow the claimant to use the law as an ass to evade the fact of her tenancy with the 2nd defendant and to blindfold the Court into putting a toga of legality on circumstances, which have the potentialities of unfairness and fraud. Equity would not permit these – Enekwe v. International Merchant Bank of Nigeria Limited & Ors (2006) LPELR-1140 (SC) 37, A-C and Chieke v. Olusoga & Anor (1997) LPELR-845 (SC) 16-17, D. It is also pertinent to note that, the claimant’s alleged husband never appeared throughout in the Magistrate’s Court or at any material point during the currency of the tenancy. It was the claimant who defended the suit at the Magistrate’s Court [note that, the suit was eventually struck out and therefore, the legal implication of still being extant]. The alleged husband never did anything with respect to the contract. He did not initiate it, he did not execute it and, was not in the picture at any material point, except as habitually feigned by the claimant.
The 2nd defendant clearly stated how the claimant came into contact with her and, how the claimant alone physically initiated and negotiated the contract with her. It is also interesting to note that, the witness to the claimant at the execution of the contract, was her brother. It is clear that, the privity is between the claimant and the 2nd defendant and not the unknown third party called the husband. Any other contrary conclusion would inure in assisting the claimant to perfect her chicanery over the 2nd defendant. I therefore emphatically hold that, the claimant was, at best, an agent of an undisclosed principal or, an agent to a principal that lived abroad and thus, a foreign principal, and at worst, the 2nd defendant’s contracting party. I so find and, consequently hold that, the claimant is, therefore personally liable for the incidences of the tenancy. I found, from the scenario above that, the claimant dishonestly employed the loopholes in the law of agency to attempt to evade her obligations in the contract and thereby, to defraud the 2nd defendant by claiming agent of disclosed principal, where none actually existed.
The 2nd defendant gave evidence of how she met with the claimant, through her former employer, the FBN, with which she had dropped information that, she had an apartment to rent out and that, the staff should introduce to her potential responsible tenants for the apartment and that, through this means, she got in touch with the claimant, who personally negotiated the tenancy with her and that, at the point of execution of the tenancy contract, the claimant said her husband was abroad – P. 2 of Exhibit C9 [Magistrate’s Court’s Judgment] where the 2nd defendant stated that: “the wife of the defendant negotiated the tenancy…” and that the tenancy agreement was “signed by the defendant’s wife…” The above was corroborated at p. 4 of FDP’s Report [Exhibit XXD1A]:
“I worked with First bank and retired in the year 2000. I went to our office to ask them to assist me in finding a good tenant. The person who introduced me to her was Carol Iloani. On that day, I came to the bank and met Mrs. Cynthia and told her to follow me to the house. We told her terms and told her about Lawyers and tenancy fee. She refused to pay the Tenancy fee and paid only N30,000 for Lawyer and Tenancy fee and she paid the rent twice that was how she packed in. She also refused to pay N6000 for PHCN card.”
The chicanery is made plain from the very beginning. I leave it at that and, move to consider the real question: whether the claimant admitted indebtedness to the 2nd defendant?
The claimant tendered the receipts issued for the payments made so far with regard to the tenancy [Exhibit C5]. They are five in number, with the last issued 03/07/2015 and stated to be for the rent period of 01/06/2015-31/05/2016. The claimant pleaded in para 23 of the SF that, on her advice, her husband vacated and delivered up possession of the apartment in June 2017. How he delivered up the possession was not pleaded. But it is significant to note that, that was a period of 12 months and above. It is therefore clear that, there is an implied admission of the arrear of rent yet unpaid. The 2nd defendant pleaded in para 5 of the SDSD that, the claimant owed her N633,330.27 and that, they packed out in December 2017, contrary to June 2017 admitted by the claimant. In the Reply, the claimant did not deny the sum owed but only said she did not have any contract with the 2nd defendant and that, it was her husband that had tenancy with the 2nd defendant. Having found, as I did above that, the claimant had tenancy agreement with the 2nd defendant, it follows that; the claimant was, at least indebted to the June 2017 she pleaded.
In support of the above, I quote the claimant’s testimony in Exhibit C9 [Magistrate’s Court’s Judgment] at p. 5, para 2, in which her evidence was that:
“…she pays annually and has been regular with her payment except when her husband had a problem in 2014 and she had tried as a civil servant to meet up on her own. She stated that as at the time the quit notice was caused on them, she was not owing any rent and that she is still willing now to pay her rent if the court permits her as she had approached her landlady with it but she refused to collect it and insisted she no longer wanted them in the house.”
This clearly showed that, the claimant was the one paying the rent physically and that, owed debt on the apartment, as deduced above. She gave the evidence in issue on 9/2/2017 and the judgment was delivered on 30th March 2017, while she admitted packing out June 2017. This shows clearly that, as the time she allegedly packed out, the rent for the period 01/06/2016-31/05/2017 was overdue and had not been paid. What is admitted needs no further proof. There is therefore incontrovertible evidence of her owing the 2nd defendant the debt for the period admitted, therefore, there is no need for proof, which would warrant issues of breach of fair hearing and non-compliance with any rigid procedures – Arinze v. FBN [supra]. At p. 1 of Exhibit XXD1A [FDP’s Report], the claimant was asked if she knew the 2nd defendant and she answered in the affirmative. She was asked what their relationship was, she said: “She is my husband’s landlady if she is the one.”
At p. 6 of the same FDP’s Report, she was asked to cross-examine the 2nd defendant, she initially said she had no question for her because, all she said was not about her but immediately recounted and asked the 2nd defendant: “Madam you said you sued us to court, who are us?” and the 2nd defendant answered: “The man you claimed to be your husband.” The claimant further asked the 2nd defendant, who her husband was and, the 2nd defendant answered: “Chukwuma Odimma, I don’t know him that is the name you gave me as your husband.”
Thereafter, the claimant refused to participate further, by insisting that, she had no case with anybody. The 2nd defendant had earlier testified before the FDP at p. 5 that, at the day of the proceedings, if the claimant packed out of her apartment, the claimant would be owing her N534,000. With the refusal of the claimant to participate in the proceedings, basing her defence on the supposedly iron-cast grounds that, it was her husband that had tenancy with the 2nd defendant and the second ground of errors in the spelling of her name in the letter of invitation to the FDP, it is clear that, the claimant admitted the indebtedness. It is pertinent to note that, on further proceedings of the FDP on p. 10 of the FDP’s Report, the claimant completed the proceedings of the day, by insisting she had no case with anybody but stated the address of where she lived and that; she was still living in the address at that moment. That was October 20, 2017, which was the first date of the FDP’s proceedings.
Later, the FDP adjourned to 24th October 2017 and on this date, sat as adjourned. The claimant testified on this date that, she had no witness and confirmed her residence as the previous address she gave and that; the 2nd defendant was her landlady. The FDP was therefore not wrong in its findings and recommendations that the claimant had tenancy with the 2nd defendant and owed her Mesne Profit and that, the claimant be reduced in rank while the debt be recouped from her salaries upfront. The FDP’s findings and recommendations were therefore not perverse. They were backed up by concrete and cogent evidence and were very logical consequences of the claimant’s misconducts.
I am aware that the erudite claimant’s counsel had attacked the FDP’s Report that, it did not contain the true reflections of what transpired there. But, apart from citing it as evidence to support the fact that, the claimant was constantly and continually referred to as ‘defaulter’ and that, this grounded bias, which shows inconsistency in the attack against the correctness of the record, as you cannot take the portion of a document favourable to you and reject the unfavourable part without cogent reasons, the claimant did not give her own version of the exact thing that transpired in the FDP and how and where, it materially differed from what is contained in the FDP’s Report as tendered Chief of Army Staff & Anor v. Ali Isah (2017) LPELR-41979 (CA) 18-20, F-D. She who alleges discrepancy, alteration or falsification of a record, owes the Court a duty to state her own version of the correct record and show how and where it differed from the official record. Where this is not done, the court presumes the official record as correct and authentic because of the presumption of correctness of official records – Chief of Army Staff & Anor v. Ali Isah [supra] and Oyedele v. Odumosu (2016) LPELR-41441 (CA) 29-30, C-A.
The claimant’s learned counsel has argued too that, the functions of the courts were usurped by the findings of the FDP that the claimant owed a lawful debt. That is not correct. Like I indicated earlier, where there is admission, the need for proof in court no longer arises. And besides, the offence in issue is a misconduct covered by the terms and conditions of service, which clearly provides in S. 16(b) of the RSCEA that:
“Any member of the Corps who:
(a) …
(b) Fails to pay a lawful debt, shall be guilty of gross misconduct and liable to reduction in rank and the debt recovered from his salary.”
This provision is very clear in its intendment and the intendment is that, it is part and parcel of the terms and conditions of service to protect the image of the Corps against being battered in the public view. Schedules 1 & 2 of the RSCEA give the FDP and some of its officers the powers to try and award punishments for the offences created. These do not interfere with the powers of courts to try these same causes and matters, since the courts still retain their jurisdictions to judicially review the decisions of these bodies in line with S. 36(2)(b) of the Constitution. The misconduct in issue is not criminal in nature and so, falls into the body of issues, which administrative bodies can investigate and render a decision on, subject to the powers of the courts to review the decisions, which is what this suit filed by the claimant calls upon me to do. In line with the powers of the courts to review administrative civil decisions, I have carefully reviewed the FDP’s civil decision, as earlier explained above, and found no fault with it.
Let me state that, throughout the various stages of the tenancy saga, the claimant had demonstrated an unusual contumacy and, an attempt to gain by fraudulent means. She tricked the 2nd defendant into executing the tenancy in the name of her purported husband and, while she and her siblings enjoyed the tenancy till they packed out, she was not ready to pay the holding over rent [Mesne Profit] on the premises, taking refuge under the canopy of an husband, she admitted variously, was abroad and, had finally vamoosed – Paras. 12, 13 & 54 of the SF and para 13 of the claimant’s RWSO deposed 22/06/2021. The claimant had testified at the Magistrate’s Court [P. 5 of Exhibit C9] that, she was ready to pay the rent but the landlady refused to collect it: why did she not pay the money she boasted she had, when eventually she packed out or they packed out, and even up till now, she did not explain. This very evidence destroyed the claimant’s insistence that, her alleged husband only, was the party to the contract, and by implication, ought to pay the bills.
It proved three things: 1. The claimant admitted being a party to the contract and knew that, she owed a debt arising from the tenancy. 2. The claimant had the full rent of N400,000 for the rent year 01/06/2016-31/05/2017 with her. 3. If her alleged husband was truly the one to pay, he had given her the full money and, since the rent is still being owed now, it is the claimant that now owed it and, no longer the alleged husband. So, in whatever way one looks at it, the claimant is responsible for the debt. Why did she not pay it when the money she claimed to have and was ready to pay but for the landlady’s refusal to collect, when this same landlady reported her to her office for owing her this same debt, before her contumacy made the issue to be transferred to the headquarters? Why did she not tender the money to the FDP but instead, continued in her insolvency, even though, she was still living at the apartment up to that point? It means she has reputation problem.
These conducts are unbecoming of a gentlewoman and civilized lady of the Corps, a paramilitary organisation and, ordinarily makes the claimant liable to outright termination by virtue of S. 33 of the RSCEA, which says: “Any member of the Corps who behaves in a manner unbecoming of the character of a gentleman Officer shall have his appointment terminated.” The contumacy with which she treated the FDP is even alone enough to have her reduced in rank outright for gross rudeness and insubordination – SS. 28(b) & 42(1)(a)-(d) of the RSCEA. She persistently refused to answer questions and picked issues with flimsy things like the mere misspelling of her name. The claimant’s conducts in issue also amount to incivility to a member of the public, contrary to S. 20(a) of the RSCEA, which also attracts demotion.
I must state that, the section under which the claimant was charged [S. 16(b)] must be understood in the context of the whole RSCEA and not in isolation, as the practice is that, the provisions of a statute are construed in the context of the entire statute to get to the true intendment of the statute. The provisions of S. 16(b) of the RSCEA must be construed in the lights of SS. 3 [Definition of Scandalous Behaviour], 20(a) & 33 of the RSCEA, to have the full import of the misconduct with which the claimant was charged brought to mind. That is why the 1st defendant pleaded in para 12 of the FDSD that, the claimant’s conducts under review: “thereby dented the corporate image of the Corps.” It shows clearly that, the claimant’s behaviour was regarded as scandalous and uncivil to members of the public.
At the international scene, I found the following source from [Australian Fair Work Commission] useful on “out of hours conducts” of employees that might warrant disciplinary measures against such employees:
“It is only in exceptional circumstances that an employer has a right to extend any supervision over the private activities of employees.
The out of hours conduct must have a relevant connection to the employment relationship…
· The conduct must be such that, viewed objectively, it is likely to cause serious damage to the relationship between the employee and employer; or
· The conduct damages the employer’s interests; or
· The conduct is incompatible with the employee’s duty as an employee.’
In cases involving out of hours conduct, it is not sufficient for the employer to simply assert that the conduct will in some way affect the employer’s reputation or compromise the employee’s capacity to perform his duties, there needs to be evidentiary material upon which a firm finding may be made.”
In the same literature, the following example of a life case was given of what an employer might justifiably classified as unacceptable out-of-hours behaviour that would justify dismissal:
“The employee engaged in sexual intercourse in a hotel room in front of colleagues. Her colleagues complained about her behaviour to the employer. After a number of interviews, the employee conceded that such activity did take place. The Full Bench found on appeal, in a majority decision, that the employee’s dishonesty throughout the investigation amounted to a valid reason for her dismissal.”
You can see that, the justification for the dismissal was not actually based on the culpability for the offence charged but for the employee’s subsequent misconduct at the trial. It is also clear that, private transactions or conducts of employees could be a reason for disciplinary actions against employees, provided the thresholds are met. And when such private conducts are adjudged as matters for disciplinary issues in employment relations, they become part of the incidences of employment relations. I have a sacred constitutional duty, placed on my shoulders [SS. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution and 13-19 of the NICA], as a question of law [legal obligation], distinct from question of fact, to eschew unfair labour practices and to, at the same time, make the application of international best practices in labour relations the centerpiece of the national labour practices in Nigeria in order to bring Nigeria at par with international best practices, such that, Nigeria will become a hub for local and international investments by reason of its best practices in labour relations.
I have performed this duty by searching for and citing at least, one international best practice in the area of out-of-hours discipline of employees. From the foregoing, it is clear that, there is nothing unusual in the provisions of S. 16(b) of the RSCEA. It is also abundantly clear from the facts of this case that, the claimant’s behaviour scandalized the Corps, both in its corporate image and the image of the individual members of the Corps, whose opportunities to rent houses from the general public have been negatively impacted by the claimant’s gross misconducts. This Court therefore has the sacred constitutional duty to righten the battered images of the Corps and the staffers by restoring confidence on them by sanctioning adequate and appropriate measures.
From the scenario of the case as painted above, whereby the claimant had spent countless number of office hours attending to a frivolous case and also wasting the precious time of her employer, in intervening in the matter twice at the immediate local office level of the claimant, then, at the zonal office level and, finally, in having to set up a panel [the FDP] to investigate this same issue, which had gone to the Multi-Door Courthouse without solution, to the Magistrate’s Court without solution, and the FDP, the highest disciplinary organ of the Corps, yet without solution, all due to the unusual contumacy of the claimant, and now in this Court. It cannot therefore be argued that, these have not impacted seriously on the claimant’s ability to perform her duty to her employer. It cannot also be argued with a scintilla of reasonable conviction that, serious question of dishonesty is not involved in the case, verging on attempt to defraud.
The public image of Corps [the 1st defendant] has clearly been negatively impacted by the claimant’s misconducts in issue. The public image of the individual members of the Corps has also been negatively impacted and their breadth of opportunities to access private accommodations in the public negatively impacted too, as the claimant’s misconducts have the tendency to make the public lose confidence in renting houses to the Corps. I am therefore of the considered view that, the conducts of the claimant herein ticked all the elements of a proper instance where an employer could justifiably discipline an employee for her private misconducts for having negative impacts on the employer and the staffers.
It should be noted that, this is a statutory employment, where the Corps, as a paramilitary public institution, has primary responsibility to the public, as distinct from a private company or outfit, with primary responsibility to the private owners. Therefore, the need for good public perception is heightened and so the need on the individual staffer’s upholding higher probity. It should also be noted that, the misconduct in issue, was directly forbidden in a statute and directly made part and parcel of the claimant’s conditions of service; and as such, it is not ordinary contractual term and condition of employment but a statutory mandatory term. It therefore forms part of the fundamental integral terms of the contract executed between the claimant and the 1st defendant, her employer, and the claimant is accordingly bound by it. I hold firmly therefore that, the claimant was damnable and accordingly so punished by the FDP. She has no basis absolutely to complain that she was demoted with her serious insolence and unabashed and unconscionable dishonesty repeatedly exhibited. She pushed her luck to the extreme by approaching this Court to reverse a decision, which this Court considers too mild.
Before I round up on issue 2, which is the crux of the merit of the case, let me make few further germane remarks. All the contradictions the learned claimant’s counsel talked about with respect to the 2nd defendant’s evidence are totally irrelevant to the substantive facts of the case, which are all admitted by the claimant. Besides, what the learned claimant’s counsel regarded as contradictions, were not actually contradictions, but induced by the confusion arising from the claimant’s near-perfect chicanery, which made the exact nature of the contract difficult for a layman, like the 2nd defendant, to deduce. Rather, it was the claimant who was blowing hot and cold at the same time while trying to constantly perfect her crafty and beguiling chicanery.
Anyway, the law is that, while a defendant can plead and canvass at trial, inconsistent defences, once they are not mutually exclusive, the case of the claimant must be consistent throughout, from inception to completion – Egbe v. Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 14, C-F and MV “Western Star” & Ors v. B.L. Lizard Shipping Company Ltd (2013) JELR 35578 (CA). This is also applicable to the contradictions alleged with respect to the evidence of the 1st defendant. They are immaterial to the facts of the case. For example, the issue of whether the claimant was married is totally irrelevant to the main facts of the case, which is the reason I did not decide the issue. It is rather the claimant who made material contradictory presentation in her case. From this, it is seen that, the claimant is not a witness of truth. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, the claimant is personally liable for the contract in issue. In view of the above, I resolve issue 2 in favour of the defendants and against the claimant. The FDP’s trial, its report together with the findings and recommendations are therefore valid and the, consequential Exhibit C15, which confirmed the findings and recommendation is also valid. In the end, the 2nd defendant was right to report the claimant to her employer. S. 16(b) of the RSCEA is not self-executing. Someone must therefore bring its infringement to the notice of the Corps.
I therefore move to issue 3, which is on the CC.
Issue 3: Is the 1st defendant entitled to the relief claimed in the CC? At p. 11 of the FDP, the FDP, amongst others, made the following finding, which is apposite to this issue: “4. The defaulter did not deny that she is owing her landlady and has failed to pay a lawful debt of N543Thousand as at 20th October, 2017.” Further in its recommendations, the FDP says:
“From the evidence before the panel and the findings above, the defaulter violated regulation 16(b) of the FRSC Regulations on Discipline, 2013 as amended; [sic] Any member of the Corps who fails to pay a lawful debt shall be guilty of gross misconduct and liable to reduction in rank and the debt recovered from his salary.
The panel therefore recommends reduction in rank and the debt recovered from the defaulter’s salary.
The defaulter was matched in. The findings and recommendation was read to her.”
From the foregoing, it could be seen that, the relief claimed in the CC is nothing other than that, the Court should confirm the FDP’s decision, as reproduced above. That is, in a nutshell, the Court should affirm the FDP’s decision that; the claimant pays the lawful debt. I have earlier shown clearly, that, the misconduct of failure to pay lawful debt is within the compass of the conditions of the employment relations the claimant had with her employer. And this is not just a provision of subsidiary legislation but that, of an Act of the NASS. It therefore ranks higher in hierarchy than the state law that created the Magistrate’s Court, as recovery of premises tribunal or rent tribunal. While it might not be that, by this fact that, the Corps is constituted as debt recovery agent against its staff, from the context of the provisions of S. 16(b) of the RSCEA, as explained earlier with the aid of the international example cited, it is clear that, the debt in view is such debts that might dent the image of the Corps in the public eye, especially such that might have direct negative impacts on the relationship of the members of the Corps with the general public on access to rentage of accommodation from the public.
There is no doubt in my mind that, the claimant’s conducts herein are such that would not, only jeopardize the public perception of the Corps as a whole or as a corporate institution, but that would significantly negatively impact the readiness of the public to rent out accommodations to members of the Corps. It comes to be that, not only the abstract image of the Corps would suffer but the individual members of the Corps, who would be treated as pariahs with nobody ready to rent houses to them. The Court in its duty under S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution, to uproot the unfair labour practices imbedded in the conducts of the claimant, which tend to give her employer bad reputation with the public and with the tendency of negatively affecting the image of the individual members of the Corps, as responsible government paramilitary officials that could get accommodations rented from the general public and, with the unusual contumacy and dishonesty exhibited by the claimant at the FDP and throughout this disgraceful saga, has a duty to remedy these misconducts in employment relations and therefore holds that, the claimant was rightly found liable and accordingly punished for her misconducts.
It is the duty of this Court thereto to put an end to such irresponsible behaviours that have direct negative impacts on the image of the Corps and the ability of the staff to rent private accommodations from the public. The power of the 1st defendant to deduct the debt upfront from the staff-debtor’s salary, in such clear and incontrovertible circumstances, is sacrosanct in order to re-kindle public confidence in the Corps and thereby secure the negatively affected right of the staff to get accommodations from the public.
And by dint of S. 13-19 of the NICA, especially SS. 14 & 19, this Court has the jurisdiction to make any order justified by the facts of cases before it, which power has been confirmed in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Adegboyu v. UBA. In arriving at its decision and making its orders, this Court takes into consideration the socio-economic implications of its decisions and the impacts on the general public and the society as a whole. In these, issues of objective reasonableness and fairness are paramount. This much is revealed in S. 10(3)(a)&(b) of the Trinidad and Tobago’s Labour Relations Act, when it says, the Trinidad and Tobago’s labour court must take into consideration what: “it considers fair and just, having regard to the interest of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole…” and “act in accordance with equity, good conscience and substantial merit of the case before it, having regard to the principles and practices of good industrial relations.” It was stating the obvious international best practices in labour courts around the world.
The power of the South African labour court to grant any relief, even though, not claimed, so far it is supported by the facts of the case, in aid of substantial justice, is imbued, pursuant to S. 23(1) of the South African Constitution – “Everyone has the right to fair labour practices” –, which is impari materia with S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Nigerian Constitution – and, complemented by S. 158 of the South African LRA, which provides that:
“(1) The Labour Court may –
(a) make any appropriate order, including
(i) the grant of urgent relief;
(ii) an interdict;
(iii) an order directing the performance of any particular act which order, when implemented, will remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of this Act;
(iv) a declaratory order;
(v) an award of compensation in any circumstances contemplated in this Act;
(vi) an award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act…”
In line with the above international best practices, as encapsulated by SS. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution, 13-19 of the NICA and 16(b) of the RSCEA, the justice of this case supports the grant of the relief framed as CC which, in actual fact, is a prayer to uphold the decision of the FDP, which I found no reason to disturb, as I have explained earlier on above. In the end, I resolve issue 3 against the claimant and in favour of the 1st and 2nd defendants. I accordingly order:
1. Per chance the debt had not been deducted upfront from the claimant’s salaries before now, the 1st defendant to deduct the sum of N534Thousand [Five Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand Naira] debt owed the 2nd defendant from the claimant’s salaries upfront each month spread over a period of 18 [eighteen] months, payable into an account to be provided by the 2nd defendant to the 1st defendant.
2. I also order cost of N50Thousand Naira [Fifty Thousand Naira] against the claimant and in favour of the 1st defendant.
3. I equally order cost of N100Thousand Naira [One Hundred Thousand Naira] against the claimant and in favour of the 2nd defendant.
Having treated all germane issues, the case must come to an end.
CONCLUSION
Having decided issues 2 & 3 against the claimant and in favour of the defendants, the case of the claimant therefore lacks merits and is accordingly liable to be dismissed, save the reliefs granted abovein against the claimant and, in the defendants’ favour, as stated abovein. The suit is accordingly dismissed as explained.
Judgment in this case is accordingly entered today, being Tuesday, the 28th day of November, in the year 2023, under my hand, as the presiding judge.
……………………………
HON. JUSTICE Oluwakayode Ojo AROWOSEGBE
Presiding JUDGE
ENUGU DIVISION
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
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